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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic theory has changed dramatically during the last couple of
decades. While the traditional ad-hoc1 IS-LM2 and AD-AS3 frameworks con-
tinue to dominate almost every undergraduate textbook4, they have virtually
disappeared from the recent issues of all major peer-reviewed journals. The Lu-
cas (1976) and Sims (1980) Critiques, the rational expectations revolution and
the real business cycle literature have altered the way modern macroeconomic
theory is performed, although nowadays none of these theories is considered
to be the state of the art. Instead, a new consensus in macroeconomics has
emerged, namely the New Keynesian (or New Neoclassical Synthesis) liter-
ature. It combines features from traditional macroeconomics and the afore-
mentioned more recent streams. Due to these rapid developments Blanchard
(2000, p. 1375) hypothesizes that "progress in macroeconomics may well be
the success story of twentieth century economics."
The new modern macroeconomic mainstream di¤ers in two important ways
from more traditional approaches:
(i) Microfoundations from rst microeconomic principles instead of ad hoc
structural equations, which were defended on grounds of their empirical suit-
ability. As inheritance from the famous Lucas (1976) Critique5, microeconomic
optimization and macroeconomic implications have been connected. As a con-
sequence, modern macroeconomic researchers are able to do a welfare analyses
of di¤erent policy proposals.
(ii) Dynamic (stochastic) general equilibrium (DSGE) modeling under ra-
tional expectations instead of a comparative static analysis, which was fre-
quently performed in partial equilibrium frameworks. The DSGE toolkit was
the inheritance from the Real Business Cycle (RBC) literature. As a con-
sequence, the interaction between di¤erent markets and dynamic adjustment
paths has been made visible, thus providing a more complete picture of the
1In what follows a framework will be titulated to be "ad hoc" if the macroeconomic re-
lationships are postulated without deriving them from agentsmicroeconomic optimization.
2The IS curve stands for the goods market equilibrium (investment - savings) and the LM
curve stands for the money market equilibrium (liquidity demand - money supply) under
xed prices.
3Representing aggregate demand and aggregate supply.
4See, for example, Blanchard (2005), Mankiw (2005), Neumann (1996) or Wohltmann
(2005).
5See chapter 2 for details.
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economy, for example, with respect to the speed of adjustment and the asso-
ciated costs of di¤erent policies.
The New Keynesian literature originated with works by Blanchard and Kiy-
otaki (1987), Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1980), among others, who introduced
several market frictions into the RBC framework (e.g., monopolistic competi-
tion, menu costs, staggered prices and wages). This dissertation hypothesizes
that these frictions do not go far enough yet. They do not give su¢ cient atten-
tion to (i) the interaction among di¤erent types of nominal frictions and po-
tential complementarities, (ii) the role of labor turnover costs, wage bargaining
and other labor market frictions in determining macroeconomic performance
and (iii) policy implications of these frictions. This dissertation sheds lights
on all of these issues. It models several frictions and derives the implications
thereof, namely the interaction of nominal price and wage rigidities, a real wage
rigidity, hiring and ring costs and wage bargaining. Two chapters rather t
into the New Keynesian monetary economics literature (analyzing the e¤ects of
monetary policy), while three are closer to the macro-labor literature (analyz-
ing the e¤ects of di¤erent labor market policies).6 In chapters 3 to 7 di¤erent
dynamic macroeconomic models are derived from agents prot and utility
maximization7 (micro-foundation) who take the existing market frictions into
account. The models are calibrated numerically and the macroeconomic e¤ects
of di¤erent policies are derived.
The book is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews recent developments
in macroeconomic and labor theory. It shortly surveys the path of modern
macroeconomics from the IS-LM model to the New Neoclassical Synthesis and
points out well-known weaknesses and potential solutions, thus introducing
chapters 3 and 4. Furthermore, chapter 2 provides a short overview of the
state of the art in the macro-labor theory and potential weaknesses, serving as
a door opener for chapters 5 to 7.
Chapter 3 analyzes complementarities between price and wage staggering in
the well-known Calvo (1983) framework. These complementarities were so far
ignored by the New Keynesian literature. Furthermore, it questions the general
view that wage staggering generates more persistence than price staggering,
6The distinction between labor and monetary economics may not be relevant any more
when these lines come to the eyes of the reader. Recently, these two streams of literature
have converged very quickly. See, for example, Christo¤el and Linzert (2005), Krause and
Lubik (2007) or Trigari (2004).
7In all chapters it is assumed that agents follow the rational expectations hypothesis.
Thus, it is not possible for policy makers to cheat the economic agents, for example, through
money illusion.
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by dening a new persistence measure. Chapter 4 analyzes the e¤ects of a real
wage rigidity on disinations and challenges the view that a real wage rigidity
is necessary to obtain a realistic disinationary output slump.
Chapter 5 introduces a new dynamic labor market framework and cali-
brates it for the East German labor market after reunication. Furthermore,
the idea of labor market traps is explained intuitively. Chapter 6 extends the
simple homogenous labor market framework to the case with low productivity
labor market traps. It calibrates the more sophisticated model for East Ger-
many and performs several exercises in order to see how East Germanys labor
market may be kick-started. In chapter 7 the simple model from chapter 5 is
extended to a more heterogenous labor market with three exogenously given
ability groups and endogenous human capital movement, which depends on
the (un-)employment duration, thus providing a more complete picture of the
labor market. The framework is used in order to evaluate di¤erently targeted
employment subsidies which are currently discussed in the political debate in
Germany. Finally, the thesis concludes and gives a tentative outlook for future
research developments.
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2 Modern Macroeconomic and Labor Theory
2.1 Macroeconomic Theory
2.1.1 The Path to the New Synthesis
This subsection provides a short description of the developments in macroeco-
nomic theory (specically in monetary economics) during the last couple of
decades. It is only meant to be an appetizer and it heavily borrows from Blan-
chard (2000), Goodfriend (2007), Goodfriend and King (1997), Gottschalk
(2005) and Mankiw (1990). Readers who get hungry by this appetizer are
referred to these authors.
As mentioned above, the monetary framework of the 1950s and 1960s, the
old neoclassical synthesis (well known through the famous IS-LM model), can
still be found in most undergraduate textbooks. However, during the 1970s it
lost its appeal due to empirical and theoretical weaknesses. "The empirical aw
was that the consensus view could not adequately cope with the rising rates
of ination and unemployment experienced during the 1970s. The theoretical
aw was the consensus view left a chasm between microeconomic principles
and macroeconomic practice (...)." (Mankiw, 1990, p. 1647).
The monetarist theory prepared the funeral for the old neoclassical synthe-
sis. In his presidential address to the American Economic Association Fried-
man (1968)8 challenged the view that there is a stable long-run trade-o¤ be-
tween ination and real economic activity. Friedman proposed the idea of a
steady state unemployment rate (the "natural rate of unemployment") which
is independent of the ination rate. However, most monetarists acknowledged
the short-run nonneutrality of money, without having a sound theoretical un-
derpinning for it. They attributed it to short-run price stickiness and expecta-
tional errors9. Gurley (1961, p. 308) points out this theoretical shortcoming:
"Money is a veil, but when the veil utters, real output sputters."
The rational expectations revolution puts the nal nails into the old neo-
classical synthesisco¢ n, most famously with the seminal work of Lucas (1976).
He states that it is crucial to take the behavioral reaction of economic agents
into account when analyzing di¤erent economic policies. Rational agents will
adjust their behavior to altered circumstances. As a consequence, the struc-
tural equations which are derived from empirical work, cannot be used for
8See Phelps (1968) for a similar reasoning.
9For details see Goodfriend and King (1997, p. 8 f.) or Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, p.
471 f.).
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policy evaluation, as they may lack stability. Along these lines Sims (1980)
criticizes the way traditional macroeconometric models are identied empiri-
cally (via untested a priori restrictions).
In the light of the destruction of the stable ination-output trade-o¤ view,
the real business cycle theory developed an alternative explanation for eco-
nomic uctuations, namely exogenous variations in technology (see Kydland
and Prescott, 1982, and King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988a and b). The pre-
vailing view of RBC modelers said that technology shocks "account for more
than half the uctuations in the postwar period with a best point estimate
near 75%."10 The RBC theory used a perfect competition environment and,
thus, monetary policy had no role to play. But the view that the business
cycle is almost entirely driven by technology shocks is very much at odds with
empirical evidence.11 And the "policy ine¤ectiveness proposal"12 (the view
that monetary policy or any government policy in general is ine¤ective) does
not only stand in contrast to central bankersperception, but also to empirical
evidence, e.g. from Vector-Autoregressions.13
Interestingly, rational expectations and the real business cycle theory laid
an important groundwork for the New Keynesian theory, which originated
with the inexible price/wage adjustment mechanisms by Calvo (1983) and
Taylor (1980), and the monopolistic competition framework by Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987). "While most macroeconomists have recognized the method-
ological impact of the RBC research program and have adopted its modeling
tools, other important, more substantive elements of that program have been
challenged in recent years." (Galí and Rabanal, 2004, p. 225). The ingredients
of the New Keynesian literature will be shortly reviewed in the next subsection.
2.1.2 Main Components
Policy makers only have a role to play if market frictions, which were absent in
the RBC literature, are introduced into the dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) framework, which became a standard tool of business cycle
analysis through the RBC literature. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) delivered
important foundations for the New Keynesian theory, with a combination of
constant elasticity of substitution monopolistic competition14 and menu costs.
10Galí and Rabanal (2004, p. 225)
11For a recent survey see Galí and Rabanal (2004).
12See, for example, Sargent and Wallace (1975).
13See, e.g., Christiano et al. (2005) or Angeloni et al. (2003).
14See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
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The state of the art New Keynesian models contain the following compo-
nents (see, for example, Galí, 2003, Clarida et al., 1999, Walsh, 2003, Wood-
ford, 2003, for very comprehensive summaries):
 rational expectation formation
 dynamic general equilibrium analysis
 derivation from rst microeconomic principles
 market clearing
 monopolistic competition
 adjustment costs or staggered prices and / or wages
Thus, the New Keynesian literature combines elements from di¤erent com-
peting schools of thought, namely rational expectations, (neo-)classical eco-
nomics (market clearing) and RBC literature (dynamic general equilibrium
analysis and the modeling tools). Monopolistic competition and non-exible
price / wage adjustment add the Keynesian components. Among the nomi-
nal rigidities, Calvos (1983) stochastic15 adjustment mechanism ranks most
famously, which can be attributed to its analytical simplicity and the resulting
price distribution. The Calvo scheme delivers more dispersed prices than the
deterministic Taylor staggering16 and thus, the price distribution is closer to
the empirical evidence.
2.1.3 Problems and Potential Solutions
The standard microfounded DSGE model (which does not use ad hoc assump-
tion on a microeconomic level, but derives all macroeconomic equations from
rmsprot and householdsutility maximization) is usually associated with
the following two problems17: (i) a lack of ination and output persistence
(plus implausible output responses), (ii) disinationary booms.18
15Prices / wages can be adjusted with an exogenously given probability every period.
Alternatively, but less frequently, Taylors (1980) deterministic approach or Rotembergs
(1983) adjustment costs are used.
16If p is the quarterly probability of not re-setting prices, after n periods, there remains
a fraction np of rms which was not able to re-set prices. Thus, other than under Taylor
contracting, there is always a small fraction of rms which have not been able to re-set prices
for a long time. For an intensive discussion of the implications of Calvo price adjustment
versus Taylor staggering see Kiley (2002) and Dixon and Engin (2006).
17See Mankiw (2001, p. 53 ¤.) for a discussion of these phenomena.
18Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) point out further counter-factual implications of this class of
models.
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Lack of Ination and Output Persistence: Fuhrer and Moore (1995,
p. 129) point out19 that "all of the persistence in ination derives from the
persistence in the driving term yt. Thus, a one-period shock to output will
a¤ect ination for one period only; the contracting specication adds no ina-
tion persistence of its own. (...) Unless the shock itself persists, the e¤ect on
ination will not persist." While prices are a predetermined variable in New
Keynesian models, the ination rate is a jump variable20 and, thus, the latter
does not show persistence (in contrast to the empirical evidence).
Chari et al. (2000) construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with
Taylor type price staggering and conclude that this type of model is not able
to generate su¢ cient degrees of endogenous output persistence: "We nd that
for a wide range of parameter values, the amount of endogenous stickiness is
small. Thus, we nd that in a standard quantitative model, staggered price-
setting, alone, does not generate business cycle uctuations." (Chari et al.,
2000, p. 1151) Huang and Liu (2002) use the Taylor framework as well and
write that: "With reasonable values of parameters in preferences and technolo-
gies, staggered price-setting by itself is incapable of [generating persistence],
while staggered wage-setting has a great potential in generating real persis-
tence (...)." (p. 407) We will re-consider this issue in chapter 3.
Recent works (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005, Smets and Wouters, 2003) have
tried to solve these problems (lack of ination and output persistence) by
introducing a set of ad hoc assumptions on the microeconomic level, for ex-
ample, habit formation by households21, indexation of prices22 and articial
timing assumptions23. In a new approach, Altig et al. (2005) reconcile mi-
croeconometric evidence on price stickiness24 and macroeconometric ination
19Fuhrer and Moore (1995) refer to the standard forward looking Phillips curve (t =
Ett+1 + yt), where  is the ination rate (in period t and t+1) and y is the output gap,
derived from Taylor (1980) two period contracting.
20Formally, the eigenvalue of a jump variable is greater than one, while the one for a
predetermined variable is smaller than one (see, for example, Gandolfo, 2003).
21Consumption is not determined by the optimization of a standard util-
ity function. But the lag of consumption is added in the utility function:
Et
1P
i=0
i [Ut (Ct+i   bCt+i 1)  Ut (Nt+i) + Ut (mt+i)], where C is consumption, N is la-
bor input and m are the real money balances (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005).
22Prices that cannot be re-optimized are adjusted automatically, by indexing them to the
past or steady state ination rate. If a rm j is not able to re-adjust prices in period t and
indexes to past ination, its prices (P ) develop as follows: Pj;t = t 1Pj;t 1, where t 1 is
the ination rate of the previous period.
23It is assumed that the agents react with a specic time lag to certain shocks.
24See Bils and Klenow (2004) for US evidence and Stahl (2005) for German evidence. The
US evidence suggest that price are adjusted very frequently, viz. on average about every
second quarter.
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persistence by introducing rm-specic capital. "In standard equilibrium busi-
ness cycle models a rms capital stock is not pre-determined and all factors of
production, including capital, can be instantaneously transferred across rms,
without any cost, in perfectly competitive markets. (...) In our model, a rms
capital is pre-determined and can only be changed over time by varying the
rate of investment." (Altig et al., 2005, p. 2)
Disinationary Booms: The problem of disinationary booms was pop-
ularized by Ball (1994). While empirically disinations are associated with
considerable output slumps25, Ball (1994) shows that New Keynesian models
may generate a boom if a credible future disination is announced. In anticipa-
tion of a credible disination, price setters adjust prices downwards before the
growth of the nominal money balances is reduced, thus causing a temporary
increase in real money balances and an economic boom. In a recent paper,
Trabandt (2006)26 shows that disinationary booms, as shown in Ball (1994),
are due to the specic money demand and the partial equilibrium nature. They
disappear in a fully edged DSGE model.
Relation to the Thesis: Chapter 3 and 4 contribute to the aforementioned
literature and try to clarify some misconceptions. Chapter 3 belongs to the lit-
erature stream, which analyzes the output persistence after a monetary shock.
It explores the inuence of price and wage staggering on monetary persis-
tence. We show that, for plausible parameter values, wage and price stag-
gering are highly complementary in generating monetary persistence. We do
so by proposing the new measure "quantitative persistence," after discussing
weaknesses of the "contract multiplier,"27 which is generally used to compare
persistence. The existence of complementarities means that beyond under-
standing how price and wage staggering work in isolation, it is important to
explore their interactions. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that the degree
of monetary persistence generated by wage vis-à-vis price staggering depends
crucially on the relative competitiveness of the labor and product markets. We
show that the conventional wisdom that wage staggering can generate more
persistence than price staggering does not necessarily hold.
25See e.g. Ball (1993).
26While Trabandt (2006) uses the Calvo price adjustment, a similar point is made in
Ascari (1998) with Taylor wage staggering. However, as will be shown in chapter 4, there
remain misconceptions about disinations in DSGE models among economists.
27See Huang and Liu (2002, p. 408) who dene the contract multiplier as "the ratio of
output response at the end of the initial contract duration to that in the impact period."
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Chapter 4 belongs to the stream of literature which analyzes disinations in
New Keynesian workhorse models. It examines the cost of disination under
real wage rigidities in a micro-founded New Keynesian model. Other than
Blanchard and Galí (2007) who did the same in a linearized framework, we
take non-linearities into account. We show that the results both qualitatively
and quantitatively change dramatically both for the steady states and for the
dynamic adjustment paths. Moreover, a disination implies a prolonged slump
without any need for real wage rigidities.
2.1.4 Unemployment in Workhorse New Keynesian Models
In the standard New Keynesian models (e.g., Clarida et al., 1999, Galí, 2003,
Woodford, 2003) there is no unemployment at all. The labor market is (neo-)
classical. Thus, the labor supply is given by the households intertemporal
utility maximization and the labor demand is given by the rmsprot max-
imization. A restrictive monetary policy leads to a temporary drop in labor
demand, which equals labor supply at any point in time. Quite often, the
temporary reduction in working hours for each worker (compared to the nat-
ural level28) is interpreted as unemployment. Van der Ploeg (2005, p. 811)
points out that the nature of underemployment in New Keynesian models is
quite di¤erent from reality. In central European countries about 10 percent
of the active labor force are registered as unemployed, some of them for very
protracted periods of time: e.g., in Germany the proportion of long term unem-
ployed29 (among all unemployed) is roughly 50 percent (Sachverständigenrat,
2004). Thus, other than in the New Keynesian models in reality unemployment
is distributed very unequally.
Possibly, the approximation to use underemployment instead of unemploy-
ment is not even innocuous for monetary policy analysis and may be the root
of the problems that were pointed out above, e.g., the lack of ination per-
sistence and implausible impulse response function. But for the analysis of
non-monetary policies (for example labor market measures) the New Keyne-
sian short-cut to interpret the deviation from the natural level of employment
as unemployment may lead to very biased theoretical results. It ignores im-
portant phenomena, which are well known from the labor literature, such as
human capital attrition, insider power, wage bargaining or e¢ ciency wages
(see section below).
28As described above, the natural rate idea goes back to Phelps (1968) and Friedman
(1968).
29Dened as unemployment for more than one year.
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It would be very desirable to move towards a more unied macro-labor
framework (in order to analyze di¤erent policies), which takes the lessons
of recent macroeconomic theory into account, namely rational expectations,
derivation of macroeconomic implications from agents intertemporal prot
maximization, general equilibrium and the RBC toolkit. This may not only
be helpful to solve some of the major problems in monetary economics, which
are described above. But it would also provide more insights about the inter-
action of di¤erent markets, policies and complementarities thereof.
In recent years there have been two major tendencies in order to enable
the New Keynesian framework to analyze a set of di¤erent policies:
On the one hand, the set of new ad hoc assumptions has been inated
to approach the theoretical responses to the empirical evidence. Galí et al.
(2007) introduce, for example, so called "rule of thumb" consumers, i.e. con-
sumers that live in "hand-to-mouth" fashion and do not save at all. Thus,
these households30 do not base their consumption decision on the intertempo-
ral budget constraint, i.e. they do not behave in pure Ricardian fashion31. By
introducing this ad hoc assumption, the modeled theoretical reactions to scal
policy come closer to the empirical evidence.32 Although the micro-founded
dynamic general equilibrium models were introduced to overcome the Lucas
Critique, they increasingly run afoul of it in their recent specications.
On the other hand, labor market frictions are introduced into the standard
New Keynesian model, thus deviating from the neo-classical labor market (e.g.,
Blanchard and Galí, 2006 and 2007, Christo¤el and Linzert, 2005, Krause and
Lubik, 2007, and Trigari, 2004). However, most current approaches33 use the
search and matching model, going back to Mortensen and Pissarides(1994)
seminal work, which may also be subject to the Lucas Critique (1976). The
next section will review recent developments in the macro-labor theory and
point out potential limitations of the search and matching theory.
2.2 State of the Art in Macro-Labor Theory
The (neo-)classical labor market theory (as used in the New Keynesian the-
ory) has very important empirical and theoretical caveats. As mentioned
30Galí et al. (2007) assume a certain fraction of all households follow "rule of thumb"
behavior.
31For the "Ricardian equivalence" see Barro (1974).
32For other ad hoc assumptions see Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets andWouters (2003),
which are shortly discussed above. The ad hoc assumptions are defended on grounds of a
better t with the empirical evidence.
33For an exception see Danthine and Kurmann (2004) who use an e¢ ciency wage approach.
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above, there is no involuntary unemployment34, but only voluntary inactiv-
ity of workers. Rationally optimizing agents choose not to supply their labor
at the prevailing market wage. In light of considerable unemployment rates in
continental Europe, this is very di¢ cult to accept. For a review of empirical
shortcomings of the neoclassical labor market model see, for example, Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2004, p. 459 f.).
In reaction to the deciencies of the neoclassical labor market, during the
1980s numerous theories have evolved which explain why the actual wage may
be above the neoclassical market clearing level. Most of the contributions
either belong to the e¢ ciency wage or insider-outsider literature. Two famous
examples will shortly be described below.
E¢ ciency Wages: E¢ ciency wage models usually need two ingredients:
a principal-agent problem and moral hazard. The principal (employer) and
the agent (employee) agree on a certain labor contract. If there is asymmetric
information, e.g. the employer is not able to monitor the e¤ort of the employee
perfectly, there arises a moral hazard problem, i.e. the employee may provide
less e¤ort than she committed to. The intuition for involuntary unemployment
in Shapiro and Stiglitzs (1984, p. 433)35 model runs as follows: "Under the
conventional competitive paradigm, in which all workers receive the market
wage and there is no unemployment, the worst that can happen to a worker
who shirks on the job is that he is red. Since he can immediately be rehired,
however, he pays no penalty for his misdemeanor. (...) To induce its workers
not to shirk, the rm attempts to pay more than the "going wage": then,
if a worker is caught shirking and is red, he will pay a penalty. If it pays
one rm to raise its wage, however, it will pay all rms to raise the wages.
(...) But as all rms raise their wages, their demand for labor decreases, and
unemployment results." Shapiro and Stiglitzs (1984) model is criticized for its
stationary nature, which restricts the wage prole to be constant over time,
yielding only a very specic case.36
34The term "involuntary unemployment" was popularized by Keynes (1936). In what
follows it is used, as dened by Snower and Lindbeck (1988b, p. 105): "A worker is in-
voluntarily unemployed over a particular period of time if he does not have a job during
that period, even though he would wish to work at an e¢ ciency wage that is less than the
e¢ ciency wage of a current employee, provided that he had the opportunity to be employed
under identical conditions of employment as the emplyoee." For a discussion of "involuntary
unemployment" see De Vroey (2004).
35There are numerous other e¢ ciency wage type models, which - for the sake of brievity
- will not be discussed.
36See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, p. 353 f.) for more details.
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Insider versus Outsiders: Lindbeck and Snower (1985, 1988a) develop the
insider-outsider theory which claims that labor turnover costs (hiring costs, r-
ing costs or cost of training) create economic rents which are extracted by in-
siders in wage negotiations. The insiders, who are protected by labor turnover
costs or who can use labor harassment (withdraw cooperation) to reduce the
productivity of potential wage underbidders, will agree on a higher wages with
the employer than under a neoclassical labor market. Thus, as in the e¢ ciency
wage theory, due to too high wages, involuntary unemployment will arise. Sim-
ilar to the e¢ ciency wage theory, the original insider-outsider theory has been
criticized on ground of its static nature and simplifying assumptions.37
Search and Matching: Recently, labor market theory has shifted away
from its static predecessors to dynamic approaches. The search and match-
ing approach by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) has emerged to be the new
mainstream tool for the explanation of unemployment and for the analysis of
di¤erent labor market policies.38
The search and matching theory assumes that there is a well-behaved
matching function, where the number of matches in the labor market (Q)
is a function of unemployment and vacancies (Q = f (U; V a)), where U is
the number of unemployed workers and V a is the number of vacancies. The
matching function is typically specied in Cobb Douglas form (Q = U1V a2).
"The matching function goes straight to an aggregate level (for example,
a country region, or industry) and does not take into account the diversity of
individual actions." (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, p. 518). Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001, p. 424) write that "the matching function is a black box: we
have good intuition about its existence and properties but only some tentative
ideas about its microfoundations."
In light of the Lucas Critique it is of course highly doubtable to use a black
box specication for policy analysis. As with the old style IS-LM model, the
data may seem to be in accordance with the search and matching function.
But under di¤erent policies, rational agents may adjust their behavior and
thus change the search and matching process substantially. Various empirical
studies cast some doubt on the stability of the search and matching function
(see below).
Frequently, the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and matching
framework is used to analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent employment policies (see,
37For a discussion see Fehr (1990) and Lindbeck and Snower (1990).
38See Pissarides (2000) for a comprehensive text book.
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e.g., Boone and van Ours, 2004, Bovenberg et al., 2000, Cardullo and van der
Linden, 2006, Mortensen and Pissarides, 2003, Pierrard, 2005, and Vereshchag-
ina, 2002). The matching technology - describing the relation between the
inputs and output of the matching process - is assumed to be stable through
time. This assumption is admissible provided that the matching technology
(described by the functional form of the matching function) can be considered
independent of the inputs and output of the matching process. However, very
often a negative time trend is found when estimating the search and match-
ing function, thus casting doubt on the stability through time (Blanchard and
Diamond, 1989, for the United States, and Fahr and Sunde, 2001 and 2004,
for Germany).39 It is admissible to use the matching function to analyze labor
market policies, provided that these policies have no signicant inuence on
the matching process itself. However, we do not see a rationale why active
labor market policies should not a¤ect the matching process.
Relation to the Thesis: In order to prevent running afoul of the Lucas
Critique, we do not take the aforementioned short-cut.40 Instead, we derive the
policy e¤ects in a microfounded way from the intertemporal maximization of
economic agents and model their incentives explicitly. We give special emphasis
to the rm side in our model since labor demand is the short side of the market
in economies with stellar unemployment. The household side comes into play
through the wage formation.
Chapter 5 develops a simple micro-founded framework and applies it to the
situation in East Germany after unication. The East German labor market
has hardly made any progress since German reunication, despite massive mi-
gration ows and support from the West. We argue that East Germany is in
trouble precisely because of the support it has received. The chapter explores
the phenomenon of "the caring hand that cripples," arising from bargaining
by proxy, the adoption of the West German welfare system and the associated
employment persistence. Even the steady decrease of labor cost (normalized
by productivity) since the beginning of the 1990s did not help to kick start
39Furthermore, many empirical studies reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale
(e.g. Warren, 1996, for the United States, Fahr and Sunde, 2001, for Germany). The
number of matches (Q) is a function of unemployment and vacancies (Q = f (U; V a)),
typically specied in Cobb Douglas form (Q = U1V a2). If 1 + 2 do not sum up to 1,
the results are input dependent.
40Furthermore, in contrast to a big part of the search and matching literature, we use
an endogenous job destruction rate. It can e.g. be expected that a wage subsidy reduces
the ring rate, while a hiring subsidy does not do so. Omitting this feature would bias the
results.
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the East. We suggest that labor force participants fell into "traps," concern-
ing low skills, aging of the workforce, labour-saving capital and skills, capital
underutilization, and unemployment arising from the decline of the tradable
sector. However, we do not model these labor markets formally yet.
Chapter 6 extends the framework to a dual labor market, with a high pro-
ductivity (primary) sector and a low productivity (secondary) sector where
the movement between these two sectors is endogenous, thus formalizing labor
market traps. The framework is used to analyze di¤erent policies to kick-
start East Germany. More generally, the chapter addresses the question of
why prolonged regional unemployment di¤erentials tend to persist even af-
ter their proximate causes have been reversed (e.g., after wages in the high-
unemployment regions have fallen relative to those in the low-unemployment
regions). We suggest that the longer people are unemployed, the greater is
the likelihood of falling into a low-productivity "trap," through the attrition
of skills and work habits. We develop and calibrate a model along these lines
for East Germany and examine the e¤ectiveness of three employment policies
in this context: (i) a weakening of workersposition in wage negotiations due
to a drop in the replacement rate or ring costs, leading to a fall in wages, (ii)
hiring subsidies, and (iii) training subsidies. We show that the employment
e¤ects of these policies depend crucially on whether low-productivity traps are
present.
Chapter 7 develops a more detailed labor market with three ability groups
which are exogenous and endogenous skill acquisition / attrition through on-
the-job training / unemployment. It provides a theoretical and quantitative
analysis of various types of well known employment subsidies. Two important
questions are addressed: (i) How should employment subsidies be targeted? (ii)
How large should the subsidies be? We consider measures involving targeting
workers with low incomes/abilities and targeting the unemployed. To make
our analysis particularly useful to policy makers, we focus on policies that are
"approximately welfare e¢ cient," i.e. policies that (a) improve employment
and welfare, (b) do not raise earnings inequality and (c) are self-nancing. This
criterion enables us to identify policies which satisfy these favorable properties
and to determine the size of the subsidies required for this purpose. The
calibration shows that hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed
and low-income/ability workers can be approximately welfare e¢ cient, while
low-wage subsidies do not satisfy this criterion. Even in terms of inequality
reduction low-wage subsidies are outperformed by targeted hiring vouchers.
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Furthermore, hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed are more
e¤ective than hiring vouchers targeted at low-income/ability workers. These
subsidy rankings also hold if the self-nancing constraint is relaxed and the
government spends a given additional amount on the subsidies.
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3 Monetary Persistence and Staggering Com-
plementarities
3.1 Introduction
We show in this chapter41 that, for plausible parameter values, wage and price
staggering are highly complementary in generating persistent output e¤ects
in response to monetary policy shocks. In other words, the joint e¤ect of
wage and price staggering on monetary persistence is larger than the sum of
the individual e¤ects. Thus the comparisons between the e¤ects of wage and
price staggering, which are so common in the New Keynesian literature, are
only of limited usefulness. Clearly, the larger the complementarities between
wage and price staggering are, the less important it is to know how wage
and price staggering work in isolation and the more important it is to explore
their interactions. This result deserves attention because, in practice, it is
very common for nominal wages and prices both to be set for nite periods of
time (see, for example, Christiano et al., 2005, Erceg et al., 2000, Smets and
Wouters, 2003).
In evaluating the relative e¤ects of wage and price staggering on monetary
persistence, as well as their joint e¤ects, the production technology turns out
to be important. Since the real e¤ects of temporary monetary shocks work
themselves out over the short run, it is natural to assume that rms face di-
minishing returns to labor - also a primarily short-run phenomenon. We show
that the more rapidly diminishing the returns to labor are, the more the rela-
tive competitiveness of the product and labor markets matters for the relative
monetary persistence generated by wage and price staggering. Our analysis
indicates that, for plausible technological parameter values, the relative com-
petitiveness has a sizeable inuence on the relative monetary persistence.
In order to understand the complementarities, it is necessary to analyze the
individuals e¤ects of wage and price staggering. In the recent New Keynesian
literature, a large body of articles argues that wage staggering generates more
monetary persistence than price staggering in response to monetary policy
shocks (i.e. the real e¤ects of temporary monetary shocks are more persistent
when wages are set through overlapping nominal contracts than when prices
are set in this way), see e.g. Andersen (1998), Huang and Liu (2002) and
41For a di¤erent version of this chapter see "Monetary Persistence, Imperfect Competition
and Staggering Complementarities," with Dennis Snower, CEPR Discussion Paper, No.
5658, May 2006.
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Kim (2003). This chapter calls this conventional wisdom into question. It
shows that the relative strength of monetary persistence generated by wage
vis-à-vis price staggering depends on the relative competitiveness of the labor
and product markets. In particular, the more competitive the product market
is relative to the labor market, the more monetary persistence is generated
by price relative to wage staggering. We show that if the product market is
su¢ ciently more competitive than the labor market, price staggering makes
the real e¤ects of temporary monetary shocks more persistent than does wage
staggering. This result is potentially important because, in practice, product
markets are often more competitive than labor markets. There are various
obvious reasons for this, e.g. employers often nd it more costly to switch
between employees than consumers nd it to switch between products.
In this context, it turns out to be useful to think carefully about how
we measure monetary persistence. The e¤ects of a monetary shock on real
economic activity through time (e.g. the e¤ects of a temporary increase in
money growth on national output) can be described by the relevant impulse
response function (IRF). The "degree of monetary persistence" is a summary
statistic of this function. The standard statistic, which is generally used in the
New Keynesian literature, is the "contract multiplier," usually dened as the
ratio of the response after the contract duration has elapsed to the response
in the impact period (see e.g. Huang and Liu, 2002). In other words, this
summary statistic measures how much the response dies out within a given
span of time.
While the contract multiplier captures one feature of the IRF, it misses
other important ones. Suppose, for example, that wage and price staggering
were associated with IRFs (of output to a given monetary shock) that di¤ered
only by an additive constant. This di¤erence, however large, would not be
identied by the contract multiplier, because both IRFs have the same slope
at every point in time, and thus the ratio of the response in period 1 and
period t would be the same. To capture this di¤erence, it is convenient to
use a measure that we call "quantitative persistence:" for a temporary unit
shock in period 1, it is the sum of the output responses from period 2 onwards.
In words, quantitative persistence measures by how much output changes, in
total, after the monetary shock has disappeared. This measure of monetary
persistence turns out to be particularly useful in describing how wage and
price staggering a¤ect monetary persistence. It is also useful in capturing the
complementarities between wage and price staggering in generating monetary
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persistence.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the underlying dy-
namic general equilibrium models, which are standard New Keynesian models
with Calvo staggering. In order to understand the complementarities, it is
necessary to look at the relative strength of monetary persistence individually
rst and jointly thereafter. Section 3 describes, formally and intuitively, how
the relative strength of monetary persistence generated by wage vis-à-vis price
staggering depends on the relative competitiveness of the labor and product
markets. Section 4 derives the complementarities between wage and price stag-
gering in generating monetary persistence. Section 5 relates our results to the
existing literature. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Models of Wage and Price Staggering
Our model economies each contain households, rms and a government. The
government prints money and bonds and imposes taxes/transfers on the house-
holds.42 Our models of wage and price staggering are completely standard
Calvo (1983) models. The model is linearized around a zero money growth
steady state. Monetary shocks are generated when the monetary authority
(government) increases the money supply and the economic agents do not know
the shock until it occurs. We will discuss the e¤ects of a one time increase of
the money supply by 1%,43 which is transferred from the monetary authority
to the households in a lump-sum manner ("helicopter drop of money").
In the model of wage staggering, there is a continuum of households sup-
plying di¤erentiated labor and the rms produce output by means of all the
labor types. These labor types are imperfect substitutes in production (as
in Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987). The householdswage setting is randomly
staggered, with each household having a xed probability of changing its wage
in any given period of time. The wages are set to maximize the households
utility, subject to their budget constraints and labor demand functions. The
rms maximize their prots instantaneously with respect to employment and
output, subject to their production functions.
42Without loss of generality we assume no government consumption. If we assumed that
the government consumes a constant fraction of each good, which is nanced via lump-sum
taxation, we would obtain a similar dynamic system. Calculations are available on request.
43In most other papers the money growth follows an autoregressive process. We however
do not consider autocorrelations of the money supply, as we seek to identify the endoge-
nous persistence generated by the behavior of the model (rather than the persistence of
the shocks). As Taylor noted, "leaving all the persistence of ination to exogenous serial
correlation is not a completely satisfactory conclusion" (Taylor, 1999, p. 1040).
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In the model of price staggering, rms supply a continuum of goods to
the households. These goods are imperfectly substitutes in consumption. The
rmsprice setting is randomly staggered. The prices are set to maximize the
rmsprots, subject to their production functions and their product demand
functions. The households maximize their utility instantaneously with respect
to consumption, labor, real money balances and bond holdings, subject to
their budget constraints.
In the rst step, we derive the dynamic system for wage staggering, with the
purpose to generate IRFs. Thus we will be able to compare them to IRFs for
price staggering, which will be generated from the according dynamic system
afterwards.
3.2.1 Wage Staggering
Firms: The product market is perfectly competitive. There is a xed number
of identical rms (normalized to unity), producing a homogeneous product.
The rms are price-takers. Firms face the following short-run Cobb-Douglas
type production function:44
Yt(j ) = AtNt(j )
1  (1)
where j is the index for the rm, Yt is the level of production, At is a pro-
ductivity parameter, Nt is the labor input, and  denotes how signicant the
diminishing returns to labor are.45
Under perfect competition, prices are set uniformly and are equal to mar-
ginal costs:
Pt= MC
no
t (2)
where Pt is the aggregate price level andMC not are the nominal marginal costs.
Households: The aggregate labor input is a Dixit-Stiglitz function of a con-
tinuum of individual labor inputs (normalized to unity):
44We use the following terminology. Capital letters are level variables (Yt), lower case
letters denote logarithmic variables (yt), lower case letters with a bar (y) denote the variable
at the steady state and lower case variables with a tilde (~yt) denote deviations from the steady
state.
45As the e¤ect of monetary shocks work themselves out over the short run, we assume a
xed amount of capital. Many recent papers assume full mobility of capital. Altig et al.
(2005, p. 2) comment this approach as "empiricially unrealistic but [it is] defended on the
grounds of tractability. The hope is that these assumptions are innocuous and do not a¤ect
major model properties. In fact these assumptions matter a lot."
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Nt=
24 1Z
ho0=0
Nt (ho
0)
"w 1
"w dho 0
35
"w
"w 1
(3)
where Nt (ho) is the amount of labor chosen from household ho and "w is the
elasticity of substitution between di¤erent labor types.
Minimizing the rms labor cost, we obtain its labor demand function for
each labor type:
Nt+i (ho)=

W t (ho)
Wt+i
 "w
Nt+i (4)
where W t (ho) is the optimal wage set by household ho in period t. The
corresponding aggregate wage index Wt+i is dened as
Wt+i =
24 1Z
ho0=0
Wt+i (ho
0)1 "w dho 0
35
1
1 "w
. (5)
The households utility is Ut(Ct+i (ho)) Ut(Nt+i (ho))+Ut(Mt+i (ho) =Pt+i),
Ut0 > 0; Ut" < 0; where Ct+i (ho) is its consumption,46 Nt+i (ho) is its em-
ployment, and Mt+i (ho) =Pt+i are its real money balances. In each period the
wages can be reset with probability (1  w).
The household maximizes its utility in a Calvo setting47
Ut

Ct (ho) ;
Mt (ho)
Pt
;N t (ho)

=
C 1 t (ho)
1   +

Mt(ho)
Pt
1 
1    
N 1+'t (ho)
1 + '
(6)
subject to its budget constraint:
Et
1X
i=0
i

Ct+i+
R 1t+iBt+i+M t+i
Pt+i

(7)
= Et
1X
i=0
i

Wt (ho)
Pt+i
Nt+i (ho)+
Tt+i
Pt+i
+
t+i
Pt+i
+
Bt+i 1
Pt+i
+
Mt+i 1
Pt+i

where Pt is the aggregate price index, Rt+i=1 + rt+i is the discount factor
on its one-period bond holdings Bt+i, Tt+i is its net lump-sum transfers from
46As usual in the literature, we assume complete insurance markets that allow households
to share the income risk stemming from staggered wage setting.
47We choose a separable utility function with the standard desirable long-run properties.
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government, and t+i is its prot income, which is transferred to consumers
in lump sum manner.
The households decision can be decomposed into two optimization prob-
lems. First, the "wage contracting problem" which only takes place with prob-
ability (1  w) in each period. Here the utility function is maximized with
respect to the optimal wage. Second, the "intra-contract problem" in which the
contract wage is given and the household maximizes its utility with respect to
its other endogenous variables (consumption, money and bond holdings) each
period.
Solving the wage contracting problem, we obtain the following optimal
wage48:
w t (ho) = w+(1   w)E t
1X
i=0
(w)
i

ln

 UtN(N t+i(ho))
UtC (Ct+i)

+ pt+i

(8)
where w t (ho) is the logarithm of the re-set wage and w=("w= ("w   1)) is
the steady state mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution and UtN ,
Utc are the rst derivatives of the utility function with respect to labor and
consumption. And  UtN(N t+i(ho))=Utc (Ct+i) denotes the marginal rate of
substitution between labor and consumption.
For the intra-contract problem we obtain the following general rst order
conditions:
Ut
Ct
= RtEt

Ut
Ct+1
Pt
Pt+1

(9)
and
Ut
Mt
Ut
Ct
=1  R 1t (10)
where Ut
Ct
, Ut
Mt
denote the rst derivatives of the utility function with respect
to consumption and money holdings in period t.
Log-linearizing the consumption function and money demand function de-
rived from the households decision problem, we obtain:
ct= E t(ct+1) 
1

(r t E t(t+1)  ln ) (11)
and
48The derivations of these and further results are given in the Technical Appendix.
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~mt ~pt=


~ct ~r t (12)
where  = (1=r) and49 r is the steady state interest rate.
Finally, we close the system with a goods market clearing condition (13),
a production function (14) and a money supply equation (15):
yt= ct (13)
yt= at +(1  ) nt (14)
mt= mt 1+mt. (15)
Dynamic System: For the wage staggering model, the intertemporal output
response to the monetary shock can be derived from equations (2), (8), (11),
(12), (13), (14) and (15), yielding
Et(

1 +
1


1  

~yt+1)+
1

Et ( ~wt+1)+
1

(~mt ~pt) (16)
= (1 +
1

+
1


1  )~y t+
1

~wt
wEt~wt+1 = [(1 + ) w] ~wt ww t 1 (17)
  1
1 + 'w
(1  w)(1  w)

 +
'+ 
(1  )

~yt
where (~mt ~pt) are the real money balances. The rst equation expresses an IS
type relation between the deviations of real money holdings, wages and output
from the steady state. The second equation expresses the wage dynamics in
dependence of the output deviations.50
49When we have a one-o¤monetary shock, the interest elasticity is not of further relevance
for the IRFs of the dynamic system. For the calculations below, we assumed  =  = 1.
50The wage can also be expressed in terms of prices, by using the relationship from the
production function (1): ~wt= ~pt  (= (1  ))~yt. Thus the two equations can be re-written
in terms of prices instead of wages. Further note that equation (15) holds.
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3.2.2 Price Staggering
The labor market is perfectly competitive; labor is a homogeneous factor;
households and rms are wage-takers. There is a continuum of goods and a
xed number of identical households (normalized to unity). Each household
maximizes its utility with respect to consumption of all the goods, labor, and
real money balances, subject to its budget constraint.
Firms: Minimizing the cost of consumption of the di¤erent product varieties
for a given consumption bundle,
Yt=
24 1Z
j0=0
Yt (j
0)
"p 1
"p dj 0
35
"p
"p 1
(18)
we obtain the following product demand function:
Yt+i (j)=

Pt (j)
Pt+i
 "p
Yt+i (19)
where Pt (j) is the wage set by rm j. The corresponding aggregate price
index is Pt+i is dened as
Pt+i =
24 1Z
j0=0
Pt+i (j
0)1 "p dj 0
35
1
1 "p
. (20)
In each period the rm resets its price with probability (1  p). Thus the
rm maximizes its prot
max
fPt (j)g
Et
1X
i=0
(p)
i (Pt(j )Y t(j )  N t(j )W t) (21)
subject to its production function
Yt(j ) = AtNt(j )
1  (22)
and to its product demand function (19).
Solving this problem we obtain the following price setting equation:
pt=p + (1  p)Et
1X
i=0
(p)
imcno
t;t+i
(23)
where p = ("p= ("p   1)) is the steady state mark-up over marginal costs and
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mcno
t;t+i
are the nominal marginal costs in period t + i when prices were set in
period t.
Households: As households are wage takers in the price-staggering model,
their optimality problem reduces to the intra-contract optimization problem of
the wage staggering model above, with the di¤erence that they optimize with
respect to their labor supply and all other endogenous variables:
max
fCt+i;Bt+i;M t+i;N t+ig
Et
1X
i=0
i

Ut

Ct+i (ho) ;
Mt+i (ho)
Pt+i
;Nt+i (ho)

=
264Et 1X
i=0
i
0B@C 1 t+i (ho)
1   +

Mt+i(ho)
Pt+i
1 
1    
N 1+'t+i (ho)
1 + '
1CA
375 (24)
subject to its budget constraint
Et
1X
i=0
i

Ct+i +
R 1t Bt+i+M t+i
Pt+i

(25)
= Et
1X
i=0
i

Wt (ho)
Pt+i
Nt+i +
Tt+i
Pt+i
+
t+i
Pt+i
+
Bt+i 1
Pt+i
+
Mt+i 1
Pt+i

This yields the following labor supply function (in logs), in addition to (11)
and (12):
wt pt=ct+'nt. (26)
Dynamic System: In the price-staggering model, the associated intertem-
poral output response to the monetary shock is described by the following two
equations, which can be derived from (1), (11), (12), (23), (26), (13), (14) and
(15), yielding:
Et~yt+1+
1

Et~pt+1+
1

(~mt   ~pt)=

1 +
1


~yt+
1

~pt (27)
Et~pt+1=(1 + )~pt ~pt 1 ~y t (28)
where  =
 
 + '+
1 

[(1  p) (1  p) (1  )] = [p [1 +  ("p   1)]]. Fur-
thermore equation (15) holds.
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w = 0:75 p = 0:75  = 0:3
' = 1  = 1  = 1
 = 0:99 "w = 10 "p = 10
Table 1: Calibration values
3.3 The E¤ect of Competition on Monetary Persistence
We consider monetary persistence in response to a simple, one-o¤ money
growth shock. In particular, suppose that money growth is initially zero, then
in period 1 it increases to some positive constant (normalized to unity), and
thereafter it returns to zero. By "monetary persistence" we mean the e¤ects
of this shock on output after period 1 (i.e. from period 2 onwards).
3.3.1 The Conventional Case
We simulate the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the deviation of output
from the steady state under wage and price staggering with respect to a one-o¤
1% money growth shock,51 for the standard parameter values52, as described
in table (1).
The values for w and p imply that prices or wages are set every four
quarters, on average.53 Since there are diminishing returns to labor in the short
run (over which the monetary shocks work themselves out), we set  = 0:3,
which is the standard value (corresponding to a 70% labor share of income
under perfect competition). By setting  = 1, we obtain a logarithmic utility
function for consumption. Furthermore, we choose  = 1. The disutility of
labor is quadratic (' = 1). By setting  = 0:99, we obtain a quarterly real
discount rate of 1%, i.e. about 4% a year, as it is standard in the literature.
The value for "p implies a steady state mark-up of about 11% over marginal
costs, whereas the interpretation for "w is somewhat more di¢ cult, it is the
mark-up over marginal rate of substitution between work and consumption.54
For the moment we assume that "w = "p and set them both to 10, as it is
common in the literature (see e.g. Kim, 2003), although there is no empirical
literature that would give explicit support for this assumption.
51The nominal money supply increases by one percent in period 1.
52In addition, the elasticity of substitution at the labor market is varied, which is discussed
later.
53This is in line with the empirical evidence surveyed by Taylor (1999). In a very recent
study Stahl (2005) shows that an average price duration of one year, before a new increase
takes place, is a fairly consistent pattern for the German metal working industry.
54For a discussion of the role of the marginal rate of substitution, see e.g. Gali et al.
(2003).
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Figure 1: The conventional case
Under this standard assumption, we obtain the conventional nding of
the existing literature, namely that the output response dies out more slowly
under wage staggering than under price staggering. Existing studies in general
use the contract multiplier to measure persistence (see e.g. Huang and Liu,
2002),55 dividing the output e¤ect in the fourth period (as the average contract
duration is 4 when setting either w or p to 0:75) by the output e¤ect during
the impact period. For the described calibration we get a contract multiplier
of 53% for price staggering, whereas it is 72% for wage staggering (see gure
(1) for an optical inspection).
3.3.2 Competition and Persistence
Numerical Results: For simplicity, we capture the degree of competition in
the product and labor markets by the elasticities of substitution among prod-
ucts (in household consumption) and among labor types (in rm production),
respectively. The greater the product elasticity of substitution, the lower is the
mark-up of prices over marginal cost (Lerners index of monopoly power); the
greater the labor elasticity of substitution, the lower is the mark-up of wages
over the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption.
For a variety of reasons, product markets are commonly more competitive
55Chari et al. (2000, p. 1152) use a somewhat di¤erent version of the contract multiplier,
dened as: "half life of output in the model with staggered price setting to the half life of
output under synchronized price setting."
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than labor markets. This is certainly true under centralized wage bargaining,
since centralized price bargaining is relatively uncommon. But even in the
absence of centralized wage bargaining, wage setting often tends to be more
centralized than price setting: workers of comparable types in an enterprise
or rm often set their wages at the same time, whereas such synchroniza-
tion generally does not apply to substitutable products across the economy.
Consequently, rmscosts of switching among standard labor types tends to
be substantially greater than consumerscosts of switching among standard
product types.
Microeconomic evidence shows that the elasticities of substitution among
di¤erent labor types are quite low. Gri¢ ns (1992)56 estimate for the elasticity
of substitution between white males and females as well as for white males and
black males are e.g. roughly 3.57 Thus we set the elasticity of substitution to 2
and 4, respectively.58 The elasticities of substitution that are used for di¤erent
product types in the literature have a very wide span too. We are aware of a
range from 6 (Sbodorne, 2002) to 10 (Chari et al., 2000) or 11 (Galì, 2003),
which would mean mark-ups between 10 and 20% over the marginal costs.
It turns out that the relative degrees of competition in the product and
labor markets (viz., the relative elasticities of substitution59) play an important
role in determining the relative magnitudes of monetary persistence generated
by wage and price staggering. To show this, we plotted the output responses
for di¤erent labor elasticities of substitution ("w = 2, "w = 4) that may be
empirically more realistic (see gure (2)).
The impulse response function of the price-staggering model ("p = 10)
starts at a much higher level than the one for the wage staggering function. It
dies out at about the same speed than the one of the wage staggering model
with "w = 2 and somewhat faster as the one with "w = 4.
56Gri¢ n (1992) used rm-level data for 555 large rms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.
57Based on an estimation with a translog cost system with capital included and with
federal contractors. See Gri¢ n (1992).
58We are in line with Huang and Liu (2002), who - in contrast to many other authors -
use di¤erent values for the elasticities of substitution of wage and price staggering. They
set "w equal to 2, 4 and 6 alternatively.
59In the context of our model, the elasticity of substitution among labor types depends on
what constitutes a wage-setting cohort. If workers with comparable human capital set their
wages at the same time, then the corresponding elasticity of substitution among di¤erent
cohorts will be relatively small. On the other hand, if wage-setting cohorts are chosen
randomly across occupations, then the corresponding elasticity will of course be relatively
high.
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Figure 2: Output IRFs for di¤erent market structures
An Alternative Measure of Monetary Persistence: When we set "p =
10 and "w = 4, the contract multiplier for wage staggering is 61% and thus well
above the 53% for price staggering. Again, even with a signicant di¤erence
in the market structure in the product and labor market, the conventional
wisdom seems to hold: wage staggering generates more output persistence
than price staggering in terms of the contract multiplier. Nevertheless, the
optical inspection of gure (2) calls this result into question. Although the
output IRF for wage staggering dies out more slowly (see contract multiplier),
it starts at a much lower level. The contract multiplier captures the relative
change in the slope of the IRFs, but not the relative positions of these IRFs. If
the wage and price staggering IRFs had the same slope, but the wage setting
IRF were much lower, then the wage and price-setting responses would have
the same contract multiplier, but we would clearly like to say that the output
response under price setting is more persistent (in some sense) than that under
wage setting.
On this account, we propose a new output persistence measure. Our main
measure of monetary persistence will be what we have called quantitative per-
sistence: the sum of all output changes from period 2 onwards, due to a one-o¤
monetary shock which is normalized to a unit shock:
 =
1X
t=2
~yt (29)
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where ~yt is the di¤erence between output in the presence and absence of the
shock (deviations from the steady state).
This expression would have to be rewritten if we assume an exogenous
serial correlation of the money supply, as it is done in most chapters. Then
we would have to subtract the e¤ects, resulting from the additional increase
in the money supply due to the serial correlation.
When "p = "w = 10, then the quantitative persistence measure is 5.37
for wage staggering and 3.46 for price staggering. Thus the qualitative re-
sult of the "contract multiplier" that wage staggering is more persistent than
price staggering is conrmed when both markets have the same competitive
structure.
For "p = 10 and "w = 4, the quantitative persistence measure is 3.46 for
price staggering and 3.28 for wage staggering. Thus the degree of persistence is
similar, albeit somewhat bigger for price staggering. This result is more in line
with the optical inspection of gure (2), which shows two impulse response
functions with a similar output e¤ect. As a consequence, the conventional
result that wage staggering is always a lot more persistent than wage staggering
is already questioned.
For "w = 2 the contract multiplier drops to 52%. Thus it indicates equiv-
alence of wage and price staggering. The visual inspection of gure (2) shows
that the contract multiplier tells a completely counter-intuitive story. Both
IRFs die out at about the same speed,60 but the IRF for price staggering
starts at a much higher level. From our point of view it would be hard to
claim that the two IRFs are equivalent in terms of output persistence. The
quantitative persistence captures the di¤erence appropriately and falls to 2.34
for "w = 2, whereas it is 3.46 for price staggering. As a consequence, the
quantitative persistence measure signals that price staggering is almost 50%
more persistent than wage staggering.
Figure (3) depicts the persistence from price staggering to wage staggering
(as a quotient, in terms of quantitative persistence) when we x "p = 10 and
change the labor elasticity of substitution ("w) in the wage staggering model
(the labor elasticity of substitution varies from 1 to 10, corresponding to a
range of "p   "w from -9 to 0, as shown in gure (3)). It can be seen that
the labor elasticity of substitution ("w) has to be about 5.5 units smaller than
the product elasticity of substitution ("p) to obtain the same "quantitative
persistence" for both staggering types (quotient is equal to 1). The more
60As measured by the contract multiplier.
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Figure 3: Competition and relative persistence (the elasticity of substituion
for di¤erent product types is xed to 10. The abscissa denotes "p   "w.)
competitive the product market is relative to the labor market, the greater is
the persistence from price staggering relative to wage staggering.
The gap between "w and "p that is necessary to generate the same output
persistence by wage and price staggering depends of course on the base value
for "p. The smaller "p; the smaller has to be the gap to obtain the same quanti-
tative persistence. If we assume for example that the elasticity of substitution
in the product market is 6, which appears to be the lower bound in the litera-
ture, then the two models would show the same persistence if the elasticity of
substitution in the labor market would be 2.5.61
3.3.3 Intuition
The Conventional Intuition: The conventional intuition on why mone-
tary persistence is greater under wage staggering than under price staggering
may be summarized as follows.62 Suppose that there are constant returns to
labor. Under price staggering households set their wages as mark-up over the
current marginal rate of substitution.63 As the householdswage decision is
synchronized, wages adjust quickly. They even overshoot their new steady
61In both cases the quantitative persistence measure would be about 2.6.
62See Huang and Liu (2002) for a more detailed description.
63Under perfect competition, naturally, wages are equal to the marginal rate of substitu-
tion.
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state level, since the positive output e¤ect during the initial periods after the
shock increases the marginal disutility of labor and thus raises the marginal
rate of substitution between work and consumption. In response, rms raise
their prices quickly, since these prices are a constant mark-up over current
and future marginal costs (due to constant returns to labor). However prices
adjust less quickly than they would do in the absence of price staggering.
Under wage staggering, a positive monetary shock raises employment and,
with it, the disutility of labor, and thus each household has an incentive to
push the wage up. But an increase in the individual wage also raises the
households wage relative to other wage setting cohorts, leading to a fall in
the demand for the households labor. These wage adjustments are moderate,
however, since households dislike uctuations in their working hours (as the
marginal disutility of labor rises with hours employed).
Thus, in contrast to the price-staggering model, there is a gradual rise in
wages, rather than overshooting. This leads to slower price adjustments by
rms,64 even though prices can be adjusted instantaneously. The slower price
adjustment leaves more room for output deviations from the steady state.
Consequently wage staggering delivers more output persistence than does
price staggering.
Intuition on How Diminishing Returns A¤ect Monetary Persistence:
We have argued that monetary persistence is a short-run phenomenon, over
which returns to labor are generally diminishing. In this context, marginal
costs are clearly no longer constant across rms, but depend on the rms
employment.65
When there is a positive monetary shock in the price-staggering model,
then (as above) households adjust their wages upwards instantaneously and
wages overshoot their long-run equilibrium. This leads to a rise in average
marginal costs for the economy. Thus each rm has an incentive to raise its
price. When it does, its price rises relative to other prices and its marginal
costs rise relative to other marginal costs.66 Due to these variations in rm-
specic marginal costs, the rms price increase will be less than it would have
64When we assume no productivity shocks the deviations of the marginal costs from the
steady state would be equal to the deviations of the wages from the steady state ~mct= ~w t.
The rm sets prices equal to marginal costs (~pt= ~mct).
65Mathematically: ~pt= ~mct = ~wt+(= (1  ))~yt.
66In mathematical terms: ~mcrt;t+i= ~mc
r
t+i  ("p= (1  ))
 
pt ~pt+i

, where ~mcnt;t+i is
the deviation of the rm-specic nominal marginal costs from the steady state and ~mcnt+i is
the one of the average economy wide average nominal marginal costs.
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been if all rms had the same marginal cost schedule under constant returns
to labor. (The faster the returns to labor diminish, the more moderate the
price adjustment will be.) Thus the adjustment path from the old to the new
steady takes a longer time.67 This extends the duration of the deviation of
output from the steady state, i.e. it magnies output persistence.68
Under wage staggering, decreasing returns to labor lead to larger deviations
of prices from the old steady state in the impact period than constant returns.
The reason is that prices are a mark-up over marginal costs, the marginal costs
depend on the deviation of output from the steady state (under diminishing
returns), and output responds to the monetary shock.69 Because of the instan-
taneous ination jump during the impact period (see gure (4)), the room for
output adjustments will be reduced considerably and thus the wage staggering
mechanism will generate less persistence in terms of "quantitative persistence"
than under constant returns to labor.
Although the New Keynesian literature often claims that wage staggering
generates more plausible impulse response functions of output with respect to
monetary shocks, our analysis sounds a cautionary note. First, as noted, the
wage staggering generates more output persistence only when the elasticities
of substitution for labor and products are su¢ ciently close. Secondly, wage
staggering has a lower ination persistence than price staggering, either in
terms of the contract multiplier or in terms of quantitative persistence (see
gure (4)).
The intuition above shows why the existing literature - resting on the as-
sumption of constant returns to labor - concludes that wage staggering gener-
ates more output persistence than price staggering. If the marginal disutility
of labor function is assumed to be increasing with output, whereas the mar-
ginal cost curve is assumed to be at and thus independent of the rm-specic
output, then wage staggering turns out to lead to more output persistence than
price staggering. But in the presence of diminishing returns to labor - which
is appropriate in the context of monetary persistence - the output e¤ects of
67Mathematically this can be seen in the following Phillips curve relationship, by setting
 to di¤erent values Et~t+1 = ~t   [(1  p) (1  p) (1  )] = [p [1 +  ("p   1)]]~yt.
68Note that there is a second countervailing e¤ect. Under decreasing returns to labor the
average marginal costs in the economy rise steeper when there is a positive output e¤ect.
As a consequence, the overall output e¤ect in the economy is reduced, as we have even more
pro-cyclical average marginal costs than under constant returns to labor. Nevertheless, this
second e¤ect is dominated by the rst one under usual calibrations.
69Mathematically, ~pt = ~wt + (= (1  )) ~yt. When  = 0 (constant returns to labor), we
obtain ~pt = ~wt.
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Figure 4: Ination persistence
the wage staggering mechanism are weakened and thus the conventional result
need no longer hold.
Intuition on How Competitiveness A¤ects Monetary Persistence:
We now explain intuitively how the relative competitiveness of the labor and
product markets inuences monetary persistence. We measure relative com-
petitiveness in terms of the relative elasticities of substitution among products
and labor types. The greater the elasticity of substitution, the smaller is the
individual wage rise (in the wage staggering model) or price rise (in the price-
staggering model) relative to the market average, in response to a positive
monetary shock. Since demand uctuations are undesirable for households
and rms with respect to their utility and prot maximization, the degree of
wage/price adjustment will be more muted.70 As result, the output response
is more persistent.
This means that relative competitiveness matters for persistence. The more
competitive the product market relative to the labor market, the greater is the
monetary persistence generated by price staggering relative to that generated
by wage staggering.
70Firms face the following demand scheduleYt+i (j)= (Pt (j) =Pt+i)
 "p Yt+i and the labor
demand looks as follows Nt+i (ho)= (W t (ho) =Wt+i)
 "w Nt+i.
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3.4 Complementarities between Wage and Price Stag-
gering
Finally, consider an economy where households and rms set both prices and
wages in a staggered fashion. Specically, households set their wages as mark-
up over the current and future individual marginal rate of substitution and
prices, rms set their prices as mark-up over their current and future rm-
specic marginal costs. Consequently, there is an intertemporal wage-price
spiral: the slower wages adjust, the slower prices adjust, and vice versa.
The dynamic system for joint wage and price staggering is
Et~yt+1+
1

Et~pt+1+
1

(~mt ~pt)=

1 +
1


~yt+
1

~pt (30)
Et~pt+1=(1 +  + )~pt ~pt 1 ~wnot +

1  ~yt (31)
wEt~wt+1 =  w~wt 1 + (1 + 2w  
1
1 + 'w
(1  w)(1  w)'w)~wt(32)
  1
1 + 'w
(1  w)(1  w)(( + ' 1
(1  ))~y t+~pt) (33)
and the money growth equation (15) holds.
In this context, we inquire whether wage and price staggering are comple-
mentary in their inuence on monetary persistence, i.e. whether their joint
e¤ect on persistence is greater than the sum of the individual e¤ects. Specif-
ically, we measure the degree of complementarity (com) by dividing the joint
e¤ect of wage and price staggering ( w+p) by the sum of individual e¤ects of
the two types of staggering ( p +  w):
com =
 w+p
 p +  w
. (34)
Values bigger than 1 signal that wage and price staggering are complemen-
tary, whereas they are substitutes for values smaller than 1.
When we set "p = 10 and "w = 4 (and use the same calibration as before,
gure (5) shows the impulse response functions of the three models), we get
a quantitative persistence measure of 7.75 for joint staggering, which gives
us a complementarity measure of com = 1:15. Thus joint wage and price
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Figure 5: IRFs from wage staggering, price staggering and both types
staggering is 15% more output persistent than the sum of the two staggering
mechanisms.71
It can be shown that the complementarity depends on the existence of
decreasing returns to labor. In our numerical simulations, wage and price
staggering are not complementary under constant returns to labor, and they
become complementary only once  is larger than 0:15 (see gure (6)).
3.5 Relation to the Literature
There is a relatively large body of literature on the relative degree of monetary
persistence arising from wage and price staggering under Taylor contracts, but
relatively little under Calvo contracts (the focus of this chapter).
As noted, the recent literature on Taylor contracts concludes that wage
staggering generates more monetary persistence than price staggering. In An-
dersens (1998) model output responses from wage staggering are always longer
lived than from price staggering. In Huang and Lius (2002) paper the output
responses from price staggering are dampened oscillatory, whereas the output
IRFs from wage staggering are not.72 The oscillatory output response to mon-
etary shocks under the standard numerical calibrations in dynamic stochastic
71As the contract multiplier is 53% for price staggering and 61% for wage staggering, it
would be impossible to have complementarities.
72Erceg (1997) uses both types of staggering, which can account for a strong contract
multiplier.
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Figure 6: Complementarities between wage and price staggering
general equilibrium (DSGE) models (Kiley, 1997, Chari et al., 2000, Huang
and Liu, 2002) is considered an important weakness of the Taylor model.
Some authors have sought to overcome persistence problems by incorporat-
ing real rigidities in price-staggering models. Edge (2002) assumes rm-specic
factor inputs to restore the equivalence of wage and price staggering, i.e. that
each household is coupled with a rm, hiring its labor and capital out to that
rm only.73 Jeanne (1998) introduces a real wage rigidity, as unions may be
concerned about a fair division of income between labor and capital. Kiley
(1997) analyzes the e¤ect of several real rigidities to increase the persistence
of price staggering, such as countercyclical mark-ups.74 The basic insight goes
back to Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Ball and Romer (1990), who argue
that it is necessary to atten the supply side in order to prevent procycli-
cal marginal costs, which would lead to fast price adjustments and thus low
persistence.
Taylor (1999) observed that "there needs to be some neighborhood e¤ects
between price setters, so that one rm pays attention to the price decision
of the next rm and the most recent rm, thereby linking the price decision
of one rm to another and causing the persistence e¤ects". This phenomenon
applies to our price-staggering model. Under decreasing returns to labor, rms
73The basic idea to slow down price adjustments with real rigidities in a DSGE model
with nominal rigidities was rst proposed by Kimball (1995) and implemented by Rotemberg
(1996). In a unifying framework Ascari (2003) shows that labor immobility plays a key role
in generating persistence.
74Kiley (1997) therefore used the ideas of a model from Gali (1994).
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pay more attention to their relative price from a purely prot-maximizing
perspective. If the rm specic price is too far above the average market
price,75 there will be undesirable uctuations in rm-specic demand.76
Regarding Calvo contracts (as in this chapter), various contributions ex-
amine how realistically Calvo wage and/or price staggering can replicate em-
pirical impulse response functions or how optimal monetary policy has to be
conducted in such a framework.77 To the best of our knowledge, however,
the only study that explicitly discusses the di¤erences in persistence gener-
ated by Calvo wage and price staggering is Kim (2003). He states that in
contrast to Taylor contracts, Calvo wage and price staggering can both gen-
erate persistence (no oscillatory movements). But similar to the studies for
Taylor staggering, he concludes that wage staggering is generally better able
to generate persistence. We conrm the rst result, but have doubts about
the second because it hinges on two important implausible assumptions: (i)
in the basic version of Kims model (section 2.2.1) the capital stock adjusts
exibly and instantaneously (which we have argued is unlikely to occur over
the time span relevant for monetary persistence)78 and (ii) Kim (2003) as-
sumes the same elasticity of substitution for di¤erent product and labor types,
whereas we argue that product markets are generally more competitive than
labor markets.
The inability to explain su¢ cient ination persistence is known to be a ma-
jor weakness of New Keynesian models (see, for example, Mankiw, 2001). This
chapter contributes to this literature by showing and explaining the intuition
why wage staggering under decreasing returns has a low ination persistence,
either measured in terms of the contract multiplier or in terms of "quantitative
persistence."
The role of the elasticity of substitution has been mentioned in the lit-
75See Sbodorne (2002) for an equivalent mathematical derivation.
76Thus our result is somewhat contrasting to Kileys (1997), who claims that increasing
returns to labor atten marginal costs and thus increase persistence. The e¤ect we describe
above cannot kick in, as Kiley (1997) uses a rst order Taylor approximation to remove rm-
specic subscripts. Further di¤erences are that his model incorporates capital accumulation
and uses Taylor contracts.
77To mention just a few examples: Rotemberg andWoodford (1998) try to match empirical
impulse response functions with a Calvo price staggering model. Christiano et al. (2005)
have the same objective. Gali (2003) derives impulse response functions from Calvo price
staggering and discusses optimal monetary policy. Erceg et al. (2000) use a model with
Calvo wage and price staggering that is similar in spirit to ours. They do not discuss the
issue of monetary persistence, but optimal monetary policy.
78Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) nd out that a xed-capital version ts the empirical
evidence better. A discussion of this issue can be found in Altig et al. (2005). This and
other very recent papers (e.g. Woodford, 2005) model rm-specic capital endogenously.
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erature (Ascari, 2003, Huang and Liu, 200279), but the inuence of relative
competitiveness in the labor and product markets on the relative monetary
persistence generated by wage and price staggering has not been analyzed.
This chapter does so numerically and intuitively. Furthermore, the existing
literature uses the contract multiplier to measure output persistence from nu-
merical impulse response functions (see e.g. Huang and Liu, 2002, Kim 2003).
The weaknesses of this measure have not been discussed to date. This chapter
does so and introduces the quantitative persistence measure to address this
problem. The complementarity of wage and price staggering in generating
persistence has not been examined either in the literature; our "quantitative
persistence" measure enables us to do so in a meaningful way.
3.6 Concluding Thoughts
This chapter shows that the relative degree of competition in the labor and
product markets plays a central role in determining the relative monetary
persistence arising from wage and price staggering. The more competitive a
market is, the more persistent will be the output responses to a monetary
shock arising from the wage or price inertia in that market. The intuition is
that deviating too much from the optimal price or wage will lead to bigger
demand changes in the labor or product markets if there is more competition
(i.e. the elasticity of substitution is bigger). Consequently, more competition
leads to a dampened wage and price adjustment, which leaves more room for
deviations of the output from the steady state.
Finally, we nd that wage and price staggering have complementary e¤ects
on monetary persistence. We show this in terms of a new measure of monetary
persistence, our "quantitative persistence" statistic. The existence of comple-
mentarities means that beyond understanding how wage and price staggering
work in isolation, it is very important to explore their interactions.
79Both studies use Taylor contracts.
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3.7 Technical Appendix
3.7.1 Wage Staggering Model
Households Optimization Problem: The representative household op-
timizes the following utility function:
max
fCt+i;W t(ho);Bt+i;M t+ig
Et
1X
i=0
i
"
Ut (Ct+i (ho)) 
Ut (Nt+i (ho))+Ut

Mt+i(ho)
Pt+i
 # (35)
subject to its budget constraint:
Et
1X
i=0
i

Ct+i +
R 1t+iBt+i+M t+i
Pt+i

(36)
= Et
1X
i=0
i

Wt (ho)
Pt+i
Nt+i (ho)+
Tt+i
Pt+i
+
t+i
Pt+i
+
Bt+i 1
Pt+i
+
Mt+i 1
Pt+i

and its labor demand function:
Nt+i (ho) =

W t (ho)
Wt+i
 "w
Nt+i; i = 1; :::; N   1 (37)
where Pt is the aggregate price index, Rt+i=1 + rt+i is the nominal interest
factor on its bond holdings Bt+i, Tt+i is its net lump-sum transfers from gov-
ernment, and t+i is its prot income.
The problem can be decomposed in a wage-contracting problem where the
wage is optimized with respect to all endogenous variables and a intra-contract
period problemwhere the wage is taken as given and the optimal level of money,
bond holdings, and consumption is chosen.
Wage-Contracting Problem Every time the household can change its
wages, it has to solve the following optimization problem:
max
fWt (ho)g
Et
1X
i=0
(w)
i

Ut (Ct+i (ho)) Ut (Nt+i (ho))+Ut

Mt+i (ho)
Pt+i

(38)
s.t.
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Et
1X
i=0
i

Ct+i +
R 1t Bt+i+M t+i
Pt+i

(39)
= Et
1X
i=0
i

Wt (ho)
Pt+i
Nt+i+
Tt+i
Pt+i
+
t+i
Pt+i
+
Bt+i 1
Pt+i
+
Mt+i 1
Pt+i

and
Nt+i(ho) =

W t (ho)
Wt+i
 w
Nt+i (40)
Since the product market is perfectly competitive, prot income is zero:
t+i
Pt+i
= 0. Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that the government refunds
its seigniorage from money and bond creation to the households in the form
of lump-sum transfers:
R 1t Bt+i+M t+i
Pt+i
=
Tt+i
Pt+i
+
Bt+i 1
Pt
+
Mt+i 1
Pt
. (41)
Then the households budget constraint reduces to
Et
1X
i=0
iCt+i = Et
1X
i=0
i
Wt (ho)
Pt+i
Nt+i. (42)
For analytical tractability, we make the usual assumption that households
can insure themselves against idiosyncratic consumption shocks.80 Thus:
Pt+iCt+i=W t+iNt+i. (43)
By substituting (40) and (43) into the utility function and taking the rst
derivative with respect to the wage, we obtain the following optimal wage:
W t (ho) =
w
w   1
Et
P1
i=0(w)
i
 UtN  N dt+i(ho)N dt+i(ho)
Et
P1
i=0(w)
i
h
Utc(Ct+i)
Pt+i
i
N dt+i(ho)
(44)
In logs:
80For a more detailed description see e.g. Erceg et al. (2000).
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w t (ho) = ln

w
w   1

+ ln
 
Et
1X
i=0
(w)
i
 UtN  N dt+i(ho)N dt+i(ho)
!
  ln
 
Et
1X
i=0
(w)
i

UtC (Ct+i)
Pt+i

N dt+i(ho)
!
(45)
We log-linearize as follows:
w t (ho)  w (ho) +
1X
i=0
266666664
h
@wt (i)
@UtN
@UtN
@ lnUtN
i
equ
"
ln
 UtN  N dt+i (ho) 
ln
 UtN(N d(ho))
#
 
h
@wt (i)
@Utc
@Utc
@ lnUtc
i
equ
"
logUtc (Ct+i)) 
log Uc (C ))
#
 
h
@wt (i)
@Pt
@Pt
@pt
i
equ
(pt+i p)
377777775
(46)
which yields:
w t (ho)  w + (1  w)Et
1X
i=0
(w)
i
 
ln
h
 UtN(N dt+i(ho))
i
  lnUtc (Ct+i) + pt+i
!
(47)
or put di¤erently:
w t (ho)  w + (1  w)Et
1X
i=0
(w)
i
 
lnMRS t;t+i+pt+i

(48)
where w = ("w= ("w   1)) is the steady state mark-up and MRS t;t+i81 is the
marginal rate of substitution in period t+ i of households who set their wages
in period t.
We can rewrite the individual marginal rate of substitution in terms of
the average economy-wide marginal rate of substitution, by using the specic
utility function (102):
81MRS t;t+i=  UtN (N dt+i(ho))=Utc (Ct+i)
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MRS t;t+i =

Wt+iNt+i
Pt+i
 
W t (ho)
Wt+i
 w
Nt+i
!'
(49a)
=

Wt+iNt+i
Pt+i
 
Wt+i
Wt+i
 w
Nt+i
!' 
W t (ho)
 w
W
 w
t+i
!'
(49b)
= MRS t+i
 
W t (ho)
 w
W
 w
t+i
!'
(49c)
where MRSt+i is the average marginal rate of substitution in the economy.
Using (48), we obtain the following equation:
w t (ho) =w + (1  w)Et
1X
i=0
(w)
i
 
mrs t+i 'w
 
w t (ho)  w t+i

+pt+i

.
(50)
Using the following approximate relationship for the aggregate wage index:
wt= ww t 1 + (1  w)w t (51)
we obtain:
wt = ww t 1 + (1  w)
1
1 + 'w"
w + (1  w)Et
1X
i=0
(w)
i
 
mrs t+i+'wwt+i+pt+i
#
(52)
where mrst+i is the logarithm of MRSt+i.
By iterating by one period forward and multiplying with w:
wEwt+1 = 
2
wwt + (1  w)
1
1 + 'w
24 ww + (1  w)Et 1Pi=0(w)i+1 
mrs t+i+1+'wwt+i+1+pt+i+1

35
(53)
Thus:
51
wt wEtwt+1 = wwt 1   2wwt+
1
(1 + 'w)
(1  w)(1  w) (54)
(mrs
t
+'wwt+pt) + (1  w)
1
1 + 'w
(w   ww)
where w (constant) can be dropped when we take deviations from the steady
state.
Intra-Contract Period Problem In each period the households have to
choose on the optimal allocation of bonds, money holdings, and consumption.
Thus the representative household maximizes its utility
max
fCt+i;Bt+i;M t+ig
Et
1X
i=0
i

Ut (Ct+i (ho)) Ut (Nt+i (ho))+Ut

Mt+i (ho)
Pt+i

(55)
subject to its budget constraint:
Et
1X
i=0
i

Ct+i+
R 1t Bt+i+M t+i
Pt+i

(56)
= Et
1X
i=0
i

Wt (ho)
Pt+i
Nt+i (ho)+
Tt+i
Pt+i
+
t+i
Pt+i
+
Bt+i 1
Pt+i
+
Mt+i 1
Pt+i

We obtain the following rst order conditions via a Lagrangian
UtCt=RtEt

UtCt+1
Pt
Pt+1

(57)
UtMt
UtCt
= 1  R 1t . (58)
We optimize the following utility function
Ut

Ct (ho) ;
Mt (ho)
Pt
;N t (ho)

=
C 1 t (ho)
1   +

Mt(ho)
Pt
1 
1    
N 1+'t (ho)
1 + '
(59)
subject to its budget constraint
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Et
1X
i=0
i

Ct+i+
R 1t Bt+i+M t+i
Pt+i

(60)
= Et
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i=0
i
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Wt (ho)
Pt+i
Nt+i +
Tt+i
Pt+i
+
t+i
Pt+i
+
Bt+i 1
Pt+i
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Pt+i

using (102):
@L
@Ct
= C t  t= 0 (61)
@L
@Ct+1
= C t+1 t+1 = 0 (62)
@L
@Bt
= R 1t
1
Pt
t  1
Pt+1
t+1 = 0 (63)
@L
@Mt
=
EtM
 
t
EtP
1 
t
  t 1
Pt
+ t+1
1
Pt+1
. (64)
Combining conditions (259), (266), and (63), we obtain the following con-
sumption Euler equation:
1 = Rt
"
EtCt+1
Ct
  
Pt
EtPt+1
#
(65)
We use a rst order Taylor approximation:
Rt
"
EtCt+1
Ct
  
Pt
Pt+1
#
= (1 + rt)Et [exp ( ct+1 t+1)] (66a)
= (1 + rt) [1  Etct+1 E tt+1] (66b)
= (1 + rt)  Etct+1 E tt+1. (66c)
This delivers us equation (11).
When we plug (61) and (62) into (64), we obtain the following money
demand equation:
EtM
 
t
EtP
 
t
C t
  1 + C
 
t+1
C t
Pt
Pt+1
= 0 (67)
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When we use the Euler consumption equation (65), we obtain:
Mt
Pt
 
C t
= 1  1
1 + rt
(68)
Mt
Pt
=

1 + rt
rt
C t
 1

(69)
In logarithmic terms:
mt pt =
1


  ln rt
1 + rt
+  lnCt

(70a)
=
1


  ln

1  1
eln(1+rt)

+  lnCt

. (70b)
We log-linearize and use (1 + rt) = rt for values close enough to zero:
~mt ~pt =


~ct   1

1
1  1
er
1
e2 r
er~rt (71a)
=


~ct   1

1
er   1~rt (71b)
= 

~ct   1

1
r
~rt (71c)
The FirmsProblem In the wage staggering model rms are price takers.
Thus the prices are equal to the nominal marginal costs.82
pt+i= mc
no
t+i. (72)
3.7.2 Price Staggering Model
Households Optimization Problem: In contrast to the pure wage stag-
gering model households maximize their utility also with respect to the working
time in the price staggering model, as they do not have any wage setting power
and thus they are wage takers.
82The market clearing conditions will be shown after the derivation of the rst order
conditions of the price-staggering model.
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max
fCt+i;Bt+i;Mt+i;Nt+ig
Et
1X
i=0
i

Ut

Ct+i (ho) ;
Mt+i (ho)
Pt+i
;N t+i (ho)

=
264Et 1X
i=0
i
0B@C 1 t+i (ho)
1   +

Mt+i(ho)
Pt+i
1 
1    
N 1+'t+i (ho)
1 + '
1CA
375 (73)
subject to its budget constraint
Et
1X
i=0
i

Ct+i +
R 1t Bt+i+M t+i
Pt+i

(74)
= Et
1X
i=0
i

Wt (ho)
Pt+i
Nt+i +
Tt+i
Pt+i
+
t+i
Pt+i
+
Bt+i 1
Pt+i
+
Mt+i 1
Pt+i

.
This yields the same two following rst order conditions as before (for the
derivation see wage staggering model):
1 = Rt
"
EtCt+1
Ct
  
Pt
EtPt+1
#
(75)
Mt
Pt
=

1 + rt
rt
C t
 1

. (76)
The consumption Euler equation and the money demand equation can be
log-linearized as in the wage staggering model.
In addition, we get the following labor supply equation when we take the
rst derivative with respect to the utility function and use equation (259):
Wt+i
Pt+i
=  N
'
t+i
C t+i
= MRS t+i (77)
or alternatively in logs:
wt+i pt+i= c't+i+nt+i= mrs t+i. (78)
When households are wage takers, the real wage is always equal to the
marginal rate of substitution.
FirmsMaximization Problem: The rmsmaximization problem in the
price-staggering model is similar to the households optimization problem in
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the wage staggering model. The rms maximize
max
fPt (j)g
Et
1X
i=0
(p)
i (Pt (j )Y t(j )  N t(j )W t (j)) (79)
subject to the production function
Yt(j ) = AtNt(j )
1  (80)
and
Yt+i (j)=

Pt (j)
Pt+i
 "p
Yt+i. (81)
We get the following rst order condition:
Et
1X
i=0
(p)
i

(1  "p)Pt (j )Y t;t+i+
"p
1  Wt+iNt;t+i(j )

= 0. (82)
where t;t+i indicates the value of the variable in period t+ k when prices were
set in period t.
This can be rewritten as:
Et
1X
i=0
(p)
i

Yt;t+i

Pt (j ) 
"p
"p   1MC
no
t;t+i

= 0. (83)
Thus we obtain:
Pt (j ) =
"p
"p   1
Et
1P
i=0
(p)
iYt;t+iMC
no
t;t+i
Et
1P
i=0
(p)
iYt;t+i
. (84)
By using a rst order Taylor approximation:
pt (j)  p + (1  p)Et
1X
i=0
(p)
imcno
t;t+i
(85)
where p =
"p
"p 1 is the steady state mark-up over nominal marginal costs.
With decreasing returns to labor the rm specic marginal cost are not
necessarily equal to the economy-wide average marginal costs.
Firm-specic real marginal costs:
MC ret;t+i=
Wt+i=P t+i
(1  )(Yt;t+i=N t;t+i)
. (86)
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Average real marginal costs in the economy:
MC ret+i =
Wt+i=P t+i
(1  )(Yt+i=N t+i)
. (87)
Using (86) and (87) reformulating:
MC ret;t+i = MC
re
t+i

Pt
Pt+k
 "
1 
. (88)
When we log-linearize, we obtain
~mcret;t+i= ~mc
re
t+i 
"p
1  
 
pt ~pt+i

. (89)
Plugging in and reformulating:
~pt (ho)

1 +
"
1  

= (1  p)Et
1X
i=0
(p)
i

~mcret+i+
1  + "
1   ~pt+k

.
(90)
where m^cret+k is the deviation from the steady state of the average economy-wide
real marginal costs.
We use the approximate relation
~pt=p~pt 1+(1  p)pt (91)
and use the same forward iteration as for wage setting, we obtain the following
Phillips curve relationship:
~t=Et~t+1 +
(1  p) (1  p) (1  )
p [1 +  ("  1)] ~mc
re
t . (92)
When we log-linearize the average economy-wide marginal costs from above,
we obtain:
~mcret = ~w t ~pt+

1  ~yt 
1
1  ~at (93)
where the productivity term can be skipped, when we assume that there are
no productivity shocks (~at = 0).
3.7.3 Closing the System
The following conditions hold for all three models (price staggering, wage stag-
gering, and both types of staggering).
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Goods Market Clearing: In this simple version of the model we have the
following goods market clearing condition:
Yt= C t. (94)
Or in logarithms:
yt= ct. (95)
Thus we can derive the following equation from the Euler consumption
equation (106):
~yt= E t(~y t+1) 
1

(r t E t(t+1) + rr t) (96)
where rrt is the natural rate interest. When we plug in the money demand
function (12), we obtain (30), which is the same for all three dynamic systems:
Et~yt+1+
1

Et~pt+1+
1

(~mt   ~pt)=

1 +
1


~yt+
1

~pt. (97)
Production Function: Furthermore, to close the system, we have to
use the production function (1). Up to a rst order approximation83 it can be
shown that:
yt= at +(1  ) nt. (98)
Thus the following relationships for deviations of the marginal rate of sub-
stitution from the steady state can be derived, when we take deviations from
the steady state, assume no productivity shocks (~at = 0) and use equation (78)
for the marginal rate of substitution:
m~rs t=( + '
1
(1  ))~y t. (99)
Furthermore, using (93), with ~at = 0, the following equation is valid:
~pt= ~mc
no
t = ~w t+

1  ~yt. (100)
83The derivation is available on request.
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Money Supply Equation: Furthermore the following condition holds:
mt= mt 1+mt. (101)
3.7.4 The Three Dynamic Systems
We can dene all three dynamic systems by using the equations above. As
mentioned, equation (96), which is derived from the Euler consumption equa-
tion and which can be rewritten as an IS-type equation (97) 84, holds in all
three cases.
For the wage staggering model, we use the wage dynamics equation (54),
take derivations from the steady state, use (99) and express prices in terms of
wages (54) to obtain equation (17).
For the price-staggering model equations (78), (92) and (93) are used to
obtain (134).
For the wage- and price-staggering model equations (92) and (93) are used
to derive the Phillips curve relationship. Furthermore, when taking deviations
from the steady state (54) and using (99), the wage dynamics equation (32)
can be obtained.
84The only di¤erence is that we expressed the IS-type equation in terms of wages in the
wage-staggering model.
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4 Real Wage Rigidities and the Cost of Disin-
flation
4.1 Introduction
In a very insightful paper Blanchard and Galí (2007) advocate the introduction
of real wage rigidities in the standard new Keynesian (NK) model. They show
that real wage rigidities would generate both more realistic policy trade-oﬀs,
by breaking what Blanchard and Galí (2007) called the divine coincidence, and
a more realistic empirical behavior of inflation, by generating inflation inertia.
In order to show an example of these two previous features brought about
by the introduction of real wage rigidities, in Section 4, Blanchard and Galí
(2007) look at the cost of a classical monetary policy experiment: a disinflation
(from 4% to zero).
In this chapter85, we show that, like others in the literature, the analysis in
Blanchard and Galí (2007) is flawed because it abstracts from non-linearities,
being based on the log-linear formulation of the standard NK model. Such
a procedure is clearly not suited for analyzing the response of the model af-
ter a disinflation, since the standard NK model is non-linear, giving rise to
non-superneutrality of money. A disinflation experiment is therefore a move-
ment from one steady state to a diﬀerent one and cannot be analyzed by
log-linearizing the model around one of the two steady states.
It may be argued that a log-linear analysis is valid in an approximated
sense if the model is "almost" linear. This chapter demonstrates that this is
not the case. Indeed, we show that the results in Section 4 in Blanchard and
Galí (2007) are inaccurate both qualitatively and quantitatively.
4.2 The Model
The model is as in Blanchard and Galí (2007), that is, a standard NK model,
except for the real wage rigidity. Other than Blanchard and Galí (2007) we
add real money balances in the utility function because a disinflation describes
a path for the money supply and therefore we do need money demand.
85For a diﬀerent version of this chapter see "Real Wage Rigidities and the (Real) Cost of
Disinflation - A Comment on Blanchard and Galí -" with Guido Ascari, mimeo, January
2007.
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4.2.1 Households
We use the following instantaneous and separable utility function, with the
standard long-run properties86
Ut
µ
Ct (ho) ,
Mt (ho)
Pt
, Nt (ho)
¶
=
C1−σt
1− σ + dm
³
Mt(ho)
Pt
´1−ν
1− ν − de
N1+ϕt (ho)
1 + ϕ
,
(102)
where C is composite consumption (with elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerent types of goods equal to εp).
The household is subject to the following budget constraint
PtCt + (1 + rt)
−1Bt +Mt =WtNt − Tt +Πt +Bt−1 +Mt−1,
where rt is the nominal interest rate, Bt are one-period bond holdings, Mt is
the nominal money supply, Wt is the nominal wage rate, Nt is the labor input,
Tt are lump sum taxes, and Πt is the profit income, which is transferred to
consumers. The representative consumer maximizes the intertemporal utility
(using the discount factor β)
max
{Ct,Wt,Bt,Mt}
E0
∞X
t=0
βtUt
µ
Ct (ho) ,
Mt (ho)
Pt
, Nt (ho)
¶
, (103)
yielding the following first order conditions.87
Money demand equation:
Utm
UtC
=
dmCσt
mνt
=
rt
1 + rt
(104)
Labor supply equation:
Wt
Pt
= −UtN
UtC
=
deN
ϕ
t
1/Cσt
= deN
ϕ
t C
σ
t (105)
Euler equation:
1
Cσt
= βEt
∙µ
Pt
Pt+1
¶
(1 + rt)
µ
1
Cσt+1
¶¸
(106)
Blanchard and Galí (2007) assume the following ad-hoc88 partial adjust-
86Throughout the chapter, capital letters refer to levels, whereas small letters denote the
logarithm of a variable.
87For a detailed derivation see Technical Appendix of chapter 3.
88The ad hoc real wage adjustment rule is very much at odds with the idea of the New
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ment for the real wage: wt/pt = γ (wt−1/pt−1) + (1 − γ)mrst, where mrst is
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor supply in
logarithms and wt/pt is the real wage in logarithms. Accordingly, we add the
same real wage rigidities to the model, but in a non-linear fashion, that is
Wt
Pt
=
µ
Wt−1
Pt−1
¶γ
(MRSt)
1−γ . (107)
Wt
Pt
=
µ
Wt−1
Pt−1
¶γ
MRS1−γt =
µ
Wt−1
Pt−1
¶γ µ
−UtNt
UtCt
¶1−γ
(108)
Wt
Pt
=
µ
Wt−1
Pt−1
¶γ
(deN
ϕ
t C
σ
t )
1−γ (109)
4.2.2 Firms
Final good producers use the following aggregation technology
Yt =
∙Z 1
0
Y
εp−1
εp
i,t di
¸ εp
εp−1
(110)
Their demand for intermediate inputs is therefore equal to
Yi,t+j =
µ
Pi,t
Pt+j
¶−εp
Yt+j (111)
Firms’ pricing is described by the usual Calvo mechanism, where θp is the
fraction of firms not adjusting their price in any given period.
Under no indexation89 the problem of a price-resetting firm can be formu-
lated as
max
Pi,t
Et
∞X
j=0
θjp∆t,t+j
∙
Pi,t
Pt+j
Yi,t+j − TCret+j (Yi,t+j)
¸
(112)
s.t. Yi,t+j =
µ
Pi,t
Pt+j
¶−εp
Yt+j (113)
where Pi,t denotes the new optimal price of producer i and TCret+j (Yi,t+j) the
real total cost function and∆t,t+j is the stochastic discount factor (from period
t to period t+ j). The solution to this problem yields the familiar formula for
Keynesian literature to derive macroeconomic equations from first microeconomic principles.
A deeper critique goes beyond the scope of this chapter, which takes the real wage rigidity
as given and points out other weaknesses of the paper by Blanchard and Galí (2007).
89See Technical Appendix for the case with indexation to long-run inflation.
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the standard optimal resetted price in a Calvo setup
Pi,t =
µ
εp
εp − 1
¶
Et
P∞
j=0 θ
j
p∆t,t+j
£
P εpt+jYt+jMC
re
i,t+j
¤
Et
P∞
j=0 θ
j
p∆t,t+j
h
P εp−1t+j Yt+j
i (114)
where MCrei,t denotes the real marginal costs function.
This can be substituted as
Pi,t
Pt
=
µ
εp
εp − 1
¶µ
NUt
DNt
¶
, (115)
where
NUt = UtC (t)YtMCi,t + θpβEt
¡
πεpt+1NUt+1
¢
, (116)
and
DNt = UtC (t)Yt + θpβEt
³
πεp−1t+1 DNt+1
´
(117)
where πt+1 ≡ Pt+1Pt .
The aggregate price level evolves according to
Pt =
∙Z 1
0
Pi,t1−εpdi
¸ 1
1−εp
=⇒ (118)
1 =
"
θpπ
εp−1
t + (1− θp)
µ
Pi,t
Pt
¶1−εp# 11−εp
(119)
4.2.3 Technology
Firms produce a diﬀerentiated product using the following production function
Yt = F
αN1−αt (120)
where Y is output, and F and N are non-produced90 and labor inputs, respec-
tively.
For simplicity, we omit Fαt (since we are not explicitly interested in a cost
push shock).
90We deviate slightly from the notation by Blanchard and Galí (2007) who use the letter
M for the non-produced good, which we reserved for money.
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The labor demand and the real marginal cost of firm i is therefore
Ndi,t = [Yi,t]
1
1−α (121)
MCrei,t =
1
1− α
Wt
Pt
Y
α
1−α
i,t . (122)
Note that now marginal costs depend upon the quantity produced by the
single firm, given the decreasing returns to scale. In other words, diﬀerent
firms charging diﬀerent prices would produce diﬀerent levels of output and
hence have diﬀerent marginal costs.
Express MCrei,t as
MCrei,t =
1
1− α
Wt
Pt
Y
α
1−α
i,t (123)
=
1
1− α
Wt
Pt
"µ
Pi,t
Pt
¶−εp
Yt
# α
1−α
.
4.2.4 Aggregation and Price Dispersion
The aggregate resource constraint is now simply given by
Yt = Ct (124)
and the link between aggregate labour demand and aggregate output is pro-
vided by
Ndt =
∙Z 1
0
Ndi,tdi
¸
=
⎡
⎣
Z 1
0
"µ
Pi,t
Pt
¶−εp
Yt
# 1
1−α
di
⎤
⎦ = (125)
= [Yt]
1
1−α
Z 1
0
"µ
Pi,t
Pt
¶−εp# 11−α
di| {z }
st
= st [Yt]
1
1−α ,
where
st =
Z 1
0
"µ
Pi,t
Pt
¶−εp# 11−α
di (126)
is a sort of tax due to price distortions (and the non-linearity of the aggregator).
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) show that st is bounded below at one, so that
st represents the resource costs due to relative price dispersion under the Calvo
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mechanism with long-run inflation. Indeed, the higher st, the more labor is
needed to produce a given level of output. Note that st can also be rewritten
as a ratio between two diﬀerent price indexes Pt and ePt
st =
µ
PtePt
¶εp
where ePt = ∙Z 1
0
Pt (i)
−εp di
¸−1/εp
, (127)
as in Ascari (2004). Whenever there is price dispersion these two indexes evolve
diﬀerently from each other, determining a certain dynamics for st, that aﬀects
the level of production negatively . st would not aﬀect the real variables up to
first order whenever there is no trend inflation (i.e., π¯ = 1) or whenever the
resetted price is fully indexed to any variable whose steady state level grows
at the rate π¯.
To close the model we just need to solve for the dynamic of s using (126).
st =
Z 1
0
"µ
Pi,t
Pt
¶−εp# 11−α
di (128)
st = (1− θp)
∙
Pi,t
Pt
¸− εp
1−α
+ θpπ
εp
1−α
t st−1 (129)
4.2.5 System of Equations
The following equations are simulated non-linearly: (104), (105), (106), (115),
(117), (116), (119), (121), (122), and (129).
The money supply identity equation closes the system
mt−1rgmt = mtπt, (130)
where rgmt is the rate of growth of money, which is reduced under a disinfla-
tion.
In the presence of a real wage rigidity, equation (105) is replaced by equa-
tion (109).
4.3 Calibration
We calibrate the money demand in the same way as in Chari et al. (2000, pp.
1160 f.) who estimated the parameters for the United States91. While they
91Chari et al. (2000, p. 1161) use time series from Citibase for the observation period
1960:1 to 1995:4.
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have a non-separable utility function, we used a separable form as in Blanchard
and Galí (2007).
Given the money demand
dmCσt (1 + rt) = rtm
ν
t (131)
and taking the logarithm
lnmt =
ln dm
ν
+
σ
ν
lnCt −
1
ν
ln
µ
rt
1 + rt
¶
(132)
we obtain the same analytical form as Chari et al. (2000) (p. 1161, see equation
(25)):
ln
M (st)
P¯ (st)
= −ι ln ω
1− ω + ln c
¡
st
¢
− ι ln
µ
R (st)− 1
R (st)
¶
(133)
To obtain the same interest rate elasticity of money demand, we set ν =
2.5641 (Chari et al., 2000: ι = 0.39). To obtain the same output elasticity, we
set σ = 2.5641 as well (Chari et al., 2000: ω = 0.94). Furthermore, dm is set
to 0.063832.
As in Chari et al. (2000), deis calibrated in such a way that people de-
vote one third of their time to work (under zero steady state inflation). The
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent product types (εp) is set to 10.
Furthermore, we use a standard quarterly discount rate of one percent
(β = 0.99) and a quadratic disutility of labor (ϕ = 1), see e.g. Galí (2003). The
quarterly probability of not re-setting the prices (θp) is either set to 50 percent
(see Bils and Klenow, 2004) or to 75 percent, as in most of the calibrations
in the literature. The degree of decreasing returns to labor (1 − α) is either
0.975 (Blanchard and Galí (2007) write that the share of oil in production is
roughly 2.5 percent) or 0.67 (as in Chari et al., 2000) in our calibration.
Moreover, we also consider the case where non-resetting firms automatically
and fully index their prices to the steady state inflation rate (see Appendix for
details). This is motivated by the fact that full indexation is the only way to
obtain the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve (i.e., πt = βEtπt+1 + κyt,
as used by Blanchard and Galí, 2007) by log-linearizing the model around the
steady state, independently of the steady state inflation rate (see Ascari, 2004).
We experimented also with log-utility in consumption as in Blanchard and
Galí (2007) with no substantial diﬀerence in the results. The qualitative results
of this chapter do not depend at all on the chosen calibration, unless stated.
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4.4 Disinflation
4.4.1 Steady State Eﬀects
The obvious starting point to analyze a disinflation experiment is to look
at the steady state, since the standard NK model is non-linear and non-
superneutrality arises. In this respect Blanchard and Galí (2007, p. 1992)
write: "As is well known, the standard NKPC implies the presence of a long
run trade-oﬀ, however small, between inflation and the output gap. (...) in the
standard NK model, disinflation implies a permanently lower level output."
Blanchard and Galí (2007) use the standard linearized Phillips curve to
make their point:
πt = βπt+1 + κyt (134)
Dropping the time indices implies a positive long-run trade-oﬀ between infla-
tion and output: y = 1−βκ π. Figure (7) below shows that this conclusion is
an artifact of the linearization.93 Indeed, while it is true that the tangent of
the curve in the graph at zero inflation exhibits a positive slope equal to 1−βκ ,
the relationship between steady state output and inflation is non-linear. The
eﬀects of non-linearities are quite powerful and turn up very quickly, invert-
ing the relationship from positive to negative (see Ascari and Rankin, 2002,
Ascari, 2004 and Yun, 2005).94
Quite obviously the strength of the steady state eﬀects due to the non-
linearities depends on the parameters governing them, and in particular α, θp
and ϕ. In this respect, we show the graphs for the two values of α (the degree of
decreasing returns to labor) used by Blanchard and Galí (2007), and θp = 0.5
(probability of not re-setting the prices), following Bils and Klenow (2004), as
well as θp = 0.75, by far the value most commonly used in the literature, see
e.g. Galí (2003).
Our simulations show that non-linearities make the steady state relation-
ship between inflation and output more complex than described by Blanchard
and Galí (2007). Indeed, it may be positive only for very small level of in-
92Note that the page numbers refer to the revised online version on the website of Jordi
Galí (see reference list for the link), since the published article is forthcoming.
93In figure (7), steady state output at zero inflation was normalized to one, and quarterly
inflation rates are annualized.
94In the language of Graham and Snower (2004), BG only take the "time discounting ef-
fect" into account, whereas they ignore the "employment cycling" and "labor supply smooth-
ing" eﬀects.
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Figure 7: Steady state relationship between output and (annualized) inflation
flation, if α = 0.025; or it can instead reach a maximum for sizeable positive
inflation levels, if α = 0.33 (7.1% if θp = 0.5, 3.2% if θp = 0.75). It follows that
the long-run eﬀects of the Blanchard and Galí (2007) disinflation experiment,
i.e., from 4% to zero, are ambiguous and can be sizeable, depending on the
calibration chosen. Finally, it is worth noting that the long-run eﬀects depend
very much on the particular starting point. Steady state output changes are
very diﬀerent when disinflating from 8% to 4%, rather than from 4% to zero
(see Ascari, 2004).
Some authors may argue that at least in analyzing the steady state prop-
erties of the standard NK model one should allow for indexation. Partial
indexation would flatten and move the output peak somewhat to the right,
but would in any case not be reconcilable with Blanchard and Galí’s (2006)
linearized equations. And complete indexation to steady state inflation would
lead to an entirely vertical (flat in our figure (7)) long-run Phillips curve, thus
wiping out any trade-oﬀ.
4.4.2 Disinflation Dynamics
4.4.3 Standard New Keynesian Model
Blanchard and Galí (2007, p. 16) make the following qualitative statement:
"Hence, at the time of disinflation (period 0) output declines by dy(0) =
−1−βκ π∗, remaining at the lower level thereafter, with no additional transitional
dynamics coming into play." They argue quantitatively (p. 16-17): "In the
standard NK model, the real eﬀects of disinflations mentioned above tend to
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Figure 8: Output response after a disinflation from 4% to 0
be small, at least for plausible parameter values."
Blanchard and Galí’s (2007) assessment of the eﬀects of a disinflation in a
standard NK model is based on a specific log-linearized version of the model,
and is hence inevitably going to be mistaken both qualitatively and quantita-
tively.
Figure (8) shows the output dynamics (in percentage deviation) in the
standard NKmodel, following a sudden decrease in the rate of growth of money
from 4% to zero, as in Blanchard and Galí (2007).95 From a qualitative point
of view, it is evident that transitional dynamics comes into play, and they
do not necessarily seem to be at odds with empirical observations: output
drops on impact and then sluggishly returns to its new steady state value after
roughly two years and a half. From a quantitative point of view, the eﬀects
are quite big: the slump on impact is about 3.5% of the starting output level,
and output remains below steady state all along the adjustment path. It is
worth stressing that this path is obtained for the standard microfounded NK
model and standard calibration values.96
To sum up, Blanchard and Galí (2007) write that the standard NK model
cannot capture the empirical evidence of the negative eﬀects of a disinflation.
"The decline around the time of disinflation seems substantially smaller than
in actual disinflationary episodes, as reported in Ball (1994)." (p. 17) Again,
95In figure (8) , we thus set γ = 0 and use the benchmark calibration. The paths displayed
in figure (8) and onwards are obtained using the software DYNARE developed by Juillard
(1996) and others at CEPREMAP.
96As it is well-known, a microfounded money demand is crucial to obtain such a path (see,
e.g., Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, chp. 10, Ascari and Rankin, 2002 and references therein).
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Figure 9: Output response after a disinflation from 8% to 4%
we instead claim that the linearization and not the complete microfoundation
as such is responsible for this feature, and thus not the NK model per se.
A Remark: In Figure (8) we plot two paths for two diﬀerent cases: no in-
dexation (χ = 0) and full indexation (χ = 1) to the steady state rate growth
rate of money. For the benchmark calibration, the two paths are almost iden-
tical, showing that our result does not depend on the degree of indexation.
The reader should anyway keep in mind that indexation would matter more,
whenever eﬀects arising from non-linearities are stronger. Indeed, given the
benchmark calibration in figure (8), the old and new steady states are very
close. However, whenever the long-run eﬀects are sizeable instead (because
of diﬀerent starting inflation values and/or diﬀerent calibration), indexation
would obviously also matter for the dynamic adjustment path. This is an
important point, exemplifying how long-run eﬀects and short-run dynamics
interrelate with each other in a full non-linear model. Just as an illustration,
figure (9) shows the output dynamics following a disinflation from 8% to 4%
when θp = 0.75, under the two cases of no and full indexation (see Ascari and
Ropele, 2006).
4.4.4 Real Wage Rigidities
Blanchard and Galí (2007, p. 18) write: "Hence, a permanent reduction in
inflation of 4 percentage points in (annualized) inflation lowers the level of
output by roughly 50 basis points in the quarter the policy is implemented,
an eﬀect about 10 times larger than in the standard model." They claim that
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Figure 10: The eﬀect of real rigidities on the output response to a disinflation
real wage rigidities: (i) are necessary to obtain a dynamic response of output
after a disinflation, and (ii) they increase the impact eﬀect on output and thus
the overall costs of a disinflation manifold. We already saw that the first point
is not true, since a dynamic path for output is obtained in the standard model
without the need for any real rigidities.
Figure (10) shows that Blanchard and Galí’s (2007) assessment of the role
that real rigidities play for the dynamic adjustment after a disinflation is quali-
tatively right.97 Indeed, real wage rigidities cause stronger and more persistent
eﬀects on output. From a quantitative point of view, however, the eﬀects are by
no means of the order of magnitude suggested by Blanchard and Galí (2007).
In the extreme case assumed by Blanchard and Galí (2007), i.e., γ = 0.9, the
impact eﬀect is only twice as large as in the standard model. Moreover, during
the adjustment, output oscillates and the sudden slump is followed by a pro-
longed boom that partly compensates the initial output loss, with respect to
the case without real wage rigidities, where convergence is instead monotonic.
Moreover, figure (10) does not suggest a "relatively fast convergence to the
new steady state."
Finally it is worth noting that only very extreme values of γ tend to have
sizeable eﬀects on the output response, since for values smaller than 0.5, the
quantitative eﬀects of real rigidities are small (more on that in the next sub-
section).
97In Figure (10) and in the following ones, we assume full indexation, benchmark cali-
bration and again 4% to zero disinflation experiment. Note that the steady state values do
not depend on γ. The paths for output would be almost identical if we had assumed no
indexation.
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Blanchard and Galí (2007) stress the importance of real rigidities for infla-
tion dynamics. Indeed, in Section 6 of their article, Blanchard and Galí (2007)
show that real wage rigidities are able to generate inflation inertia and give
raise to a log-linearized Phillips curve equation which is very similar to the ad
hoc specification used in the empirical literature. This point can be visual-
ized by plotting the dynamic response of inflation, as in figure (9). Inflation
indeed displays more inertia for higher values of γ. Moreover, for the calibra-
tion chosen by Blanchard and Galí (2007), i.e., γ = 0.9, inflation exhibits a
hump-shaped response. However, (i) again only extreme values of γ tend to
have significant eﬀects; (ii) the numbers are rather disconcerting. Inflation
falls immediately with little inertia whatsoever in any case: the first quarter
after the disinflation, inflation is -50% (in annualized terms) if γ = 0, and -24%
if γ = 0.9. The reason lies in the fact that during the adjustment phase the
price level has to decrease in order to generate a higher level of real balances to
satiate the increase in money demand brought about by the disinflation (see,
e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, chapter 10, Ascari and Rankin, 2002 and
references therein).
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Figure 11: Inflation response after a disinflation from 4% to 0
4.4.5 Returns to Scale
Blanchard and Galí (2007, p. 18) write: "Finally, it is worth noticing that [...]
the quantitative results above change significantly if we assume the presence of
decreasing returns. Hence, under our alternative calibration with decreasing
returns, the loss of output at the outset of the disinflation is multiplied by a
factor of 4 relative to the case with no real rigidities (compared with a factor
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Figure 12: Decreasing returns to scale to labor and the eﬀect of real rigidities
of 10 in the case of constant returns). The smaller initial impact coexists with
a larger persistence."
Figure (12) shows indeed that assuming stronger decreasing returns to scale
to labor (DRTS) cause: (i) a higher persistence in the output response; (ii) a
downward rescaling of the eﬀect of real rigidities. From a quantitative point of
view, however, the eﬀects are not of the size described by Blanchard and Galí
(2007): actually assuming DRTS makes real rigidities virtually unimportant
for the output response to a disinflation.
Finally, it is worth visualizing the diﬀerent paths of the output response
for the Blanchard and Galí (2007) preferred calibration (i.e., γ = 0.9) under
almost constant and DRTS. With DRTS not only persistence, but also the
impact eﬀect is larger. Note that simply by diﬀerentiating (25) at p. 17 in
Blanchard and Galí (2007) with respect to α, it is easy to check that Blanchard
and Galí (2007) equations would actually imply the opposite: an increase in
α would lower the impact eﬀect of a disinflation.
4.5 Concluding Thoughts
In a stimulating paper Blanchard and Galí (2007) look at disinflations in a
standard NK model augmented by the introduction of real wage rigidities.
They claim this feature to be crucial for this class of models to explain the
cost of disinflation.
In this chapter, we show that, like others in the literature, the analysis in
Blanchard and Galí (2007) is flawed because it abstracts from non-linearities,
being based on the log-linear formulation of the standard NK model. Indeed,
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Figure 13: DRTS and ouput response after a disinflation from 4% to 0 (γ =
0.9)
we show that the results in their Section 4 are inaccurate both qualitatively
and quantitatively, once the full microfounded and non-linear model is taken
into account.
This chapter sounds a cautionary note with respect to log-linearized model
as a tool to analyze disinflation experiments theoretically. More generally, we
want to advocate the explicit consideration of the eﬀects of non-linearities,
whenever it is necessary and possible.
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4.6 Technical Appendix
4.6.1 Firms’ Price Setting
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This can be rewritten as
Pi,t
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=
µ
εp
εp − 1
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j UtC (t+ j)
∙µ
Pt+j
Pt
¶εp
Yt+jMCi,t+j
¸
(137)
DNt = Et
∞X
j=0
(θpβ)
j UtC (t+ j)
"µ
Pt+j
Pt
¶εp−1
Yt+j
#
(138)
The denominator can also be written as:
DNt = UtC (t)Yt +Et
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j=1
(θpβ)
j
"µ
Pt+j
Pt
¶εp−1
UtC (t+ j)Yt+j
#
(139)
Thus:
DNt = UtC (t)Yt + θpβEt
³
πεp−1t+1 DNt+1
´
(140)
and
NUt = UtC (t)YtMCi,t + θpβEt
¡
πεpt+1NUt+1
¢
. (141)
4.6.2 Indexation to Long-Run Inflation
Under this assumption, a firm that cannot re-optimize its price updates the
price according to this simple rule:
Pi,t = π¯χPi,t−1 (142)
where π¯ is the steady state inflation level and χ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that
measures the degree of indexation. If χ = 1, there is full indexation, if χ = 0
there is no indexation and the problem is the same one as in the previous case.
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The problem of a price-resetting firm then becomes the following
max
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and the first order condition is
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This can be rewritten again as
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Employing similar substitution as above these two equations can be written as
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and similarly
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The aggregate price level now evolves according to
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Aggregation and price dispersion:
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Under indexation to long-run inflation the following system of equations is
simulated:
Equations (104), (105), (106), (115), (150), (152), (154), (121), (122), and
(156).
In the presence of a real wage rigidity, equation (105) is replaced by equa-
tion (109).
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5 The East German Labor Market after Re-
unification
5.1 Introduction
This chapter98 oﬀers an explanation why the East German labor market has
made disappointing progress since German reunification. The unemployment
rate almost doubled from 1991 to 2004 (from around 10% to 20%)99, despite
massive migration flows from East Germany to West Germany. The oﬃcial
figures depict only the tip of the iceberg, since they neglect the big stock of
hidden unemployment (e.g. Bonin and Zimmermann, 2000, Fuchs and Weber,
2005). The share of long-term unemployed has climbed from a quarter in 1992
to almost a half in 2004 (e.g. Sachverständigenrat, 2004, p. 315). Since 1997
the East German GDP has grown at rates similar or even lower than those in
the West.100
This sorry performance may seem puzzling, for East Germans were the
envy of their newly-capitalist neighbors. Through reunification, they received
well-functioning legal and welfare systems, an orderly privatization process,
generous welfare benefits and infrastructure investment - all financed by trans-
fers from West Germany.
At the beginning of the nineties this jump start helped East Germany to
have a much smoother transition in terms of macroeconomic stability than its
Eastern European neighbors (see Appendix for a comparison to Czech Repub-
lic). But after an initial straw fire, spurred by West Germany, the Eastern
neighbors started to catch-up or even to overhaul. They are doing much bet-
ter in terms of their unemployment rates.101 Slovenia is the first transition
country which has a bigger GDP per head than East Germany. Others are
probably going to follow soon.
Today, transfers are running at around €80 billion per year102 (about 4%
98A short version of this chapter was published as "The Caring Hand that Cripples: The
East German Labor Market after Reunification," with Dennis Snower. American Economic
Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 375-382. Detailed version: IZA Discussion Paper, No. 2066,
April 2006.
99According to the oﬃcial statistics of the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2006) the unem-
ployment rate among dependently employed in East Germany (including Berlin) has risen
from 10.2% in 1991 to 20.1% in 2004.
100Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2005).
101The International Labour Organization (2004, p. 27) writes that the average unemploy-
ment rate in the transition economies is 9.2%.
102Numbers for 2003. Gross transfers (not deducting federal taxes) even amounted to 116
billion Euro (Ragnitz, 2003, p. 2).
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of Germany’s GDP) with no sign of abating; 50% of them constitutes social
assistance, e.g. unemployment and retirement benefits. About one quarter of
East German private consumption is paid by West German transfers. When
the transfer driven production is deducted, even in East Germany’s economi-
cally strong regions the GDP per head is only about 55% of the West German
level (Lehmann et al., 2005). Never before has a region received such immense
support in the move to capitalism; but the fledgling has not thrived. What
went wrong?
The answer, we will argue in this chapter, is that the East German labor
market is in trouble precisely because of the support it has received. This
chapter explores the phenomenon of "the helping hand that cripples." We
view East Germany as an important case study in the pitfalls to transition,
highlighting weaknesses of other European welfare systems.
We argue that the following mistakes were made in East Germany, each
disguised as social support.
Bargaining by proxy: Right after reunification, East German wage bar-
gaining was primarily in the hands of West German unions and employers,
rather than their weak and inexperienced Eastern counterparts (e.g. Sinn,
2002). The Westerners rapidly raised the Eastern wage, in the name of soli-
darity and equality with the Easterners. In reality, however, Western unions
feared migration of workers from East to West and of firms in the opposite
direction, resulting in downward pressure on Western wages and employment.
Given a low short-run elasticity of labor demand, there was an incentive to
raise East German wages.
Unemployment benefits and associated welfare entitlements: The
East inherited generous unemployment support through unification. This,
along with stringent job security provisions and other labor market regula-
tions, also put upward pressure on wages and kept them high (relative to
productivity) even once East Germans began to gain control over their own
wages.103
The post-unification wage hike led to a sharp fall in East German employ-
ment. Thereafter, however, Eastern real wages fell relative to productivity.
103Other factors also helped make labor expensive in the East. For instance, the huge
investment subsidies after reunification naturally raised the price of labor relative to the price
of capital. The decision to adopt a 1-to-1 exchange rate between the East and West German
mark after reunification, amounted to a massive appreciation of the EG currency. Yet we
will focus on bargaining by proxy, unemployment benefits, job security and regulations, for
without them, EG wages could have largely compensated for the investment subsidies and
the exchange rate decision.
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But the employment rate scarcely rose. Why?
Employment persistence: Through reunification East Germany inher-
ited West German labor legislation, including generous job security provisions
that raised firing costs and labor regulations that raised hiring costs. Due
to these "caring hand" measures, employment became much more persistent
(temporary labor market shocks had more persistent after-eﬀects).
Yet employment persistence cannot tell the whole story. It explains why
the employment response was sluggish, but not why the Eastern employment
rate hardly rose at all. Moreover, East German industrial labor productiv-
ity remains about one quarter beneath that in the West even though capital
intensity is higher than in the West (e.g. Klodt, 2000).
We will suggest that these phenomena may have arisen because East Ger-
man labor force participants fell into "traps," concerning low skills, aging of
the workforce, labor-saving capital and skills, capital underutilization, and un-
employment arising from the decline of the tradable sector. These traps were
all promoted by the "caring hand" of the West.
We maintain that the problems above extend well beyond East Germany;
rather, they appear whenever labor market institutions generate substantial
labor turnover costs and permit insiders to exert significant market power in
wage determination. Bargaining by proxy is widespread: within firms, insiders
(whether formally through unions or through informal understandings) often
have an influence on the wages of entrants. Employment persistence arises
whenever there are costs of adjusting employment, the labor force, or the size
of the insider workforces within firms. The traps are well-known to policy
makers everywhere, especially in terms of their consequences (e.g. poverty
traps, unemployment traps, low-skill traps). The existence of traps constitute
an important reason why labor market reforms often need to be deep (large
changes in policy instruments) and broad (involving several complementary
measures).
In what follows, Section 2 presents a model of wage determination and
employment persistence, Section 3 deals with the traps, Section 4 presents our
calibration exercises, and Section 5 concludes.
5.2 Wage Determination and Employment Persistence
We present a particularly simple model of the East German labor market,
with the following sequence of decisions: first, wages are determined, taking
into account their influence on migration and employment; second, migration
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decisions are made, taking wages as given; and third, firms make their employ-
ment decisions, taking wages and migration as given. We start with the last
stage.
5.2.1 Employment
Assume constant returns to labor and let a and ba be labor productivity in East
Germany and West Germany,104 respectively. (All West German variables are
denoted byb.) There is a random operating cost ξt,105 iid across workers and
time, with a mean normalized to zero and a constant cumulative distribution
Γ (ξt). For the wage w, firing cost f per worker (constant), firing rate φ,
and discount factor δ, an insider generates the following expected profit:106
Πt = −ξt +
P∞
t=0 δ
t (1− φ)t (a− w)− δφf
P∞
t=0 δ
t (1− φ)t.
The insider is fired when Πt < −f , so that ξt > (a− w + (1− δ) f) /
(1− δ (1− φ)). Thus the firing rate is given by the following implicit func-
tion:107
φ = 1− Γ
µ
a− w + (1− δ) f
1− δ (1− φ)
¶
(157)
Given a hiring cost h per worker (a constant), an entrant is hired when Π > h,
so that the hiring rate is
η = Γ
µ
a− w − δφf
1− δ (1− φ) − h
¶
(158)
The change in employment (∆Nt) is the diﬀerence between the hiring from
the unemployment pool (ηUtt−1) and the firing from the employment pool
(φNt−1), where Utt−1 and Nt−1 are the aggregate unemployment and employ-
ment levels: ∆Nt = ηUtt−1−φNt−1. Letting (nt = Nt/Lt) be the employment
rate and gt be the labor force growth factor (gt = Lt/Lt−1), this implies the
following employment dynamics equation:
nt =
1
gt
(η + (1− η − φ)nt−1) (159)
and similarly for West Germany.
104The capital stock is not modeled endogenously. Changes in wages have a substitution
and scale eﬀect. The overall outcome depends on their relative magnitude.
105For a detailed description of the sequencing see Appendix.
106In what follows, only those variables have time subscripts that, for given parameter
values, actually vary through time in our model.
107We assume that (∂Γ/∂φ) > −1, so that a rise in (a− w) or f both reduce the firing
rate.
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In this context, the massive East German wage hike after reunification
reduced the hiring rate η and thereby led to a sharply lower employment rate
nt (due to a downward shift of curve (159). Furthermore, this East German
employment collapse became long-lived since reunification raised the degree
of employment persistence. Specifically, the reunification-induced increase in
job security (raising firing costs) and labor market regulations (raising hiring
costs), reduced the hiring and firing rates (η and φ) and thereby raised the
employment persistence parameter (1− η − φ) /gt, ceteris paribus.
5.2.2 Migration
Theoretical Framework: Labor force growth in our model depends only on
migration. Assuming for simplicity that household per-period utility is equal
to consumption (no disutility of work), migration depends on the diﬀerence
between the expected present values of income to be earned in East and West.
In equilibrium, an insider’s present value is Vi = w + δ ((1− φ)Vi + φVo),
and for an entrant (both in the East) it is Vo = b+ δ (ηVi + (1− η)Vo), which
can be solved for Vi and Vo. Assume that East German insiders and outsiders
become outsiders in West Germany. Let bVi, bVo > Vo, implying migration from
East to West.
Workers are heterogeneous in terms of their mobility costs, which are iid
across workers and through time. For simplicity, we view the migration cost
solely as a congestion-type cost, letting the cost of the marginal migrant be
co (mijt), j = i, o; co0, co” > 0 ; where mij,t = MIj,t/Lt, MIj,t is the number
of migrants j, and MIi,t +MIo,t = ∆Lt. Setting this cost equal to the gain
from migration for the marginal insider and outsider, we obtain the aggregate
migration rate:108
mi = g − 1 = co−1
³bVo − Vi´+ co−1 ³bVo − Vo´ . (160)
A rise in the East German wage w (ceteris paribus) has countervailing
eﬀects: it raises the attractiveness of East German jobs, thereby reducing mi-
gration from East Germany; it also reduces the hiring rate and raises the firing
rate in East Germany, thereby increasing migration. In the calibrated model
below, the former eﬀect dominates, so that an East German wage increase
reduces migration. A fall in migration, in turn, reduces the growth rate of the
108In the long run, we expect some mechanism to come into operation, so that net migration
comes to an end (e.g. equalization of East-West income diﬀerentials). Since this tendency
has been minor since reunification, we leave it out of our current analysis.
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West German labor force and thereby increases the West German employment
rate (by the West German counterpart of equation (159). In short, a rise in
the East German wage leads to a rise in the West German employment rate.
Empirical Evidence: The empirical literature provides evidence in favor
of the hypothesis that higher wages have reduced the migration flows from
East to West. The wage diﬀerential for migrants shows a positive impact on
the propensity to migrate (Brücker and Trübswetter, 2004). Burda and Hunt
(2001) analyze the eﬀects of the wage level in source and destination states
on the actual propensity to migrate. For the beginning of the nineties they
conclude that "on balance, high wages in the East reduced emigration" (p. 62),
whereas they have diﬃculties in explaining the rise of the East-West migration
in 1998 by the actual wage and unemployment levels. They attribute it to a
change of expectations, specifically, the anticipation among East Germans that
there will be no complete wage adjustment in the near future.109
It is worth noting that the empirical literature does not find a clear-cut
relationship between income and migration. For example, Burda (1993), and
Burda et al. (1998) present a U- or S-shaped form, which they attribute to the
option value of waiting. Observe, however, that this stream of the literature
analyzes the eﬀect of household income on migration, and thus does not adopt
our approach of focusing on diﬀerentials in the expected present value of future
income streams. We are not aware of any empirical study that analyzes the
eﬀect of present value diﬀerentials on the propensity to migrate.
An indirect way of assessing the consequences of high wages is to examine
how East German wage increases aﬀect the overall East German wage bill.
For this purpose, it is necessary to estimate the elasticity of labor demand
(under the assumption that, in the presence of substantial East German un-
employment, employment decisions are determined by the labor demand). A
short-run labor demand elasticity greater than minus one of course implies
that the overall wage bill rises in the short run when wages increase. Riphan
et al. (1999, p. 27), surveying the empirical literature for Germany as a whole
on this issue, find that almost all the estimated labor demand elasticities lie
well beneath 1 in absolute terms.110
109In our calibration model below, we assume perfect foresight over the sample period, and
thus expectational swings are captured only insofar as they turn out to be realistic.
110Franz and König (1986), Stark and Jänsch (1988), Flaig and Steiner (1989), Kraft (1991),
Zimmermann and Bauer (1997), Buslei and Steiner (1999), and Falk and Köbel (2001) all
estimate labor demand elasticities that are consonant with our theory. The only outlier is
Trabert et al. (1998).
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Heitger (2001) or FitzRoy and Funke (1996) estimate eﬀects of wages on
employment for East Germany that are usually either greater than -1 or not
significantly diﬀerent from zero, which is consonant with our assumption that
an East German wage hike raises East German income.111
5.2.3 Wage Determination
Theoretical Framework: We consider two types of wage negotiations: (i)
"self-suﬃcient bargaining", in which the bargaining parties determine their
own wages (the standard wage bargaining framework) and (ii) "bargaining by
proxy". We represent West German wage bargaining as self-suﬃcient. We
view East German wages after unification as reflecting both types of wage
negotiations, with bargaining by proxy gradually giving way to self-suﬃcient
bargaining with the passage of time.
Under self-suﬃcient bargaining, let the wage be the outcome of a bargain
between each insider and his firm. The wage is renegotiated in each period.
Under bargaining agreement, the insider receives the wage w, and the firm
receives the expected profit (a− w) in each period. Under disagreement, the
insider’s fallback income is b, assumed equal to the unemployment benefit, and
the firm’s fallback profit is −f , i.e. during disagreement the insider imposes
the maximal cost on the firm (e.g. through strike, work-to-rule, sabotage)
short of inducing dismissal. Assuming that disagreement in the current period
does not aﬀect future returns, the insider’s surplus is w − b and the firm’s
surplus is a − w + f .112 The negotiated wage maximizes the Nash product
(w − b)µ (a− w + f)1−µ, where µ represents the bargaining strength of the in-
sider relative to the firm (assumed equal in East Germany andWest Germany).
Similarly for the West German wage. Thus the negotiated wages are
111One exception in Fitzroy and Funke’s (1998) paper is the estimated short-run elastic-
ity for low-skilled in East German manufacturing, which is smaller than -1 (-1.26), but
statistically not diﬀerent thereof at a 95% confidence level.
112Specifically, the expected present value of returns under agreement are Vi,t = wt +
δ
¡¡
1− φt+1
¢
Vi,t+1 + φt+1Vo,t+1
¢
and eΠt = (at − wt) + δ ³¡1− φt+1¢ eΠt+1 − φt+1ft+1´,
for the insider and the firm, respectively. (Since the wage is renegotiated in each pe-
riod, the present value in period t is independent of the present value in period t + 1.)
Since disagreement in the current period does not aﬀect future returns, the present
value of returns under disagreement are V 0i,t = bt + δ
¡¡
1− φt+1
¢
Vi,t+1 + φt+1Vo,t+1
¢
andeΠ0t = −ft + δ ³¡1− φt+1¢ eΠt+1 − φt+1ft+1´, for the insider and the firm, respectively.
Thus the insider’s surplus is Vi,t − V 0i,t = wt − bt = w − b and the firm’s surplus iseΠt − eΠ0t = at − wt + ft = a− w + f .
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w = (1− µ) b+ µ (a+ f) , wˆ = (1− µ) bˆ+ µ
³
aˆ+ bf´ (161)
We conceive of bargaining by proxy as a broad-based process, supported by
public institutions, involving all West German firms and workers (not just the
insiders). The bargaining parties are concerned with the East German wage
because, as noted, it positively aﬀects the West German employment rate.
A rise in the West German employment rate, in turn, raises the West
German workers’ payoﬀ and reduces the West German firms’ payoﬀ, along the
following lines. Let the average incomes of West German outsiders and insiders
(per period) be yˆo = ηˆwˆ + (1− ηˆ) bˆ and yˆi =
³
1− φˆ
´
wˆ + φˆbˆ, respectively.
Then the average West German worker’s bargaining surplus per period t + j
is yˆo (1− nˆt+j) + yˆinˆt+j − ey, where ey is the fallback income under bargaining
disagreement (exogenously given). This surplus rises with the employment
rate. For simplicity, let yˆo = ey, so that the West German worker’s per-period
surplus reduces to (yˆi − yˆo) nˆt+j. Thus the present value of the worker’s surplus
is
Λw =
Ã
(yˆi − yˆo)
∞X
j=0
δjnˆt+j
!
. (162)
Under bargaining agreement, the average firm receives ba − bw − bfbφbn −bhbη (1− bn) per period; under disagreement, it receives −f . Thus its surplus
per period is boa − bonnˆt, where boa = ba− bw− bhbη + bf (autonomous surplus) andbon = bfbφ − bhbη (induced surplus). We assume that bon > 0, so that, plausibly,
the firm’s surplus falls with the employment rate.113 The present value of the
firm’s surplus is
Λf =
∞X
j=0
δt (boa − bonnˆt+j) . (163)
Thus bargaining by proxy can be expressed in terms of a bargain over the
West German employment rate nˆt. The Nash product is (Λw)
µ (Λf)
1−µ, to be
maximized with respect to nˆt. Since the present values Λw and Λf are time-
invariant, the bargaining solution is time-invariant as well: nˆt = nˆ. Solving
the Nash bargaining problem, we obtain the following target West German
113In practice, there are of course many other reasons why the firms’ surplus falls as the
employment rate rises, e.g. firms’ costs of searching for workers rise, and firms’ fall-back
positions deteriorate (since insiders are likely to be more aggressive during bargaining dis-
agreement).
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employment rate: bn = µboabon (164)
The West German bargainers achieve this target employment rate by setting
the East German wage w.
The greater the workers’ bargaining strength µ, the greater is the West
German target employment rate and the higher the East German wage will
be set. The lower the migration costs co, the higher will be the East German
wage corresponding to a given West German target employment rate. In this
way, our model shows why the East German labor market suﬀered on account
of purported "advantages" of the East Germans - the ability to migrate to the
wealthy West and increased bargaining strength bestowed by their Western
counterparts.
Empirical Evidence: There is a large body of evidence, largely anecdotal,
documenting the dominant role of West Germans in East Germany’s wage bar-
gaining. For example, Schröder (2000, p. 9 f.) examines the role of Germany’s
largest industrial union IG Metall114 and its counterpart employers’ associa-
tion: "Im Gewerkschaftsbereich bestand für einige Monate eine sichtlich belas-
tende Konkurrenzsituation zwischen der bundesdeutschen IG Metall und der
IG Metall/DDR. Mit der Ankündigung der Währungsunion und der Präferenz
für das Beitrittsmodell ging die Federführung auf die westdeutsche Seite über.
Für Arbeitgeberverbände und IG Metall ergaben sich daraus unterschiedliche
organisationspolitische Strategien. Auf Arbeitgeberseite wurden zwar die ost-
deutschen Funktionäre formal bestätigt; real wurde jedoch für einen nicht
weiter definierten Zeitraum ein paternalistisches Lehrer-Schüler-Verhältnis in-
stalliert, mit dem die faktische tarifpolitische Entscheidungskompetenz bei
den westdeutschen Verbänden lag. Während die ostdeutschen Arbeitgeberver-
bände integriert wurden, musste sich die IG Metall/DDR auflösen. Deren
Führungselite wurde durch eine westdeutsche Funktionärsschicht ersetzt, die
den Aufbau nach westdeutschen Vorgaben und Erfahrungen gestalten sollte."
(authors’ translation: "In the union sector there was costly competition be-
tween the West German metal working union, IG Metall, and its counterpart
from East Germany for a couple of months. With the announcement of the
monetary union and the preference for accession, the decision-making was
handed over to the West German side. This gave rise to diﬀerent organi-
zational strategies for employers’ associations and the union IG Metall. On
114Responsible for the metal-working industry.
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Union Members / Employed East Germany West Germany
Year 1992 39.7% 28.7%
Year 1996 26.7% 26.6%
Year 2002 20.4% 23.8%
Table 2: Union membership
the employers’ side the East German oﬃcials were in fact confirmed oﬃcially.
But in reality there was a paternalistic teacher-pupil relationship for an indef-
inite time period, which gave the de facto decision making power to the West
German associations. While East German employers’ associations became in-
tegrated into the negotiation process, the East German metal working union
had to disband. Its leadership elite was replaced by a West German shift of
oﬃcials, which were to pursue East German reconstruction according to West
German guidelines.") This view is e.g. confirmed by Fitzroy and Funke (1996,
p. 460): "Initial collective bargaining was conducted between west German
unions (in the absence of legitimate union representatives in East Germany)
and managers of the existing large state-owned enterprises. As is well-known, a
succession of wage increases to the western level was agreed in the initial round
of negotiation." The influence of the unions on East German wage negotiations
was widespread. For instance, Burda and Funke (1993, p. 541) write that the
"unions were recognized by eastern German employers as the de facto negoti-
ating partner in collective bargaining and were thereby able to conclude wage
agreements in almost every industrial sector and many of the service branches.
The adoption of west German labor laws by the GDR [German Democratic
Republic], including those governing severance, made this organizational cam-
paign easier." We take these and many other observations as evidence in favor
of our "bargaining by proxy" hypothesis.
Furthermore, our analysis suggests East German wage negotiations are
emancipating themselves from West German influence. This is of course a
gradual process. Supporting evidence is that the membership rate of East
German unions halved from 1992 to 2002, while the reduction inWest Germany
during the same time period was more modest (see table (2)115).
Moreover, in 2000, three quarters116 of East German companies were not
tied to a collective bargaining agreement (see e.g. Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003),
whereas this number was as low as 25% in 1993.
115Source: Schnabel (2005, p. 185)
116The rate was about 50% for West Germany.
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There were many signs of resistance toWest German influence on East Ger-
man wage bargaining. For example, in 1993 the employer’s association in the
metal working industry dropped a collective bargaining agreement that would
have claimed wage increases of 26% (see Czada, 1998). In 2003 Germans wit-
nessed an important symbolical event which signal how far the emancipation
from the West had progressed. The powerful trade union IG Metall tried to
introduce the 35-hour week in East Germany, which would have pushed regular
working time down to the same level as in West Germany. To achieve enough
manpower for the strike, the trade union IG Metall had to bring supporters
from West Germany to the East, and these supports attempted to prevent
East German workers from entering their firms. In the end, the resistance of
the East German work force and employers to this "helping hand" became
overwhelming and the 35-hour week was not implemented in the East.
East German labor cost data is also suggestive. In figure (14)117, we
compare actual East German labor costs to the values predicted by our self-
suﬃcient bargaining model (for details of the calculation see Section 4 and
Appendix). Note that the relative diﬀerence between the actual and predicted
numbers has fallen steadily. We would interpret a ratio of 1 as East Ger-
mans bargaining for their wages entirely self-suﬃciently. Our model suggests
that West Germans still have a hand in the East German bargaining process,
although the influence has gone down significantly.
5.2.4 The East German Labor Market Equilibrium
Theoretical Framework: The East German labor market equilibria are
pictured in Fig. 1. The initial employment dynamics line E0E00 (correspond-
ing to equation (159), with its long-run equilibrium point A) is hypothetical: it
illustrates East German employment in the absence of the "caring hand". Line
E1E01 depicts employment in the immediate aftermath of reunification, reflect-
ing the influence of high wages due to bargaining by proxy and increased
employment persistence (E1E01 is steeper than E0E
0
0). The employment per-
sistence implies that the wage hike dampens employment gradually (moving
from point A to B along the dotted line), consonant with the fall of the East
German employment rate in the first part of the 1990s. Finally, E2E02 describes
employment once East Germans will gain direct control over their wages, so
that East German wages fall somewhat relative to productivity. E2E02 lies
117Numbers for the five new "Länder," excluding Berlin. Source: Statistische Ämter des
Bundes und der Länder (2005), own calculations.
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Figure 14: Actual labor costs divided by the predicted labor costs under self-
suﬃcient bargaining
well beneath E0E00 on account of generous unemployment benefits and firing
costs, keeping wages high. Thus the employment rate rises somewhat, but
then remains at a high level (at point C).
Empirical Evidence: East Germany inherited the West German job secu-
rity legislation with the social and monetary union in 1990. The empirical lit-
erature shows that the German (or continental European) labor markets show
greater persistence than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts (see e.g. Schmidt,
1999). Fitzroy and Funke (1996) find a higher persistence for the labor de-
mand for skilled and medium skilled labor in East Germany than in West
Germany, whereas the opposite is the case for low-skilled labor (0.77 (0.34) for
skilled workers in East Germany (West Germany), 0.73 (0.37) for semi-skilled
and 0.48 (0.68) for low skilled).
5.3 Traps
5.3.1 Theory
While the model helps explain why the East German employment rate fell grad-
ually in the aftermath of unification, it does not shed light on East Germany’s
stagnating employment rates. For this purpose, we consider the following labor
market "traps":
The low-skill trap: Due to generous unemployment benefits, associated
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Figure 15: East German employment
welfare entitlements, and job security provisions, wages relative to productiv-
ity remained particularly high for East German unskilled workers, who thus
became especially unemployment-prone. Without jobs, they could not get on-
the-job training and become integrated in the workforce, thus falling into a
low-skill unemployment trap.
The aging trap: Since the younger workers have a longer time horizon
over which they earn wage income, to be set against the fixed cost of migrating,
the younger East Germans have had a greater incentive to migrate to the West,
where expected income is higher. This incentive was reinforced by the post-
unification wage hike: since the elasticity of labor demand is smaller in the
short run than in the long run, the wage hike raised wage income more in the
short run, i.e. the time span relevant to older workers. Insofar as older workers
are less flexible and versatile than their younger counterparts, this may lead
to less flexible and versatile capital accumulation. Thereby the East became
susceptible to an "aging trap" in which old skills and old capital dampened
labor productivity and thus labor demand.
The labor-saving trap: Due to the post-unification wage hike and in-
vestment subsidies, it became profitable for firms to invest in labor-saving
physical capital. Once this capital was in place, it was of course more diﬃcult
to find jobs for East Germany’s unemployed. Investment in labor-saving capi-
tal raised incentives for workers to acquire the associated "labor-saving labor"
skills. The resulting equilibrium, "labor-saving capital-skills trap," economizes
on labor, despite high unemployment.
The "wrong" capital-skills trap: The vast investment subsidies in East
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Germany generated capital that propped up uncompetitive enterprises and was
designed to prevent layoﬀs in declining industries. Firms had relatively little
incentive to avoid underutilization of such capital. This phenomenon provides
an explanation for the puzzling phenomenon that labor productivity is gener-
ally lower in the East than West, even though capital intensity is comparable
or higher. We hypothesize that the "wrong capital" is complementary with
"wrong skills", which also tend to be underutilized. The resulting trap helps
keep East Germans unemployment-prone and dependent on hand-outs from
the West.
The nontradable trap: The massive subsidies from West Germany trig-
gered a rapid rise of product demand in East Germany. Thus the prices of
nontradables rose, while tradable prices remained perforce unchanged (while
"imports" of tradables from West to East rose). This, combined with wage
compression between East and West (due to bargaining by proxy, uniformly
generous unemployment benefits and job security provisions), caused real pro-
ducer wages to rise much faster in the tradable than the nontradable sector.
The resulting reallocation of labor towards the nontradable sector led to higher
unemployment in the transition. Some of this unemployment persisted since
retraining takes time and many unemployed workers remained jobless due to
generous unemployment benefits, lack of on-the-job training, and retraining
costs.
To begin with, we consider a particularly simple way of incorporating them
in our previous analysis. Divide the labor market into an "employment cre-
ating" sector (EC) and an "employment destroying" sector (ED). In the
"low-skill trap," skilled labor (with a relatively high employment rate) is in
EC, whereas low-skilled or unemployed labor is in ED. In the "aging trap,"
EC employs young labor and flexible capital (with expanding labor demand)
and ED employs old labor and traditional capital (with stagnant labor de-
mand). In the "labor-saving trap," EC uses labor-using skills whereas ED
uses labor-saving skills. In the "wrong capital-skills trap," EC employs com-
petitive capital and skills, whereas in ED they are defensive.
We now amend the model above by supposing that EC-workers have higher
productivity than ED-workers, but that workers’ wages are compressed due to
unemployment benefits, firing costs, etc. Then EC-workers are more profitable
and thus have higher hiring rates and lower firing rates than ED-workers
(ηEC > ηED, φEC < φED). Suppose that firms give preference to EC-workers,
employing ED-workers only once EC-workers are not available. Then the
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Figure 16: Traps: a simple depiction
employment dynamics curve has a kink at the initial equilibrium point A, as
illustrated by the curve E0E
0
0 in Fig. 2.
118
In this context, the post-unification wage hike shifts the kinked curve down-
ward from E0E
0
0 to E1E
0
1 in the figure. Thus employment falls from n1 to n2
(over two periods in the figure). Then the newly unemployed workers n2 − n1
lose their EC-skills. So the number of EC-workers shrinks and the kink moves
leftward to n2, so that the employment dynamics curve becomes E1E”1 .
Finally, suppose that after two periods, the wage falls back partially, as
East Germany gains control over its wage bargaining, so that the employment
dynamics curve shifts to E2E
0
2. Provided that this upward shift is smaller than
the size of the kink, then the equilibrium employment rate remains at n2, point
B (rather than point C, the final equilibrium in Fig. 1): the labor market is
in a "trap."
5.3.2 Empirical Evidence
Figure (17) shows that the number of employees in East Germany119 has fallen
enormously since 1990. The tendency is even more pronounced for the industry
or the tradable sector in general.
The East German competitive position has been aﬀected dramatically by
118The figure assumes, for simplicity, that Γ” = 0, so that ∂η/∂a = −∂φ/∂a, and thus the
employment persistence parameter is the same for ED- and EC-workers.
119Excluding Berlin. For the development we use the numbers from Statistische Ämter
des Bundes und der Länder (2005) from 1991 to 2004. The percentage change from 1990 to
1991 is calculated by using the number of dependent employed people from DIW (1993, p.
256) and DIW (1994, p. 731).
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the 1:1 exchange rate adoption and bargaining by proxy. Sinn (2002, p. 118)
writes that labor costs were only 7% of the West German level before unifica-
tion. The ratio has reached about 50% in 1991.120 Bargaining by proxy has
strengthened this development. Werner Smolny (2003) shows that nominal
labor costs where increasing by about a quarter from 1990 to 1991, while the
labor productivity was falling slightly.
Figure (18)121 illustrates an important puzzle: although the labor cost nor-
malized by productivity have almost steadily fallen since 1991, the East Ger-
man employment rate has shown no substantial sign of improvement since
1992. The initial labor cost shock had extremely long after-eﬀects, which can-
not be entirely explained by labor market persistence. This provides support
for the existence of labor market traps.
We provide empirical evidence for consequences of the diﬀerent traps, ex-
plained in the theoretical section:
The low-skill trap: The unemployment rate among people without qual-
ification in East Germany jumped from around 30% in 1991 to more than a
half at the end of the nineties (DIW Berlin et al., 2002, p. 342).
The aging trap: The empirical literature provides support that young
120Own calculations. We divided the labor cost per employee in East Germany by the
number in West Germany (excluding Berlin entirely). Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes
und der Länder (2005).
121All numbers for East Germany without Berlin. The employment rate is defined as
(1-oﬃcial unemployment rate), excluding self-employed. Source: Statistische Ämter des
Bundes und der Länder (2005) and Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2006).
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ployment rate
people have a higher propensity to migrate (see e.g. Burda, 1993, Burda et
al., 1998, Büchel and Schwarze, 1994, Brücker and Trübswetter, 2004). Burda
and Hunt (2001) and Hunt (2000) write that movers are on average eleven to
fifteen years younger than stayers.
Further evidence is provided by the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
forschung (2005), which predicts that the potential labor force122 in East Ger-
many will fall from 10 million today to about 4.5 million people in 2050,
whereas the drop in West Germany will be more moderate (from 40 to 30
million people).123
The labor-saving trap: There is evidence that high wages, coupled with
investment subsidies, channeled investment flows heavily into labor saving
equipment. This tendency is clearly visible in the manufacturing sector. Ger-
ling (2002) shows that investment into capital intensive sectors had a much
larger share in East Germany than in West Germany, whereas the opposite
was the case for skilled-labor-intensive sectors.
Table (4) shows that the capital intensities (defined as capital stock divided
by the number of employees) in the industry are bigger in East Germany than
in West Germany. This phenomenon is even more pronounced when excluding
122Defined as number of people in the age group from 15 to 64.
123Only a small part of the stronger reduction in East Germany can be explained by the
inner German migration. A bigger proportion is due to a more pronounced immigration of
foreigners to West Germany (and a lower birth rate in East Germany). We conclude that
better long run perspectives render West Germany more attractive.
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Sectors124 East Germany West Germany
Capital-intensive 60% 45%
Skilled-Labor-intensive 26% 39%
Unskilled-Labor-intensive 14% 16%
Table 3: Sectoral investment
Sectors125 East Germany West Germany
Capital-intensive 60% 45%
Skilled-Labor-intensive 26% 39%
Unskilled-Labor-intensive 14% 16%
Table 4: Industrial capital intensities
the construction sector (see e.g. Sachverständigenrat, 2004, p. 311).
The "wrong" capital-skills trap: Sinn (1995) argues that the enormous
investment subsidies have created a negative cost of capital in East Germany.
Thus, capital was not only a factor of production, but also an economic good.
Even if the cost of capital was negative in some cases, on average profitable
projects were chosen. Nevertheless, the return on capital in East Germany
was significantly lower in East Germany than in West Germany during the
nineties. Quehenberger (2000, p. 127) estimates that on average it was 5%
(15%) from 1991 to 1998 in East (West) Germany and 8% (16%) from 1995 to
1998.
Besides generous investment subsidies there are many other institutional
reasons for the creation of "wrong" capital: Sinn (1995) writes e.g. that gen-
erous depreciation rules were not helpful for founders of new firms, since they
usually do not have any other substantial sources of income, which they could
use to write-oﬀ their losses. Furthermore, much of the East German investment
was not flowing into productive assets. Instead it was channeled into private
building activity, stimulated by high wages (causing a boost in demand for
rental housing) and the investment subsidies (ensuring low production costs),
see e.g. Sinn (1995).
The nontradable trap: While prices in the service sector (which contains
a big part of the non-tradable sector) have risen by almost 50% from 1991 to
2001, the price increase in the manufacturing sector (excluding construction)
was only 13%.126 Manufacturing comprises a much smaller share of total em-
ployment in East Germany than in West Germany or in the Eastern European
126Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
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transition countries (see e.g. Quehenberger, 2000, p. 131, and Statistische
Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2005).
5.4 Calibration
5.4.1 Employment, Hiring and Firing Rates
We now calibrate the model of Section 2 to provide a rough picture of how,
quantitatively, various elements of the "caring hand" can influence East Ger-
man employment. We begin by predicting the East German employment path,
based on our employment dynamics function (159), the hiring rate (226), and
the firing rate (225), as well as actual labor costs, productivity, firing costs,
and unemployment benefits from 1991 to 2004. (Source: Statistische Ämter
des Bundes und der Länder, 2005). Real productivity (a, gross value added
per worker) in 2004 was about €36,000 and real wages (w, measured as real
labor costs) were about €22,000. (All estimates are divided by the German
GDP deflator, base year 1991.)
We interpret actual labor costs as embodying the outcome of the combina-
tion of wage bargaining forms - bargaining by proxy and self-suﬃcient bargain-
ing - that have occurred in East Germany. Thus our predicted employment
path is viewed as the outcome of this bargaining combination. Discrepancies
between our predictions and the actual employment time series we then inter-
pret a consonant with the existence of traps, providing indirect evidence of the
cumulative size of these traps.
To derive the hiring and firing rates, we begin by considering a modified
form of the firm’s profit function:
Πt = −ζtξ + at − wt − φt+1δft+1 +
¡
1− φt+1
¢
δEt [Πt+1] (165)
where we now explicitly take productivity growth into account. We divide
time into the sample period (1991-2004) and post-2004 (the "long run"). The
operating cost ξ is assumed to grow at 2 percent per annum over both sub-
periods (ζ = 1.02). We use the actual productivity and wage numbers from
1991 to 2004 and we assume that in the long-run the productivity and all real
costs (the wage, the hiring and firing costs, and the operating cost ξ) all grow
at the same rate.
In the current period t, the profit is
¡
−ζtξ + at − wt
¢
. With probability
φt+1 the worker is fired at the beginning of the subsequent period and the
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firm has to pay the firing costs ft+1, which are discounted (δ) at rate 3%.127
With probability
¡
1− φt+1
¢
the worker is retained and thus the firm earns the
expected profit Et [Πt+1].
Firing costs (ft) are set to 60% of labor costs.128 We set the hiring costs
(ht) to 10% of labor costs (see Chen and Funke, 2003). The replacement ratio
(of unemployment benefits to wages) is set at 60%.129 In practice, after being
fired unemployment benefits generally amount to 60%130 of the last net income
during a first stage.131
In this context, we also derive a time path of wages under self-suﬃcient
bargaining. For this purpose, we first derive the annual West German bar-
gaining strength parameter µt for each year from the wage equation (161),
using annual West German data on bwt, bbt, bat, and bft; then we assume the
same µt for East Germany, and derive the East German wage wt, using annual
East German data on bt, at, and ft.
The firm, knowing the current period’s operating costs, fires a worker in
period t if Πt < −ft and it hires if Πt > ht. Thus, we obtain the following two
implicit functions:
φ
t
= 1− Γ
Ã
1
ζt (at − wt) +
1
ζtft−
1
ζt δφt+1ft+1 +
1
ζt δ
¡
1− φt+1
¢
Et [Πt+1]
!
, (166)
and
ηt = Γ
Ã
1
ζt (at − wt)−
1
ζtht−
1
ζt δφt+1ft+1 +
1
ζt δ
¡
1− φ
t+1
¢
Et [Πt+1]
!
. (167)
We linearize the firing and hiring rates (for technical details, see Appendix)
127This is the average real interest rate over the whole observation period, calculated as
the yearly money market interest rate minus the inflation rate (using the GDP deflator).
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
128The numbers are similar to evidence from Grund (2006) who writes that the severance
payment for collectively dismissed workers in Germany is 8500 Euro, while it is 7000 Euro
for individidually dismissed person. Tenure and the wage level are the most important
determinants.
129In 2002 the net replacement ratio of a person (without children) with the average pro-
duction worker’s salary was between 54 and 85% (depending on the family status) according
to the OECD (2004, p. 95).
13067% with children.
131The German unemployment benefit system diﬀerentiates between two stages. Roughly
speaking, everyone who was at least employed (and insured in the social security system) for
twelve months during the last three years is in a first stage eligible for "Arbeitslosengeld I"
(usually for half a year to a year, with an exception for older workers). In the second stage
unemployed can obtain "Arbeitslosengeld II" (lower level of benefits), but have to prove
their neediness.
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with a first order Taylor expansion and obtain:
φ
t
= φ0 −
1
ζt
Γ00 [(at − wt)− (at,0 − wt,0)] (168)
− 1
ζt
Γ00 [(ft − ft,0)] +
1
ζt
δφ0Γ
0
0 (ft+1 − ft+1,0)
−δ 1
ζt
(1− φ0)Γ00 (Et [Πt+1]− Et,0 [Πt+1])
and
ηt = η0 +
1
ζt
Γ00 [(at − wt)− (at,0 − wt,0)] (169)
− 1
ζt
Γ00 (ht − ht,0)−
1
ζt
δφ0Γ
0
0 (ft+1 − ft+1,0)
+
¡
1− φ
0
¢ 1
ζt
δΓ00 (Et [Πt+1]−Et,0 [Πt+1]) ,
where variables with a subscript 0 are at the reference point, around which
we linearize. We choose the year 2004 for self-suﬃcient bargaining to be the
reference point for our first order Taylor expansion. Thus, Et,0 [Πt+1] would
be the expected future profit in period t if all variables trended along a 2%
through the anchor point in 2004.
Since we assume that the productivity, the wage, and hiring and firing
costs, and operating costs (all in real terms) grow at 2% in the long-run,
hiring and firing rates are constant in the long-run. From 1991 to 2004, firing
and hiring rates would not change if a, w, f , and X would all grow along the
2%. From the previous firing and hiring rate equations, it thus follows that
Et−1,0 [Πt] = 1ζEt,0 [Πt+1] .
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We let our predicted hiring and firing rates, based on the actual data,133 be
η2004 = 0.57 and φ2004 = 0.125 in 2004, respectively. Furthermore, we assume
that the predicted wage path converges to the self-suﬃcient (SS) bargaining
wage path within ten years.134 In other words, the hiring and firing rates for
132The same is true for (at,0 − wt,0), ft,0, and ht,0.
133The estimated average risk of unemployment given employment is about 0.08 for West
Germany (Wilke, 2005). Under a steady state unemployment rate of 10% the firing rate of
8% corresponds to a hiring rate of 72% in our model. The duration of unemployment was 35
weeks in West Germany and 44 weeks in East Germany in 2004 (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2005). Thus we set the hiring rate to 57% in East Germany. Consistent with a steady state
unemployment rate of 18%, the firing rate is set to 12.5%.
134The wages under the prediction are linearly adjusted to the self-suﬃcient value in 2014.
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self-suﬃcient bargaining in 2004 are the same as the predicted ones in 2014.
Since we do not know the hiring and firing rate under self-suﬃcient bargaining
in 2004 (anchor point), we set the values η2004,SS and φ2004,SS in such a way
that we obtain the expected values (η2004 and φ2004) for the prediction. All
previous values are calculated recursively, based on the linearized model, under
the assumption of perfect foresight over the entire sample period.
5.4.2 Migration
We endogenize migration by regressing the East German labor market growth
due to migration on the derived present value diﬀerentials135 of incomes be-
tween East and West, and use the estimated coeﬃcients for predictions in the
policy exercises. In particular, we proceed along the following lines.
The East German workforce (employed plus unemployed people) is about
50% of the population.136 To generate the actual eﬀect of migration on the
workforce (mit) we multiply the actual number of migrants by 0.5 and divide
it by the workforce.
For the calibration we once again modify equation (160) to take account
of productivity growth. Specifically, we assume that the migration costs of
the marginal migrant co (mijt), j = i, o grow at the same rate as productivity
and all the firm’s costs in the long run (viz., 2 percent).137 Thus migration is
mij,t = co−1
³
Kj
ζt
´
, so that the migration function becomes
mit = co−1
Ã bVo,t − Vi,t
ζt
!
+ co−1
Ã bVo,t − Vo,t
ζt
!
. (170)
Next, we estimate the equation mit = β1 + β2
h³
2bVo,t − Vi,t − Vo,t´ /ζti,
through ordinary least squares. We use the estimated coeﬃcients (denoted by
the tilde (e) β˜1 and β˜2 to obtainmit, which is the estimated eﬀect of migration
on the labor force growth.
Naturally, the growth of the labor force cannot be entirely explained by
migration, since other factors such as population growth, active labor market
policies or early retirement schemes played a important roles (see e.g. Fuchs
and Weber, 2005, or DIW Berlin et al., 2002), and these latter factors are not
explained in our model. Thus, we define an exogenous residual (gt,x), which
135Based on our model predictions.
136Sources: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2006) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2005).
137Omitting this assumption would mean that East Germany would be completely de-
populated when East and West Germany grow at the same rate since the absolute present
value diﬀerential would grow without recess (because of the time trend).
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Figure 19: Development of the number of employees (1991=1)
is the diﬀerence of the actual labor force growth in the respective year (gt,a)
minus the eﬀects the calculated eﬀects of migration on the labor force (mit,m),
thus reading: gt,x = gt,a −mit,m.
Consequently, the labor force growth rate under diﬀerent policy exercises is
predicted as: gt,a = mit,m+gt,x, where only the migration eﬀects vary, which is
calculated based on the estimated coeﬃcients β˜1 and β˜2
138, and the exogenous
component stays constant.
The calculated hiring and hiring rates and the labor market growth are then
substituted into the employment dynamics curve (159), in order to generate
our predicted path of employment rates as well as the path under self-suﬃcient
bargaining.
5.4.3 Results
Fig. (19)139 shows the time series of the actual employment development and
the predicted employment. Note that our model predicts an improvement of
employment since the mid-nineties, whereas the actual numbers do not do so.
This discrepancy could be captured by our trap model.
Figure (20) shows the prediction of employment rate under diﬀerent policy
exercises and the actual development (excluding job creation programs, which
138The estimated values for β˜1 and β˜2 can be found in the Appendix.
139Note that employment rates are shown in figure (14). The employment path in figure
(19) is derived from the employment rates and the labor force growth rate.
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cannot be captured by our model).140
Observe that the bargaining by proxy curve tends towards the self-suﬃcient
bargaining prediction, in agreement with our observation that self-suﬃcient
bargaining is becoming increasingly pervasive in East Germany.
In this context, we now consider the eﬀects of two policies:
1. reducing the ratio of firing costs to wages by 5% and
2. reducing the replacement ratio (of unemployment benefits to wages) by
5%.
We examine these policies under self-suﬃcient bargaining. For this purpose,
we linearize equation (225) with respect to all variables determining future
profits Et [Πt+1]. See Appendix for technical details.
Fig. (20) tells an interesting story about various ingredients of the "caring
hand." It shows that if the firing cost ratio and the replacement ratio would
both have been reduced by 5%, the employment path ("SS barg + f and rr
reduction" in the figure) would have risen substantially above the employment
rates under self-suﬃcient bargaining alone, which in turn is substantially above
the actual employment path.
These two policies are complementary in our model. For example, a re-
duction in the replacement ratio reduces the wage and thereby reduces the
firing rate; this gives more leverage to the employment-promoting influence of
a reduced firing cost (via wage reduction), since this reduced firing cost and
wage is paid over a longer expected job tenure. Such policy complementarities,
along with the migration induced by the policies, account for the magnitude
of the employment eﬀects.
Including labor market traps in our calibration would of course imply that,
in the absence of suﬃciently large positive shocks, employment rates would
display little tendency to recover from their post-unification trough. In this
context, our analysis implies that East German employment rates would have
been higher over the past decade if the initial downturn in employment had
been less encumbered by the West German "caring hand."
140It is worth noting that diﬀerences to figure (19) arise because of the exogenous growth
of the East German labor force. The East German labor force (excluding Berlin), defined as
employed plus unemployed, grew from 1995 to 1997. Consequently, the predicted increased
number of jobs is not visible in the predicted employment rate. The actual employment
rates in figure (20) include Berlin, which enables us to exclude job creation programs from
the data.
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Figure 20: Employment rates under diﬀerent policies
5.5 Concluding Thoughts
This chapter provides a sober assessment of the East German labor market
problem, suggesting that this problem has been exacerbated by various forms
of "care" that the East has received from the West: support in bargaining,
unemployment benefits, and job security provisions, in particular.
Our analysis also implies that it is pointless to wait for the problem to
disappear of its own accord. In the absence of fundamental policy reform, the
damage is permanent, not temporary. The reasons are that (i) even once the
East Germans gain control over their own wages, the resulting wage negotia-
tions - based on generous unemployment benefits and job security provisions -
will still generate wages that are high relative to productivity and (ii) the re-
sulting unemployment can become perpetuated through various labor-market
traps. Without a policy reform package that is "deep" (radically improves
employment incentives) and "broad" (a range of complementary measures),141
East Germany is likely to remain dependent on the caring hand that cripples.
141See, for example, Coe and Snower (1997).
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5.6 Technical Appendix
5.6.1 Further Empirical Evidence
In table (5), we borrow an example from Burda (1994, p. 8) which nicely
illustrates what happened in the dawn of transition (from 1990 to 1993), by
comparing some numbers for East Germany and Czech Republic:
East Germans enjoyed significant real wage increases due to bargaining by
proxy and the introduction of the Deutsch Mark. The latter served as an an-
chor and prevented prices to increase by the same magnitude as in other East-
ern European countries. Nevertheless, there were considerable price increases
in the non-tradable sector. The drop in real GDP was similar in East Germany
and in Czech Republic. East Germans did not perform worse because they re-
ceived massive consumption transfers and investments into the infrastructure,
which was by the most part paid by the West. Transfers boosted the non-
tradable sector, especially the construction industry, where a boom-bust cycle
was initiated whose consequences can still be seen today (the construction
industry in East Germany is still shrinking).
5.6.2 Theoretical Derivations: Bargaining by Proxy
Since the present value of the worker’s surplus is time-invariant, the present
value of the firm’s surplus is time-invariant as well. Thus the solution of the
Nash optimization is time-invariant:
bnt = bn. (171)
Then the present values from equations (162) and (163) can be expressed
as
Λw = (yˆi − yˆo)
Ã ∞X
t=0
δtnˆt
!
= (yˆi − yˆo) bnÃ ∞X
t=0
δt
!
(172)
= (yˆi − yˆo) bn 1
1− δ
Λf =
∞X
j=0
δt (boa − bonnˆt+j) (173)
=
boa
1− δ −
bonbn
1− δ
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Changes (1990-1993) GDP Prices W142 N143 U144 CAD145
East Germany -22% +34% 62% -34% 16% 77%
Czech Republic -21% +110% -18% -8% 4% 1%
Table 5: Comparison of Czech Republic and East Germany
∂Λw
∂n
=
yˆi − yˆo
1− δ (174)
∂Λf
∂n
= − bon
1− δ (175)
Inserting these into the Nash equation:
µ (Λw)
−1 ∂Λw
∂n0
(Λf) + (1− µ)
∂Λf
∂n0
= 0 (176)
After some re-formulation we obtain:
bn = µboabon (177)
Thus: bn = µba− bw − bhbη + bfbfbφ− bhbη (178)
The greater the West German productivity aˆ and the greater the workers’
bargaining strength µ, the greater is the West German target employment rate
and the higher the East German wage will be set. The lower the migration
costs co, the higher will be the East German wage corresponding to a given
West German target employment rate. In this way our model shows why the
East German labor market suﬀered on account of a purported "strength" of the
West German labor market - high productivity - and purported "advantages"
of the East Germans - the ability to migrate to the wealthy West and increased
bargaining power bestowed by their Western counterparts.
5.6.3 Detailed Description of the Calibration
Hiring and Firing under Constant Growth Rates:
Sequencing of Decisions: There is an operating cost ξt that is a random
variable, with a cumulative distribution Γ (ξt), which is normalized to zero and
iid across workers and time. See figure (28) for an illustration of the sequencing.
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Migration 
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…
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Figure 21: Sequencing of decisions
Under bargaining by proxy, West German firms and workers bargain for
the East German wage level. In sectors where self-suﬃcient bargaining pre-
vails, East German firms and insiders bargain for their wage, as described in
equation (161). We assume that insiders seek to maximize the utility of the
representative insider (the median voter).
After the operating costs are revealed East Germans decide if they want
to migrate, based on their present value of income. Finally, the employment
decision is taken. If a firm hires a worker, it has to pay the operating cost ξt.
The current profit generated by the worker is Πt = at − wt − ξt.
Workers who are hired or not fired remain employed until the end of the
period (the opposite is true for workers who are fired or not hired). At the
beginning of the next period (t+ 1), the same process starts again.
Firing Rate: When the productivity, wages (labor costs) and firing costs
trend all along the same constant time path and when this constant time path
is equal to the trend of the operating costs, then the hiring and firing rates
are constant (see theoretical part where we assumed a zero growth rate for
simplicity). We assume that there are constant returns to labor.
Let the firing rate be φ. In the initial period, the insider generates a profit of
a−w−ξ ; if he is fired at the beginning of the next period (with probability φ),
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then he generates a cost of ζf (under the assumption that wages, productivity,
and the firing costs grow at a rate of ζ − 1 per year, with ζ > 1146); if he is
retained at the beginning of the next period (with probability (1− φ)), then
he generates an expected profit of ζ (a− w). At the beginning of the third
period, the probability of being retained is (1− φ)2, and the probability of
being retained at the beginning of the second period but fired in the third is
(1− φ)φ; and so on. Thus the present value of the profit generated by an
insider is
Πi = (a− w)− ξ +
¡
δζ (1− φ) (a− w) + (ζδ)2 (1− φ)2 (a− w) + ...
¢
−ζδ
¡
φf + (1− φ)φζδf + (1− φ)2 φζ2δ2f + ...
¢
= (a− w)− ξ +
∞X
t=1
(ζδ)t (1− φ)t (a− w)− ζδφf
∞X
t=0
(ζδ)t (1− φ)t
= −ξ + a− w
1− ζδ (1− φ) −
ζδφf
1− ζδ (1− φ) (179)
Πi = −ξ +
(a− w)− ζδφf
1− ζδ (1− φ) (180)
where δ is the discount factor (δ < 1).
A worker is fired when his present value of profit is less than −f (the firing
cost).
−ξ + (a− w)− ζδφf
1− ζδ (1− φ) < −f (181a)
ξ >
(a− w)− ζδφf
1− ζδ (1− φ) + f (181b)
ξ >
(a− w)
1− δζ (1− φ) −
ζδφf
1− δζ (1− φ) + f (181c)
ξ >
(a− w) + (1− ζδ) f
1− ζδ (1− φ) (181d)
Thus, the probability of being fired is:
φ = 1− Γ
µ
(a− w) + (1− ζδ) f
1− ζδ (1− φ)
¶
(182)
146We set the infinite growth rate to 2%. Thus α = 1.02.
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Hiring Rate: Aworker is hired at the beginning of the period if the expected
profit is bigger than the hiring costs:
Π > h (183a)
−ξ + (a− w)− ζδφf
1− ζδ (1− φ) > h (183b)
ξ <
(a− w)− ζδφf
1− ζδ (1− φ) − h (183c)
Thus:
η = Γ
µ
(a− w)− ζδφf
1− ζδ (1− φ) − h
¶
(184)
Time Varying Parameters:
Firing Rate: To control for the time trend in the data, we first of all de-
flated all productivity (defined as gross value added per employee) and labor
cost (defined as gross wages plus additional social security payments of the
employers) numbers (by dividing by the 1991 German GDP deflator). Fur-
thermore, we assume that the distribution of the operating costs shifts along
a 2% time trend, starting at ζ1ξt in 1991.
We assume for simplicity that companies expect wages, productivity and
firing costs to trend along a constant 2% growth path from period 2004 onwards
(ζ > 1) for self suﬃcient bargaining, starting at their estimated 2004 value (see
below for the calculation). The same is true for our prediction, based on actual
values, from 2014 onwards when this path has converged to the self-suﬃcient
bargaining path. We assume that the actual real wage in 2004 adjusts linearly
to the self-suﬃcient real wage in 2014.
For the 1991 to 2004 values we assume perfect foresight. We use the 2004
value for self-suﬃcient bargaining as an anchor and calculate all other firing
rates in the model with a first order Taylor series expansion with respect to
this point. Furthermore the 2004 values for self-suﬃcient bargaining are set in
such a way that the firing rate for predictions, based on the actual values, is
12.5% in 2004 and the hiring rate is 57% in 2004.
The expected present value of profits in 2005 for self-suﬃcient bargaining
is equal to:
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Π2005 = −ξ2005 +
ζ [(a− w)− ζδφf ]
1− ζδ (1− φ) (185)
Thus, firms expect the following profits for a worker in period t− 1 (if he
is retained):
E2004 (Π2005) =
∙
ζ
[(a− w)− ζδφf ]
1− ζδ (1− φ)
¸
(186)
where φ is the infinite firing rate.
The profit in 2004 writes as follows:
Π2004 = −ζ14ξ+ a2004−w2004−φζδf + δ (1− φ)
∙
ζ
[(a− w)− ζδφf ]
1− ζδ (1− φ)
¸
. (187)
The firm has to pay the operating costs and earns the productivity minus
the wage. If it does not retain the worker at the beginning of period t + 1,
it has to pay the firing cost. Otherwise it earns the expected future present
value of this worker.
Letters without time subscripts denote the long-run values. Letters with
time subscripts denote the numbers in the respective period.
Firms fire a workers at the beginning of 2004 if Π2004 < −f2004.
ζ14ξ > a2004 − w2004 + f2004
−δζφf + δ (1− φ)
∙
ζ
[(a− w)− ζδφf ]
1− ζδ (1− φ)
¸
(188)
Thus:
φ
2004
= 1− Γ
⎛
⎝
1
ζ14
(a2004 − w2004) + 1ζ14f2004
− 1
ζ14
δζφf + δ 1
ζ14
(1− φ)
h
ζ [(a−w)−ζδφf ]
1−ζ(1−φ)
i ⎞⎠ (189)
In period 2003 the expected future present value in case of retention is
defined as:
E2003 (Π2004) =
Ã
a2004 − w2004 − δφζf
+δ (1− φ)
h
ζ [(a−w)−ζδφf ]
1−ζ(1−φ)
i ! , (190)
and so on.
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Or generally:
φ
t
= 1− Γ
Ã
1
ζt (at − wt) +
1
ζtft
− 1ζt δφt+1ft+1 +
1
ζt δ
¡
1− φt+1
¢
Et (Πt+1)
!
. (191)
We linearize the firing rate with respect to the anchor (which is the year
2004 under self-suﬃcient bargaining).
φ
t
= φ0 −
1
ζt
Γ00 [(at − wt)− (at,0 − wt,0)] (192)
− 1
ζt
Γ00 [(ft − ft,0)] +
1
ζt
δφ0Γ
0
0 (ft+1 − ft+1,0)
−δ 1
ζt
(1− φ0)Γ00 (Et [Πt+1]− Et,0 [Πt+1])
Remark that we detrend the anchor variables. In t, e.g. at−n,0 =
³
1
ζ
´n
at,0.
The reason is that there would be no change of the firing rate if all variables
would just grow along their 2% trend per period.
Hiring Rate: The firm hires in 2004 if Π2004 > h2004.
−ζ14ξ2004+a2004−w2004−φδζf2005+δ (1− φ)
∙
ζ
[(a− w)− ζδφf ]
1− ζδ (1− φ)
¸
−h2004 > 0,
(193)
The cumulative function for the hiring rate in period t-1 looks as follows:
η2004 = Γ
Ã
1
ζ14
(a2004 − w2004)− 1ζ14h2004−
1
ζ14
φζδf + (1− φ) δ 1
ζ14
E2004 (Π2005)
!
, (194)
or generally speaking:
ηt = Γ
µ
1
ζt
(at − wt)−
1
ζt
ht −
1
ζt
φt+1δft+1 +
¡
1− φ
t+1
¢
δ
1
ζt
Et (Πt+1)
¶
.
(195)
After linearizing, we obtain:
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ηt = η0 +
1
ζt
Γ00 [(at − wt)− (at,0 − wt,0)] (196)
− 1
ζt
Γ00 (ht − ht,0)−
1
ζt
δφ0Γ
0
0 (ft+1 − ft+1,0)
+
¡
1− φ
0
¢ 1
ζt
δΓ00 (Et [Πt+1]−Et,0 [Πt+1])
Calculation of Alternative Wage Paths: We use the model to predict
what would have happened under alternative scenarios. Therefore, we calcu-
late the labor costs under (i) self-suﬃcient bargaining and (ii) 5% lower firing
costs and replacement rates in addition. To do so, we assume that the replace-
ment rate is 60%, the firing costs are 60% and the hiring costs are 10% of labor
costs.
Therefore, we calculate the bargaining parameter µˆt for West Germany
wˆt = (1− µˆt) bˆt + µˆt
³
aˆt + bft´ (197)
µˆt =
wˆt (1− rr)
aˆt + fˆt − rrwˆt
(198)
Assuming that East Germans would have the same bargaining parameter
as their West German counterparts (µt = µˆt), we estimate the East German
wage under self-suﬃcient bargaining:
wt = (1− µˆt) rr ∗ wt + µˆ (at + ft) (199)
wt =
µˆtat
1− (1− µˆt) rr − µˆtd
(200)
where d is the dependence of the firing costs on the wage level, which was set
to 60%.
Using the above formula, we calculate the presumable labor costs under self-
suﬃcient bargaining from 1991 to 2004. We do the same for a 5% lower replace-
ment rate and 5% lower firing costs: ft,new = 0.95ft,old and rrt,new = 0, 95rrt,old.
Next, we use these wage numbers to predict the alternative employment paths.
Policy Exercise with Lower Firing Costs and Replacement Ratio:
For the policy exercise with lower firing costs and a lower replacement ratio,
we need to know the infinite firing rate to be able to calculate the expected
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present value of a worker in 2004.
In 2005 a worker is fired if:
ζ15ξt >
ζ (a− w)
1− δζ (1− φ) +
ζ (1− ζδ) f
1− δζ (1− φ) (201)
We know that ξ and all other variables are trending at a rate ζ until infinity.
Thus long-run firing rate is equal to
φ = 1− Γ
µ
1
ζ14
(a− w) + (1− ζδ) f
1− δζ (1− φ)
¶
(202)
We linearize it with respect to all variables to determine its value in the
new equilibrium:
φnew = φ0 −
1
ζ14
Γ00
∙
1
1− ζδ (1− φ)
¸
0
[(anew − wnew)− (a0 − w0)] (203)
− 1
ζ14
Γ00
∙
1− ζδ
1− δζ (1− φ)
¸
0
(fnew − f0)
− 1
ζ14
Γ00
∙
−δζ [(a− w) + (1− ζδ) f ]
(1− δζ (1− φ))2
¸
0
(φnew − φ0)
where variables denoted with new are the infinite values under the alternative
scenario.
Thus:
φnew = φ0 −
1
1− 1
ζ14
Γ0
h
δζ[(a−w)+(1−δζ)f ]
(1−δζ(1−φ))2
i
0⎡
⎣
1
ζ14
Γ0
h
1
1−δζ(1−φ)
i
0
[(anew − wnew)− (a0 − w0)]
+ 1
ζ14
Γ0
h
1−δζ
1−δζ(1−φ)
i
0
(fnew − f0)
⎤
⎦ (204)
The same linearization is performed for the infinite hiring rate, which will
be needed later on for the calculation of the expected future wage income
stream of a worker.
η = Γ
µ
1
ζ14
(a− w)− ζδφf
1− ζδ (1− φ) −
1
ζ14
h
¶
(205)
When linearizing, we obtain:
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η0 = η0 + Γ
0
0
∙
1
ζ14
1
1− ζδ (1− φ)
¸
0
[(anew − wnew)− (a0 − w0)] (206)
−Γ00
∙
1
ζ14
δζφ
1− ζδ (1− φ)
¸
0
(fnew − f0)− Γ00
1
ζ14 0
(hnew − hold)
+Γ00
∙
1
ζ14
−ζδf (1− ζδ (1− φ))− ζδ [(a− w)− δζφf ]
(1− ζδ (1− φ))2
¸
0
(φnew − φ0)
Migration:
Infinite Problem: When all variables are trending along the 2% path
(from 2004 onwards for all policy exercises, from 2014 onwards for the predic-
tion), the present value of the future wage income does so too. An insider can
either be fired φ, or retained 1 − φ. The outsider is either hired (η), or stays
unemployed (1− η). Thus the present value of an insider is:
V¯i = w + δ
¡
(1− φ) ζV¯i + φζV¯o
¢
. (207)
The present value of an outsider is
V¯o = b+ δ
¡
ηζV¯i + (1− η) ζV¯o
¢
. (208)
Thus:
V¯o =
b+ δηζV¯i
(1− δ (1− η) ζ) (209)
V¯i =
µ
w + δφζ
b
(1− δ (1− η) ζ)
¶
/
µ
1− δ (1− φ) ζ − δ
2ζ2φη
(1− δ (1− η) ζ)
¶
(210)
Finite Time Horizon: From 1991 to 2004 (and to 2014 for the first
prediction) the problem is solved recursively.147 The present value of an insider
in 1991 is
Vi,t = wt + δ
¡¡
1− φt+1
¢
Vi,t+1 + φt+1Vo,t+1
¢
, (211)
147We choose this functional form of the insiders’ and outsiders’ present value for analytical
simplicity, but without loss of generality. In combination with (160) it means that East-
West migrants are unemployed for one period. Dropping this assumption and changing the
sequencing does not aﬀect the results qualitatively.
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while it is
Vo,t = bt + δ
¡
ηt+1Vi,t+1 +
¡
1− ηt+1
¢
Vo,t+1
¢
(212)
for an outsider.
Estimating Migration and Exogenous Labor Force Growth: The
labor force (employed plus unemployed) in East Germany is about 50% of the
population.148 To generate the eﬀect of migration on the workforce (mit =
MIt−1/Lt−1) we multiply the actual net migration by 0.5 and divide it by the
labor force, assuming that migration in period t aﬀects the labor force growth
from t to t+ 1.
The available migration numbers include East Berlin until 2001 and entire
Berlin from 2001 onwards (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005, p. 52). Since
our labor force, productivity, and labor cost numbers do not include Berlin,
we corrected the number of migrants by the factor 0.9 before 2001 and by
the factor 0.8 after 2002.149 To provide an example: 359,126 net migrants in
1990 were multiplied by 0.5 and the correction factor 0.9. The corresponding
number was then divided by the labor force in East Germany in 1990 (about
8.6 million). Thus migration reduced the labor force by -1.8% (mit) from 1990
to 1991.150
The growth of the labor force cannot be entirely explained by migration,
since other factors such as population growth, active labor market policies or
early retirement schemes played a very important role (see e.g. Fuchs and
Weber, 2005, or DIW Berlin et al., 2002), which cannot be captured by our
model. Thus, we define an exogenous residual gt,x = gt,o −mit,m.
For the calibration we have to modify equation (160) slightly. To ensure sta-
tionarity we assume that the migration costs of the marginal migrant co (mijt),
j = i, o grow at the same rate as the operating costs of the firm and all other
variables during the steady state. Thus migration is mij,t = co−1
³
Kj
ζt
´
and we
obtain.
mit = gt − 1 = co−1
Ã bVo,t − Vi,t
ζt
!
+ co−1
Ã bVo,t − Vo,t
ζt
!
(213)
148Source: "GENESIS-Online - Das statistische Informationssystem," Statistisches Bunde-
samt (2005).
149In proportion to the respective population shares.
150For 1990 we do not have oﬃcial numbers on the size of the labor force from the Bunde-
sagentur für Arbeit (since unificiation took place in October). Thus, we calculate the growth
rate for 1990 and 1991 from DIW (1993, p. 256) and DIW (1994, p. 731).
113
Est. Coeﬃcients SE154 t-Statistics p-Value R Square
beta 1 0.04 0.01 2.63 0.02 0.42
beta 2 -8.7*10^-8 0.00 -2.96 0.01
Table 6: Estimation of migration coeﬃcients. dependent variable: mi(t).
In a next step, we estimate mit,m = β1 + β2
h³
2bVo,t − Vi,t − Vo,t´ /ζti151
to determine an as good as possible fit between our prediction and the actual
values.152 We use the estimated coeﬃcients β˜1 and β˜2 to obtain m˜it,m for
diﬀerent policy exercises, which is the estimated eﬀect of migration on the
labor force growth. See figure (6) for the estimated coeﬃcients.153
Consequently, the labor force growth rate under diﬀerent policy exercises
is calculated as gt,o = m˜it,m + gt,x, where only the estimated migration eﬀects
varies and the exogenous component stays constant.
Employment Dynamics Curve: The calculated hiring and hiring rates
and the labor market growth are then plugged into the employment dynamics
curve:
nt =
1
gt,o
(ηt + (1− ηt − φt)nt−1) . (214)
151We do not model West Germany explicitly. To calculate the expected present value of
a worker who migrates there, we assume constant firing (8%) and hiring rates (72%), see
Wilke (2004). Furthermore, we assume that all variables are trending along a 1.5% trend
in West Germany until East Germany has converged to the West German level. Afterwards
West Germany’s (without the burden of transfer payments, which are currently running at
4% of GDP) variables continue to grow at 2% as well. For the years from 1991 to 2004
we use the actual labor cost numbers from Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder
(2005).
152Therefore, we use ordinary least squares which minimize the squared deviation of the
actual from the predicted values.
153In this estimation net East-West migration is marked with a negative sign.
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6 Escaping the Unemployment Trap
6.1 Introduction
The persistence of large European regional unemployment diﬀerentials - par-
ticularly within the large European economies, France, Germany, Italy and
Spain - remains a challenge to economists, despite a prodigious literature on
the subject (e.g. Decressin and Fatás, 1995, Elhorst, 2005, Faini et al., 1997,
Gray, 2004, Sinn and Westermann, 2001, Taylor and Bradley, 1997). The
mystery is not how these unemployment diﬀerentials arose, for usually regions
of relatively high unemployment are generally ones in which labor costs have
been relatively high in relation to productivity. Rather, the mystery is why
unemployment diﬀerentials far outlive their original causes. Specifically, once
the unemployment diﬀerentials have persisted for a long time, then they do
not go away, even after labor costs fall relatively to productivity. Why?
East Germany is a good case example. After German reunification in 1991,
East German real wages rose dramatically relative to productivity and unem-
ployment jumped upwards in response. With the social and monetary union in
October 1990, East German labor costs jumped from 7% (using the informal
exchange rate) to about one half of the West German level (see e.g. Franz and
Steiner, 2000, Sinn, 2002). Since then, however, labor costs have fallen steadily
in relation to productivity, but the employment rate has remained stubbornly
low, hovering near 20 percent for the past decade (see figure (18)155). Tradi-
tional labor market analysis has trouble accounting for this experience.
This chapter156 suggests a simple explanation157: Once people remain un-
employed for a long time, they tend to fall into a "trap" representing a con-
traction of their employment opportunities. In Chapter 5, we describe several
such traps, but do not model them. Consider a few examples.
Immediately after German reunification, East German wage bargaining was
conducted primarily by West German unions and employers, and these had
strong incentives to push East German wages up, in order to reduce migration
of East German workers to West Germany and of West German firms to the
East. Given the low short-run elasticity of labor demand, this "bargaining by
proxy" was not only in the interests of West German unions, but also West
155Sources: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2006a, b) and Statistische Ämter des Bundes und
der Ländern (2006), own calculations.
156For a diﬀerent version of this chapter see "Escaping the Unemployment Trap - The Case
of East Germany -" with Dennis Snower, Kiel Working Paper, No. 1309, January 2007.
157For an alternative explanation see Uhlig (2006).
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German firms who feared the entry of new firms sparked by the new migration
flows. The upward wage pressure was reinforced through generous unemploy-
ment benefits and associated welfare entitlements. The resulting East German
wage hike led to a sharp fall in East German employment, and this eﬀect
was prolonged through the introduction of generous job security provisions
and costly hiring regulations, which raised the persistence of employment (i.e.
made current employment depend more heavily on past employment). The
persistently low employment was mirrored in long-term unemployment.158
This is where possibility of traps arises. The long-term unemployed are
prone to attrition of skills and work habits and they are of course unable to
get on-the-job training. As their productivity falls, they find more diﬃcult to
find jobs, even if labor costs fall relative to the average productivity of the
employed workforce.
Naturally, if these "eﬃciency labor costs," i.e. labor costs deflated by aver-
age productivity, fell suﬃciently to more than compensate for the drop in the
productivity of the long-term unemployed, then their employment opportuni-
ties would improve; but the data appear to suggest that these costs did not
fall enough.
Furthermore, the massive East German investment subsidies that were
granted in the aftermath of reunification - often paid to prevent uncompetitive
firms to lay oﬀ their employees - resulted in the creation of capital that was
relatively unproductive and prone to underutilization (see, for example, Sinn,
1995). The labor cooperating with this capital became similarly unproductive
and underutilized, even if eﬃciency labor costs subsequently fall.
What these traps have in common is that they are both associated with low
productivity159: the long-term unemployed are prone to become less productive
and this traps them in unemployment. The drop in productivity may arise
either because workers lose skills or because they lose access to "good jobs"
(i.e. highly productive, well-paying ones).
This chapter models such a trap, and examines its implications for labor
market activity and employment policy. We build an analytical model of the
low-productivity trap and calibrate it for the East German labor market. In
this context, we inquire which policies are eﬀective in creating employment.
158The share of long-term unemployed (with a duration of more than one year) has in-
creased from one quarter in 1992 to roughly one half today (Sachverständigenrat, 2004).
159See Fuchs-Schündeln and Izem (2007) and Ragnitz (2007) for a thorough analysis of
the low labor productivity in East Germany. See Burda (2006) for a neo-classical model of
economic integration with adjustment costs, which explains the "capital deepening" and the
"labor thinning" in the East.
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The trap highlights a major, often ignored, cost of long-term unemploy-
ment. A specific rise in eﬃciency labor costs sends employees into short-term
unemployment; but should this state persist and thus turn into long-term un-
employment, then an equal and opposite fall in eﬃciency labor costs may be
insuﬃcient to bring these workers back into employment.
Our notion of a labor market "trap" is related to the literature on seg-
mented labor markets, for example, models that divide the labor market into
a high-wage "primary sector" and a "secondary sector" that is market clear-
ing.160
This chapter contributes to this literature by explaining sources of mobility
between the two sectors and examining the implications for employment and
unemployment dynamics. As noted, our model describes a labor market where
workers in the primary sector who become unemployed risk losing their skills
or their access to high-productivity jobs (for instance, because they become
stigmatized and demotivated through their unemployment spell), and thereby
they risk sinking into the "trapped" sector. The longer they are unemployed,
the greater this risk becomes. On the other hand, workers who are employed
in the trapped sector may gain skills or access to high-productivity jobs (e.g.
by using their jobs to gain information and contact to other employment op-
portunities), and thereby they may rise into the primary sector. The longer
they remain employed, the greater is the likelihood of rising. In short, un-
employment is the road to bad jobs and long-term unemployment, whereas
employment is the road to good jobs and shorter unemployment spells.
As shown below, these dynamic relations have important implications not
only for the persistence of employment and unemployment, but also for the
eﬀectiveness of labor market policies. Specifically, we show that
• the existence of low-productivity traps implies that reductions in wages
in the trapped sector (induced, say, by cuts in unemployment benefits
or firing costs), on their own, are relatively ineﬀective in raising the
corresponding employment rate (both in relation to the primary sector
and an economy without low-productivity traps).
• hiring subsidies for the trapped unemployed have a relatively strong pos-
itive influence on employment, i.e. for a given subsidy size (both absolute
160See, for example, Bulow and Summers (1986), McDonald and Solow (1985), Weitzman
(1989), Dickens and Lang (1988) for the early foundations of this literature and Kleven
and Sorensen (2004) and Lommerud et al. (2004) for more recent contributions. For the
empirical literature see, for example, Dickens and Lang (1985), Saint-Paul (1996) for a survey
and Ghilarducci and Lee (2005) for a recent contribution.
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and relative to the wage) they are more cost-eﬀective161 than hiring subsi-
dies for primary unemployed. There are two driving forces: The presence
of traps reduces the deadweight eﬀects of hiring subsidies and hiring sub-
sidies enable more trapped workers to move to the primary sector via on
the job training.
• training subsidies and programs that raise the productivity of workers
in the trapped sector, thereby improving their chances of entering the
primary sector, may also have a relatively strong employment long-run
eﬀect, but this eﬀect takes a long time to manifest itself.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. In
Section 3 this model is calibrated for the East German labor market. Section
4 considers the policy implications. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
6.2 The Model
Our labor market has a "primary" sector and a "trapped" sector. The average
productivity per worker in the trapped sector is assumed to be lower in the
trapped (atr) than in the primary sector (apr). Moreover, firms face a random
cost ξt, iid across workers and time, with a constant cumulative distribution
Γ (ξt). This cost may be interpreted as an operating cost or as a negative
productivity shock.
Decisions in the labor market are made in the following sequence: First,
workers move between sectors. Specifically, each unemployed worker in the
primary sector has an exogenously given probability ν of losing productivity
and thereby entering the trapped sector (due either to skill attrition or loss of
access to good jobs); and each employed worker in the trapped sector has an
exogenously given probability' of gaining productivity and thereby ascending
to the primary sector.162 Second, the wage is determined through bargaining.
Third, the value of the random cost ξt is revealed. Finally, firms make their
hiring and firing decisions.
Let the hiring rates of workers in the primary and trapped sectors be ηpr
and ηtr, respectively, and let their firing rates from these sectors be φpr and φtr,
respectively. (These hiring and firing rates will be derived choice-theoretically
161We call a policy more "cost eﬀective" than another policy when it generates more
employment, for a given net government expenditure outlay.
162Thus the cumulative probability of that an unemployed primary worker falls into the low-
productivity trap rises with the duration of unemployment, and the cumulative probability
of an employed trapped worker to escape from the trap rises with employment duration.
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Figure 22: Transition probabilities
below.) The transitions between the various economic states are pictured in
figure (22). Each employed primary and trapped worker remains employed
with probability
¡
1− φpr
¢
and (1− φtr), respectively; she becomes unemployed
with probability φpr and φtr, respectively. Each unemployed primary and
trapped worker remains unemployed with probability
¡
1− ηpr
¢
and (1− ηtr),
respectively; she becomes employed with probability ηpr and ηtr, respectively.
6.2.1 Wage Determination
We assume that the wage is the outcome of a Nash bargain between the median
insider and her firm in the respective sector.163 The median insider faces no
163The critical reader may object that insider power has been seriously eroded in East
Germany due to the fall in union membership since reunification. The first response to
this objection is that we should not confuse our insider bargaining with union bargaining,
since our Nash bargaining problem could be interpreted as the individual median insider
bargaining with her firm. Second, much of the erosion of East German insider power since
reunification has resulted from the replacement of bargaining by proxy (in which West
German unions and firms had dominant influence on negotiations about East German wages)
by self-suﬃcient bargaining (in which East German workers and firms have taken control
of East German wage determination). In our model, we assume that East German wage
determination is entirely self-suﬃcient in this sense. And finally, although union membership
has dropped in East Germany, union wage agreements still have very broad coverage. For
example, in 2003 firms that were covered by a firm level or sectoral wage agreement employed
54 percent of all workers in East Germany. A large share of the other firms followed existing
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risk of dismissal at the negotiated wage.164
There are constant returns to labor.165 Under bargaining agreement, the in-
sider receives the wagewtr,t and the firm receives the expected profit (atr − wtr,t)
in each period t. The expected present value of returns to a trapped insider
under bargaining agreement
¡
V Itr,t
¢
is
V Itr,t = wtr,t+δ
Ã
(1−')
¡
1− φtr,t+1
¢
V Itr,t+1 + (1−')φtr,t+1 (1−')V Utr,t+1
+'
¡
1− φpr,t+1
¢
V Ipr,t+1 +'φpr,t+1V
U
pr,t+1
!
(215)
where δ is the discount factor and V Utr,t+1 (V
U
pr,t+1) is the expected present value
of returns of an unemployed trapped (primary) worker and V Itr,t+1 (V
I
pr,t+1) is
the expected present value of returns of an employed trapped (primary) worker,
respectively. Note that with probability ' a trapped worker is upgraded to
the primary sector and thus has a higher future present value. The expected
present value of returns to the firm under bargaining agreement is
eΠ0tr,t = (atr − wtr,t)+δ
Ã
(1−')
¡
1− φtr,t+1
¢ eΠItr,t+1 − (1−')φtr,t+1ftr,t+1
+'
¡
1− φpr,t+1
¢ eΠIpr,t+1 −'φpr,t+1fpr,t+1
!
(216)
where eΠItr,t+1 (eΠIpr,t+1) is the future profit in the trapped (primary) sector,
weighted with the probability that the worker stays in the respective sector.
Under disagreement, the insider’s fallback income is btr,t, assumed equal
to the unemployment benefit. The firm’s fallback profit is −ftr,t, which is the
firing cost per employee (in the trapped sector). In words, during disagreement
the insider imposes the maximal cost on the firm (e.g. through strike, work-
to-rule, sabotage) short of inducing dismissal. Assuming that disagreement in
the current period does not aﬀect future returns, the present values of insider’s
returns under disagreement is
wage agreements voluntarily, covering 52 percent of the remaining employees (Schnabel,
2005).
164This assumption is made merely for analytical convenience; various other assumptions
would lead to similar results. The wage could e.g. be the outcome of a bargain between the
firm and the marginal worker, or between the firm and a union representing all employees.
In this last case, the insiders’ objective in the bargain will depend on their retention rate.
165In what follows, only those variables have time subscripts that, for given parameter
values, actually vary through time in our model. j is the index for the sector. It can either
be P (primary sector) or T (trapped sector).
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V 0Itr,t = btr,t+δ
Ã
(1−')
¡
1− φtr,t+1
¢
V Itr,t+1 + (1−')φtr,t+1 (1−')V Utr,t+1
+'
¡
1− φpr,t+1
¢
V Ipr,t+1 +'φpr,t+1V
U
pr,t+1
!
(217)
and the present value of the firm’s agreement under disagreement is
eΠ0tr,t = −ftr,t + δ
Ã
(1−')
¡
1− φtr,t+1
¢ eΠItr,t+1 − (1−')φtr,t+1ftr,t+1
+'
¡
1− φpr,t+1
¢ eΠIpr,t+1 −'φpr,t+1fpr,t+1
!
(218)
Thus the insider’s bargaining surplus is
V Itr,t − V 0Itr,t = wtr,t − btr,t (219)
and the firm’s bargaining surplus is
eΠtr,t − eΠItr,t = atr − wtr,t + ftr,t (220)
The negotiated wage maximizes the Nash product (Λ)
Λ = (wtr,t − btr,t)µ
¡
aItr − wtr,t + ftr,t
¢1−µ
, (221)
where µ represents the bargaining strength of the insider relative to the firm.
Thus the negotiated wage is
wtr,t = (1− µ) btr,t + µ (atr + ftr,t) . (222)
The bargaining problem is analogous in the primary sector (see Appendix),
so that the negotiated primary wage is
wpr,t = (1− µ) bpr,t + µ (apr + fpr,t) . (223)
6.2.2 Employment Decision
Having determined the wage, we now proceed to derive the hiring and firing
rates for the primary and trapped sector.
Primary Sector: Given the realized value of the random cost variable ξt,
which is iid across individuals and time and whose mean is normalized to zero,
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an insider generates the following present value of expected profit:166
Πt = −ξt +
∞X
t=0
δt
¡
1− φpr
¢t
(apr − wpr)− δφprfpr
∞X
t=0
δt
¡
1− φpr
¢t
. (224)
i.e. with probability
¡
1− φpr
¢
the insider is retained and generates profit
(apr − wpr), whereas with probability φpr is fired and generates the firing cost
fpr (constant per employee).
The insider is fired when her generated profit is less than the firing cost:
Πt < −fpr, so that ξt > (apr − wpr + (1− δ) fpr) /
¡
1− δ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
. Recalling
that Γ (ξt) is the cumulative density of the random cost ξt, the firing rate is
given by the following implicit function:167
φpr = 1− Γ
Ã
apr − wpr + (1− δ) fpr
1− δ
¡
1− φpr
¢ ! (225)
The firm faces a hiring cost of h, constant per worker. An entrant is hired
when his generated profit exceeds this hiring cost: Π > hpr. Thus the hiring
rate is
ηpr = Γ
Ã
apr − wpr − δφprfpr
1− δ
¡
1− φpr
¢ − hpr! (226)
The Trapped Sector: As noted, each worker in the trapped sector is as-
sumed to have an average productivity atr that is lower than the one of his
counterpart in the primary sector. Furthermore, trapped workers have a prob-
ability ' of moving into the primary sector. Thus, the present value of the
profit generated by an entrant in the trapped sector is168
Πt = −ξt +
atr − wtr − δ (1−')φtrftr
1− δ (1− φtr) (1−')
− φprδ'
fpr
(1− δ (1−') (1− φtr))
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
δ'
Ã
apr − wpr − δφprfpr¡
1− δ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δ (1−') (1− φtr))
!
(227)
Along the same lines as before, a worker is fired if her expected profits are
166In what follows, only those variables have time subscripts that, for given parameter
values, actually vary through time in our model.
167We assume that (∂Γ/∂φ) > −1, so that a rise in (a− w) or f both reduce the firing
rate.
168See the Appendix for a detailed derivation.
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smaller than minus the firing costs (Πt < −ftr):
φtr = 1− Γ
⎛
⎝
atr−wtr−δ(1−')φtrftr
1−δ(1−φtr)(1−')
+ ftr − φprδ'
fpr
(1−δ(1−')(1−φtr))
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
δ'
µ
apr−wpr−δφprfpr
(1−δ(1−φpr))(1−δ(1−')(1−φtr))
¶ ⎞⎠ (228)
And she is hired if the expected profits are bigger than the hiring costs in
the trapped sector (Πt > htr).
ηtr = Γ
⎛
⎝
atr−wtr−δ(1−')φtrftr
1−δ(1−φtr)(1−')
− htr − φprδ'
fpr
(1−δ(1−')(1−φtr))
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
δ'
µ
apr−wpr−δφprfpr
(1−δ(1−φpr))(1−δ(1−')(1−φtr))
¶ ⎞⎠ (229)
6.2.3 Employment Dynamics
We allow for the possibility that the employed workers in the trapped sector
may raise their productivity - through learning-by-doing, improved work mo-
tivation, better work habits and so forth - and then move into the primary
sector. Specifically, we also allow for the possibility that unemployed work-
ers in the primary sector may lose productivity - through attrition of human
capital, reduced work motivation, lost work habits, etc. - and then fall into
the trapped sector. In particular, we assume that, in each period, a constant
proportion ' of the employed workers in the trapped sector ascend to the pri-
mary sector, and a constant proportion υ of the unemployed primary workers
descend into the trapped sector.
Thus, we obtain the following employment equation for the primary sec-
tor:169
Npr,t =
¡
1− φpr
¢
Npr,t−1 +
¡
1− φpr
¢
'Ntr,t−1 + ηpr (1− υ)Upr,t−1 (230)
The employed in the primary sector (Npr,t) consist of workers who are re-
tained from the previous period170 plus the newly hired workers (ηpr (1− υ)Upr,t−1).
For the trapped sector the employment dynamics equation is:
169Note that capital letters (N , U) refer to levels, while small letters (n, u) are (un-
)employment rates.
170(1− φP )NP,t−1 are the primary employees carried forward from the previous period
and (1− φP )'NT,t−1 are the previously trapped workers who received a human capital
upgrade.
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Ntr,t = (1− φtr) (1−')Ntr,t−1 + ηtr (Utr,t−1 + vUpr,t−1) (231)
The number of employed workers in the trapped sector equals those who are
retained, without receiving a human capital upgrade, ((1− φtr) (1−')Ntr,t−1)
plus the newly hired workers (ηtr (Utr,t−1 + vUpr,t−1)).
171
After some re-formulations (see Appendix), we obtain an employment dy-
namics equation (expressed in employment rates) for the primary sector
npr,t =
1
gt,pr
£¡
1− φpr
¢
npr,t−1 +
¡
ηpr (1− υ)
¢
(1− npr,t−1)
¤
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
'
Ltr,t−1
Lpr,t
ntr,t−1 (232)
and for the trapped sector
ntr,t =
1
gt,tr
[(1− φtr) (1−')ntr,t−1 + ηtr (1− ntr,t−1)]
+ηtrυ (1− npr,t−1)
Lpr,t−1
Ltr,t
(233)
where Lpr and Ltr are the labor forces of the primary and secondary sector.
gt,pr = Lpr,t/Lpr,t−1 and gt,tr = Ltr,t/Ltr,t−1 are the labor force growth in the
primary and trapped sector.
The labor force in each sector is equal to the previous period’s labor force
plus the net movement from the other sector:
Lpr,t = Lpr,t−1 − υupr,t−1Lpr,t−1 +'ntr,t−1Ltr,t−1 (234)
and
Ltr,t = Ltr,t−1 + υupr,t−1Lpr,t−1 −'ntr,t−1Ltr,t−1. (235)
Setting the sectoral growth rate to zero and omitting time subscripts, we
obtain the following steady state value for the employment in the primary
sector
171Note that the pool of potential recruits is enlarged by those who moved from the primary
to the trapped sector (vUt−1,P ).
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npr =
ηpr (1− υ) +
¡
1− φpr
¢
'
ηtr
Ltr
Lpr
+ηtrυ
(1−[(1−φtr)(1−')]+ηtr)
φpr +
¡
ηpr (1− υ)
¢
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
' ηtrυ
(1−[(1−φtr)(1−')]+ηtr)
(236)
and in the trapped sector
ntr,t =
ηtr + ηtrυ (1− npr)
Lpr
Ltr
(1− [(1− φtr) (1−')] + ηtr)
(237)
Logically, if we set υ = ' = 0, we have two entirely separated sectors in
this economy and the above formula delivers the well-known formula:
npr =
ηpr
φpr + ηpr
and ntr =
ηtr
φtr + ηtr
(238)
6.3 Calibration of the Model
In 2004, 17.2 percent of the East German full time employed workers were
below the low wage income threshold, which is defined a two thirds of the East
German median income, i.e. they earned below 7.36 € per hour (Rhein and
Stamm, 2006). We consider these workers as a good proxy for the trapped
sector. From Hunt (2004) we know that about 60 to 80 percent of unemployed
in East Germany do not "survive" their first year of unemployment, i.e. they
leave unemployment within one year, which we interpret as hiring. During
the second year of unemployment the non-survival rate drops to much smaller
numbers, roughly ranging in the magnitude of 20 to 50 percent (very much
dependent on gender and observation period), with even smaller non-survival
rates thereafter. It can be assumed that trapped workers represent a large
share of the long-term unemployed since they have lower hiring rates and higher
firing rates than primary workers. However, they do not do so exclusively, since
primary workers in our model can stay unemployed for several periods without
becoming employed and trapped (although the probability is decreasing over
time). For simplicity, we set the steady state (indicated by the subscript 0)
hiring rate for trapped workers (ηtr,0) to 30 percent and the one for primary
workers to 80 percent (ηpr,0), roughly corresponding to Hunt’s (2004) non-
survival rates for long-term and short-term unemployed. In accordance with
a transition table for the European Union (one year transition probability
from "low pay" to "no pay", see European Commission, 2004), we set the
steady state firing rate for trapped workers equal to φtr,0 = 0.18. To obtain
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an aggregate employment rate of 80 percent172, we set the steady state firing
rate in the primary sector (φpr,0) to 12 percent.
Furthermore, we have to choose an exogenous probability of an employed
trapped worker to move to the trapped sector ('). According to Rhein et al.
(2005) the probability for German low wage income earners to move beyond
the low income threshold after 5 years is 32.5 percent.173 The European Com-
mission (2004) calculates a probability of 50 percent for a low-pay worker to
move to a higher pay within seven years.174 In line with these two pieces of
evidence, we set ' = 0.08. By setting the labor share of primary workers to
76 percent, about 17 percent of all employed workers belong to the trapped
sector; thus corresponding to the numbers by Rhein and Stamm (2006). To
obtain a stable initial equilibrium, we set the probability of a primary worker
to move to the trapped sector (υ) to 11.2 percent.175 In our initial equilibrium
the unemployment rate in the primary sector is 12 percent, whereas it amounts
to 35 percent in the trapped sector.
We set the replacement rates in the primary and trapped sector to 65 and 80
percent, respectively.176 Aggregate real productivity (a, gross value added per
worker) in 2005 was about €38,000 and real wages (w, measured as real labor
costs) were about €22,000 in East Germany.177 (All estimates are divided by
the German GDP deflator, base year 1991.178). We set the productivity for
trapped workers to 50 percent of the economy’s average, while setting the one
of primary workers to 110 percent of the average productivity.
Furthermore, we assume that in the long-run the productivity and all real
costs (the wage, the hiring and firing costs and the operating cost ξ) grow at
the same rate of two percent (ζ = 1.02). All future values are discounted (δ)
at rate 3%.179
In the literature firing costs (ft) and hiring costs (ht) which amount to 60
172This corresponds to the employment rate of dependently employed in East Germany
(see Bundesagentur, 2006a, b).
173Corresponding to an average yearly probability of 7.6 percent.
174Corresponding to an average yearly probability of 9.4 percent.
175This is necessary to guarantee that the condition vUNT = 'NT holds, i.e. in the old
steady state the number of people moving from the trapped to the non-trapped sector equals
those moving into the other direction.
176The net replacement ratios (unweighted average across six family types) of workers
with 67, 100, and 150 percent of average productivity are 78.25, 68.25, and 64.67 percent,
respectively (OECD, 2006).
177Source: Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2006).
178This is done to make numbers comparable to chapter 5.
179This is the average real interest rate over last 15 years, calculated as the yearly money
market interest rate minus the inflation rate (using the GDP deflator). Source: International
Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
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percent and 10 percent of labor costs, respectively, are proposed (Chen and
Funke, 2003). It is well known that the employment duration is one of the most
important determinants of firing costs180. Thus, we set them to 40 percent for
trapped workers, whose employment duration is shorter due to higher firing
rates, and to 70 percent for primary workers. We assume that all workers
have the same bargaining bargaining power is set equally for both sectors
(µ = 0.195) in order to match the aggregate labor costs in East Germany.
We simulate our model in a linearized form, choosing first derivatives of
the cumulative function that replicate the employment path from 1991 to 2004
as closely as possible in the homogeneous model. (For the derivation of the
linearized equations see Appendix.)
6.4 Policy Exercises
We now consider the eﬀects of various labor policies in the context of our
calibrated model of the East German labor market. We first examine the em-
ployment eﬀects of policies targeted at the trapped sector, and then investigate
untargeted policies. In both cases, we explore the influence of (i) a reduction
of the ratio of the firing costs to the wage ("firing cost ratio") together with
a fall in the replacement ratio181, (ii) hiring subsidies, (iii) training subsidies
that raise the probability of moving from the trapped to the primary sector.
For the training subsidies the policy can of course only be targeted at trapped
employees.
6.4.1 Policies Targeted at the Trapped Sector
Lower Replacement Rate and Firing Costs: Figure 3 shows the eﬀects
of a 5, 10 and 20 percent reduction of both the firing cost ratio (the ratio of
firing costs to the wage) and the replacement ratio (the ratio of unemployment
benefits to the wage) in the trapped sector, which both take place in period 0:
Steady state eﬀects: A lower replacement ratio (RR) and a lower firing cost
ratio (FCR) in the trapped sector aﬀect the wage bargaining process. They
change the fall-back position of both bargaining parties. As a consequence,
180See e.g. Grund (2006).
181In chapter 5 we have done several ex-post policy exercises with a model that did not
contain traps. Especially during the last years of the observation period (1991-2004), our
prediction was more optimistic than the real outcome, suggesting the existence of labor
market traps. The first policy exercise is the same as in chapter 5, but the innovation of this
paper over chapter 5 is that it models the eﬀects of labor market traps. It turns out that
they have far-reaching implications for the eﬀectiveness of employment policies, as shown
below.
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Figure 23: Eﬀects of a FCR and RR reduction in the trapped sector
insiders bid for lower wages. This improves firms’ incentives to hire and retain
more of the less productive workers and thus to increase their long-run em-
ployment rate in the trapped sector. A 20 percent reduction of the replacement
ratio and firing cost ratio182 makes wages fall to about two thirds of their initial
steady state value. But this considerable reduction lifts the trapped sector’s
employment rate only from 58 percent to 65 percent. The reason can be found
in the microfounded hiring and firing equations. Since trapped workers face
a higher steady state firing rate, the expected future profits of an employed
worker in the trapped sector is smaller than in the primary sector. For given
operating costs this leads to smaller hiring and hiring sensitivities with respect
to wage changes.
There are two reasons why the eﬀects on the overall employment rate are
quite moderate: (i) The trapped sector contains only a small share of all
workers (24 percent). (ii) Only some of the newly hired workers obtain a
human capital upgrade which leads to a higher employment rate, while most
of the newly hired trapped workers face a high risk of being fired (compared
to primary sector workers). In the long-run a 20 percent reduction of the
replacement ratio and firing cost ratio in the trapped sector only reduces the
share of trapped workers from 24 to 22 percent.
As a consequence, a 20 percent reduction of the replacement ratio and
firing cost ratio (inducing a wage reduction to two thirds of the initial value)
in the trapped sector increases the overall long-run employment rate only by
182Note that in the trapped sector wages react more sensitively to cuts in the replacement
rate and firings costs than in the primary sector.
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2 percentage points. This very insensitive reaction may explain why the recent
reduction of the wages in East Germany (compared to the productivity) did not
have much of an eﬀect on the employment rate (see figure (18)).183
Adjustment dynamics: The increased hiring rate and reduced firing rates do
not only lift the employment rate in the trapped sector. With more employed
people and an exogenously given probability to move from the trapped to the
primary sector, the sectoral upward movement increases. It takes a long time
until this development shows its full eﬀects: For a 20 percent reduction of the
replacement ratio and the firing cost ratio, 90 percent of the convergence to
the new steady state are realized only after 10 years.
If the replacement ratio of the most unemployment-prone group is reduced
(the trapped unemployed), the described policy comes at the price of increased
income inequality (between high income and low income earners). While this
policy may help some trapped workers who would not have found a job other-
wise and who get a chance to move to the primary sector, it hurts the insiders
in the trapped sector who obtain a lower wage and the trapped workers who
remain unemployed and receive lower unemployment benefits (due to lower
unemployment benefits).184
Hiring Subsidies: Figure 4 shows the employment eﬀects of a hiring subsidy
which is targeted at the trapped sector with diﬀerent magnitudes (50, 75 and
100 percent of the respective wage).
Steady state eﬀects: A hiring subsidy for trapped workers increases the
firms’ incentive to hire more workers with lower productivity. Other than in a
homogenous economy, hiring subsidies deliver a double dividend. Besides the
immediate hiring eﬀects, there is a longer lasting "transition eﬀect," caused by
the inter-sectoral movement. The increased employment rate strengthens the
upward mobility to the primary sector. A hiring subsidy of 100 percent would
for example reduce the share of trapped workers (of the overall workforce) from
24 to 22.5 percent.
Adjustment dynamics: The after eﬀects of the increased movement to the
primary sector take some time to work themselves out: for a 100 percent hiring
subsidies, 90 percent of the distance to the new steady state is reached after
12 years.
183Note that the reduction of the employment rate at the beginning and middle of the
ninenties can easily be explained by the initial wage shock. However, it is more diﬃcult to
explain the development during the last ten years.
184See chapter 7 for a more detailed analysis of the inequality eﬀects of diﬀerent policies.
129
0 5 10 15 20
0.798
0.8
0.802
0.804
0.806
0.808
0.81
0.812
0.814
0.816
0.818
Years  after Policy Im plementation
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
e
Overall Employment Rate
50%
75%
100%
0 5 10 15 20
0.58
0.59
0.6
0.61
0.62
0.63
0.64
Years  after Policy Implementation
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
e
Trapped Sector
50%
75%
100%
Figure 24: Eﬀects of a hiring subsidy in the trapped sector
If hiring subsidies are targeted at trapped workers only (as done in the
simulation), they are much more cost-eﬀective185 than an untargeted strategy:
(i) the deadweight is much lower since the initial steady state hiring rates in the
trapped sector are below those in the primary sector, (ii) the replacement ratio
of trapped workers is above those of primary workers and thus the savings (in
terms of the respective wage) generated by the job creation are much bigger,
(iii) the aforementioned "transition eﬀect" strengthens the overall outcome.
Hiring subsidies need to be financed. According to our simulation, long-
run net expenditures caused by a 100 percent hiring subsidy186 for all trapped
workers are about the same as the long-run net savings generated by a 7 percent
reduction of the firing cost ratio and replacement ratio.187
Hiring subsidies increase employment, without worsening the living stan-
dard of the poorest workers, namely the unemployed trapped workers (since
they continue to receive the same benefits as before). As a consequence, it may
be easier from a political economy point of view to implement hiring subsidies
than reducing the replacement ratio, which makes the unemployed workers
worse oﬀ.
Training Measures: Training subsidies or other measures that improve job-
related training (e.g. on the job training, qualification courses, training mea-
sures, etc.), could improve trapped workers’ productivity and consequently
185Defined as employment eﬀect for a given additional government expenditure.
186Of the labor costs in the trapped sector.
187This calculation is based on an average tax rate of 20 percent and the aforementioned
net replacement rates.
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Figure 25: Eﬀects of training subsidies
their access to primary good. In our model, better training measures can be
captured in terms of an increase in the exogenously given probability of mov-
ing from the trapped to the primary sector ('). Figure 5 shows what happens
if the probability of moving from the trapped to the primary sector increases
from 8 to 16 percent. The latter number roughly corresponds to a rate found
in many other European Union countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, France,
Italy the Netherlands or Spain (European Commission, 2004).
Steady state eﬀects: The training measures above raise the economy’s over-
all steady state employment rate by moving more people to the primary sector
which is associated with higher employment rates. Naturally, the steady state
employment rate of the trapped sector does not increase, as only the inter-
sectoral mobility is aﬀected but not the sectoral hiring and firing rates. Thus,
better training measures change the share of workers in the respective sectors.
The aforementioned policy would increase the share of primary workers from
74 to 86.5 percent.
Adjustment dynamics: It takes a very long time until such a policy shows
its full eﬀects. In our model 90 percent of the distance to the new steady state
would be reached 17 years after the implementation of the policy.
Furthermore, in reality it will be a challenge to design training measures in
a way that they can eﬀectively improve workers’ upward mobility (for empirical
work for East Germany see, for example, Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch, 2005,
and Lechner and Wunsch, 2007).
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Figure 26: Eﬀects of an untargeted reduction of the FCR and the RR
6.4.2 Untargeted Policies
Reduction of Unemployment Benefits and Firing Cost Ratio: If the
unemployment benefits and firing cost ratio are reduced for all workers (not
just for those in the trapped sector), the employment eﬀects will be modified
as follows:
(i) The primary sector’s hiring rate increases and the firing rate decreases,
as firms’ obtain an incentive to hire/retain more of the less productive workers.
(ii) While a higher employment rate in the primary sector is reached quickly,
there are long-lasting aftereﬀects through the intersectoral movement of labor.
A lower unemployment rate in the primary sector means that fewer people
drop into the trapped sector and thus the trapped sector shrinks compared
to the primary sector. While a 20 percent cut in unemployment benefits and
firing cost ratio for in the trapped sector only would increase the primary
sector’s share labor share from 76 to 78 percent, extending the policy to the
entire economy would increase the primary sector’s labor share from 78 to 88
percent.
(iii) If the firing rate in the primary sector goes down, there is a positive
spillover eﬀect on the hiring and firing rates in the trapped sector (see equa-
tions (228) and (229)). Since trapped workers have a constant probability of
getting a human capital upgrade in the future, higher retention rates in the
primary sector increase these workers’ profitability, giving an incentive to firms
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to retain/hire more of the less productive workers.
Hiring Subsidies: In this section we compare untargeted hiring subsidies
(provided to all workers) to those targeted at the trapped sector (as described
in the previous section). Providing a 100 percent hiring subsidy188 to all work-
ers (instead of trapped workers only) would roughly double the employment
eﬀects which are shown in the previous section. However, such an exercise
would come at a substantial cost to the government. Specifically, the net
costs189 of such an untargeted strategy would be about 9 times higher than
those for a 100 percent hiring subsidy targeted at trapped unemployed. The
main reason is the very substantial deadweight eﬀect because the hiring rates
in the primary sector are much bigger than in the trapped sector.
6.4.3 Summary of Calibration Results
Kick-Starting East Germany: Our calibration exercise shows that even
very significant wage reductions in the trapped sector (induced by reductions
in the respective replacement ratio and the firing cost ratio) would not be
suﬃcient to bring East Germany to employment levels comparable to West
Germany.190 If the replacement ratio and firing cost ratio are reduced in the
primary sector as well, this does not only make primary workers more prof-
itable for firms, but also improves the average profitability of the trapped
workers (each of them receives a human capital upgrade with a certain prob-
ability). Consequently, the employment rate in the trapped sector will rise.
Furthermore, the lower unemployment rate in the primary sector will reduce
the workers who move to the trapped sector, thus increasing the economy’s
ratio of primary to trapped workers. Our calibration shows that these spillover
eﬀects are very important. Reductions of the replacement ratio and firing cost
ratio for all workers can improve the employment rate in the trapped sector
and in the economy as a whole much more than a policy that is focused on
trapped workers.
While an untargeted strategy is more eﬀective for the reduction of the
replacement ratio and firing cost ratio, the opposite is true for hiring subsidies.
If they are targeted at the trapped sector, they turn out to be more cost
188Measured in terms of the respective wage.
189Defined as the costs for the hiring subsidy minus the increased revenue from higher
employment (via higher tax revenues with an assumed tax rate of 20 percent and lower
costs for unemployment benefits) in the new steady state.
190This result diﬀers very much from chapter 5 where it is shown in a labor market model
without traps that very moderate reforms would have had substantial positive eﬀects.
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Figure 27: Convergence speed of diﬀerent policies
eﬀective than untargeted hiring subsidies, for the following reasons. In the
presence of traps, hiring subsidies yield a double dividend of increased hiring
and transition to the primary sector. Furthermore, the associated deadweight
in the trapped sector is much smaller than in the primary sector. As shown in
our calibration, the net budgetary outlay for an targeted subsidy is one ninth
as high as the one for an untargeted hiring subsidy, while it delivers one half
of the overall the employment eﬀects.
Training measures improve the prospects of trapped workers and thus lift
the economy’s employment rate in the long-run. But it takes a long time until
they show their full eﬀects.
As shown above, a moderate cut in the replacement ratio and a reduction
of the firing cost ratio can be combined with a substantial hiring subsidy in
a self-financing policy package. Together with improved training measures
these labor market policies would help the East to become somewhat more
independent of the "caring hand that cripples" (Snower and Merkl, 2006).
General Lessons for Regional Unemployment Problems: The behav-
ior of the dual labor market, with a primary and a trapped sector diﬀers in
two substantial respects from a homogenous labor market:
(i) As shown above, even very substantial reductions in the replacement
ratio and the firing cost ratio are not suﬃcient to reduce the unemployment
ratio in the trapped sector to rates which can usually be observed in continental
134
European countries, say around 10 percent.
(ii) The eﬀects of diﬀerent labor market policies are much more persistent
under a dual labor market than under a homogenous labor market. We illus-
trate this phenomenon in figure (27). It takes at least a decade for policies like
the reduction of the replacement ratio and firing cost ratio or hiring subsidies
to show 90 percent of their after eﬀects. Training subsidies need even more
time to show 90 percent of their full after eﬀects. For a comparison: In an
economy which only consists of the primary sector, almost the whole eﬀects of
labor market reforms would already be visible after one year ("Primary Sector
Only").
6.5 Concluding Thoughts
The chapter explains a puzzling aspect of regional employment and unem-
ployment diﬀerentials, namely that they are very persistent despite changes
in wages relative to productivity. Therefore, we develop a dual labor mar-
ket model with a primary and trapped sector. We show numerically that the
trapped sector of the economy, which faces an enormous unemployment rate,
reacts very sluggishly to reductions of the wage. We propose additional mea-
sures to leave the trap, namely hiring subsidies and better training schemes.
East Germany is simply an extreme example of this phenomenon, which
also exists in Spain and Italy and elsewhere. This phenomenon makes the
inequality across regions especially persistent and policy makers have been at
a loss about how to treat this problem. This chapter provides new insights
on which policies are useful and eﬀective under these circumstances and on
potential trade-oﬀs which policy makers face.
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6.6 Technical Appendix
6.6.1 Wage Bargaining
Bargaining in the Primary Sector: The expected present value of returns
to a primary insider under bargaining agreement
¡
V Ipr,t
¢
is
V Ipr,t = wpr,t + δ
¡¡
1− φpr,t+1
¢
V Ipr,t+1 +
¡
1− φpr,t+1
¢
V Upr,t+1
¢
(239)
where δ is the discount factor and V Upr,t+1 is the expected present value of
returns of an unemployed primary worker and V Ipr,t+1 is the expected present
value of returns of an employed primary worker. The expected present value
of returns to the firm under bargaining agreement is
eΠ0pr,t = (apr − wpr,t) + δ ³¡1− φpr,t+1¢ eΠIpr,t+1 − φpr,t+1fpr,t+1´ (240)
where eΠIpr,t+1 is the future profit in the primary.
Under disagreement, the insider’s fallback income is bpr,t, assumed equal
to the unemployment benefit. The firm’s fallback profit is −fpr,t, which is the
firing cost per employee (in the trapped sector). Assuming that disagreement
in the current period does not aﬀect future returns, the present values of
insider’s returns under disagreement is
V 0Ipr,t = bpr,t + δ
¡¡
1− φpr,t+1
¢
V Ipr,t+1 +
¡
1− φpr,t+1
¢
V Upr,t+1
¢
(241)
and the present value of the firm’s agreement under disagreement is
eΠ0pr,t = −fpr,t + δ ³¡1− φpr,t+1¢ eΠIpr,t+1 − φpr,t+1fpr,t+1´ (242)
Thus the insider’s bargaining surplus is
V Ipr,t − V 0Ipr,t = wpr,t − bpr,t (243)
and the firm’s bargaining surplus is
eΠpr,t − eΠIpr,t = apr − wpr,t + fpr,t (244)
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The negotiated wage maximizes the Nash product (Λ)
Λ = (wpr,t − bpr,t)µ
¡
aIpr − wpr,t + fpr,t
¢1−µ
. (245)
Thus:
wpr,t = (1− µ) bpr,t + µ (apr + fpr,t) . (246)
Further Assumptions: We assume that the firing costs are proportional
to the wage fi,t = ρi,twi,t (where i is the index for primary (pr) and trapped
(tr) workers) with the "firing cost ratio" ρi,t in the respective sectors and that
the unemployment benefit in our model is given by bi,t = rri,twi,t with the net
replacement ratio rri,t in the respective sectors. Thus, the negotiated wage is
wi,t =
µ
(1− rri,t(1− µ)− ρµ)
ai,t . (247)
6.6.2 Model Derivation
Profit in the Trapped Sector In the trapped sector, workers have an
average productivity atr and there is an exogenously given probability ' for
employed workers to move to the primary sector of the economy. Firms take
the regime switch into account (upgrade of trapped to primary workers), which
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State Probability
Human Capital Upgrading '
No Upgrading + Firing (1−')φtr
No Upgrading + Retention (1−') (1− φtr)
Table 7: Human capital upgrade
increases the profitability.
The profit function below (Πt,regime1) corresponds to the first regime (av-
erage profits weighted with the probability that workers stay trapped):
Πt,regime1 = −ξt +
∞X
t=0
δt (1− φtr)t (1−')t (atr − wtr)−
(1−') δφtrftr
∞X
t=0
δt (1−')t (1− φtr)t (248)
Πt,regime1 =
atr − wtr − δ (1−')φtrftr
1− δ (1− φtr) (1−')
(249)
In each subsequent period a worker moves with probability ' from the
trapped to the primary sector. The profit function below (Πt,regime2) corre-
sponds to the second regime:
Πt,regime2 = δ'
∞X
t=0
δt (1−')t (1− φtr)t
⎡
⎢⎣
−φprfpr+¡
1− φpr
¢Ã P∞
t=0 δ
t
¡
1− φpr
¢t
(apr − wpr)−
δφprfpr
P∞
t=0 δ
t ¡1− φpr¢t
! ⎤⎥⎦ (250)
The second line of the formula describes the present value of a worker if
she is upgraded to the primary sector. An upgraded primary worker has the
probability φpr of not being fired immediately and a probability
¡
1− φpr
¢
of
being retained. If the latter is the case, she has the same expected profit stream
as a primary workers:
P∞
t=0 δ
t ¡1− φpr¢t (apr − wpr)−δφprfP∞t=0 δt ¡1− φpr¢t.
Since every period a certain fraction of workers moves the primary sector, we
have to write a double sum. A fraction ' among those who have not been
fired (1−')t (1− φtr)t moves to the primary sector.
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Πt,regime2 = δ'
∞X
t=0
δt (1−')t (1− φtr)t"
−φprfpr +
¡
1− φpr
¢Ãapr − wpr − δφprfpr
1− δ
¡
1− φpr
¢ !# (251)
Πt,regime2 = −φprδ'
fpr
(1− δ (1−') (1− φtr))
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
δ'
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
apr − wpr − δφprfpr¡
1− δ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δ (1−') (1− φtr))
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(252)
Thus, the overall expected profit (Πt = Πt,regime1 +Πt,regime2) is:
Πt = −ξt +
atr − wtr − δ (1−')φtrftr
1− δ (1− φtr) (1−')
− φprδ'
fpr
(1− δ (1−') (1− φtr))
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
δ'
Ã
apr − wpr − δφprfpr¡
1− δ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δ (1−') (1− φtr))
!
(253)
Employment Dynamics:
Primary Sector: The (primary) employment in period t is equal to the
people who are retained, both from the pool of employed (Npr,t−1) and from the
human capital upgrades ('Ntr,t−1). The two groups have the same retention
probability 1 − φpr. A proportion ηpr of the unemployed primary workers
is hired. The pool of primary unemployed workers is reduced by a share υ
(workers who move to the trapped sector).
Npr,t =
¡
1− φpr
¢
Npr,t−1 +
¡
1− φpr
¢
'Ntr,t−1 +
ηprUpr,t−1 − ηprvUpr,t−1 (254)
Npr,t =
¡
1− φpr
¢
Npr,t−1 +
¡
1− φpr
¢
'Ntr,t−1 +
¡
ηpr (1− υ)
¢
Upr,t−1 (255)
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Next, we introduce gt,pr which is the growth rate of the primary workforce
from period t− 1 to t (gt,pr = Lpr,t/Lpr,t−1).
Dividing by Lpr,t, we obtain:
npr,t =
1
gt,pr
¡
1− φpr
¢
npr,t−1 +
¡
1− φpr
¢
'
Ntr,t−1
Lpr,t
+
1
gt,pr
¡
ηpr (1− υ)
¢
(1− npr,t−1) (256)
npr,t =
1
gt,pr
£¡
1− φpr
¢
npr,t−1 +
¡
ηpr (1− υ)
¢
(1− npr,t−1)
¤
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
'
Ltr,t−1
Lpr,t
ntr,t−1. (257)
The labor force in the primary sector is equal to the previous period’s labor
force plus the net movement from the trapped sector:
Lpr,t = Lpr,t−1 − υupr,t−1Lpr,t−1 +'ntr,t−1Ltr,t−1. (258)
In the steady state, the growth rate of the labor force is equal to 0 (gt,pr =
Lpr,t/Lpr,t−1 = 1) and all time indices can be dropped. Thus, the following
equation holds:
npr
¡
φpr +
¡
ηpr (1− υ)
¢¢
= (1− υ) ηpr +'
¡
1− φpr
¢
ntr
Ltr
Lpr
. (259)
And the following constraint (human capital upgrades must equal down-
grades) has to hold in the steady state:
vUpr = 'Ntr (260)
Trapped Sector: The employed in the trapped sector equal the retained
workers from the previous period (who did not receive a human capital up-
grade: (1−')Ntr,t−1) plus the hired trapped unemployed (their number has
been enlarged by the human capital depreciation: ηtrUtr,t−1 + ηtrvUpr,t−1):
Ntr,t = (1− φtr) (1−')Ntr,t−1 + ηtrUtr,t−1 + ηtrvUpr,t−1 (261)
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Dividing by Ltr,t:
ntr,t =
1
gt,tr
[(1− φtr) (1−')ntr,t−1 + ηtr (1− ntr,t−1)] + ηtrυ
Upr,t−1
Ltr,t
(262)
ntr,t =
1
gt,tr
[(1− φtr) (1−')ntr,t−1 + ηtr (1− ntr,t−1)] +
ηtrυ (1− npr,t−1)
Lpr,t−1
Ltr,t
(263)
The labor force in the trapped sector is equal to the previous period’s labor
force plus the net movement from the primary sector:
Ltr,t = Ltr,t−1 + υupr,t−1Lpr,t−1 −'ntr,t−1Ltr,t−1. (264)
In the steady state the following relationship holds:
ntr = (1− φtr) (1−')ntr + ηtr (1− ntr) + ηtrυ (1− npr)
Lpr
Ltr
(265)
ntr,t =
ηtr + ηtrυ (1− npr)
Lpr
Ltr
(1− (1− φtr) (1−') + ηtr)
. (266)
Inserting (266) into (259), we obtain the following steady state relationship:
npr
¡
φpr +
¡
ηpr (1− υ)
¢¢
= ηpr (1− υ) +
¡
1− φpr
¢
'
ηtr + ηtrυ (1− npr)
Lpr
Ltr
(1− (1− φtr) (1−') + ηtr)
Ltr
Lpr
(267)
npr =
ηpr (1− υ) +
¡
1− φpr
¢
'
ηtr
Ltr
Lpr
+ηtrυ
(1−(1−φtr)(1−')+ηtr)
φpr +
¡
ηpr (1− υ)
¢
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
' ηtrυ
(1−(1−φtr)(1−')+ηtr)
. (268)
If υ = ' = 0, we have two entirely separated sectors in this economy and
we obtain the following steady state relationship:
npr =
ηpr
φpr + ηpr
. (269)
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6.6.3 Derivations for the Calibration
Non-Trapped Sector: The detailed derivations of the steady state firing
and hiring rates under diﬀerent policy exercises is analogous to Chapter 5191,
providing the following linearized equations:
φpr,new = φpr,0 −Apr [(apr,new − wpr,new)− (apr,0 − wpr,0)] (270)
−Cpr (fpr,new − fpr,0)
and
ηpr,new = ηpr,0 +Gpr [(apr,new − wpr,new)− (apr,0 − wpr,0)]
−Ipr
Ã
fpr,new
−fpr,0
!
−Kpr
Ã
hpr,new
−hpr,0
!
− Lpr
Ã
φpr,new
−φpr,0
!
,(271)
where all coeﬃcients Apr to Lpr have a positive sign.
Trapped Sector:
Firing Rate: A worker is fired if Πt < −ftr.
φtr = 1− Γ
⎛
⎝
atr−wtr−δ(1−')φtrftr
1−δ(1−φtr)(1−')
+ ftr − φprδ'
fpr
(1−δ(1−')(1−φtr))
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
δ'
µ
apr−wpr−δφprfpr
(1−δ(1−φpr))(1−δ(1−')(1−φtr))
¶ ⎞⎠ (272)
For the calibration we deflate all variables to their 1991 real value (using
German GDP deflator192) and take into account a 2% (ζ = 1.02) growth rate
of all variables (a, w, f) and the operating costs to make the calibration more
realistic and comparable to chapter 5.
φtr = 1− Γ
⎛
⎝ 1
ζ15
⎛
⎝
atr−wtr−δζ(1−')φtrftr
1−δζ(1−φtr)(1−')
+ ftr − φprδζ' fpr(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))
+
¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ'
µ
apr−wpr−δζφprfpr
(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))
¶ ⎞⎠⎞⎠
(273)
191See page 39 of the detailed version.
192Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
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Next, we take a first order Taylor approximation for the firing rate (where
the subscript "0" refers to old steady state values and the subscript "new"
refers to new steady state values). Therefore, we need the first derivatives at
the old steady state with respect to the following variables:
∂φtr,0
∂ (atr − wtr)
= − 1
ζ15
Γ0f,0
∙
1
1− ζδ (1− φtr) (1−')
¸
0
(274)
∂φtr,0
∂ (apr − wpr)
= − 1
ζ15
Γ0f,0
" ¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ'¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δζ (1−') (1− φtr))
#
(275)
∂φtr,0
∂ftr
= − 1
ζ15
Γ0f,0
∙
−δζφtr (1−')
1− ζδ (1− φtr) (1−')
+ 1
¸
0
(276)
∂φtr,0
∂fpr
= − 1
ζ15
Γ0f,0
⎡
⎣
− δζ'φpr
(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))
− δ
2ζ2'φpr(1−φpr)
(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))
⎤
⎦
0
(277)
∂φtr,0
∂φtr
= − 1
ζ15
Γ0f,0
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−δζftr (1−') (1− δζ (1− φtr) (1−'))−
δζ (1−') [atr − wtr − δζ (1−')φtrftr]
(1−δζ(1−φtr)(1−'))2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
−
³
−δ2ζ2φpr'fpr(1−')
[(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]2
´
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−
¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ'
¡
apr − wpr − δζφprfpr
¢¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
δζ (1−')
[(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(278)
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∂φtr,0
∂φpr
= − 1
ζ15
Γ0f,0
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
£¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δζ (1−') (1− φtr))
¤"
−δζ' (apr − wpr)
−δ2ζ2'fpr
¡
1− 2φpr
¢ #
−
" ¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ' (apr − wpr)−
δ2ζ2'fpr
¡
φpr − φ2pr
¢ #¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(δζ (1−'))
[(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]
2
− δζ'fpr
(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(279)
∂φtr,0
∂'
= − 1
ζ15
Γ0f,0
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
δζφtrftr [1− δζ (1− φtr) (1−')]−
[atr − wtr − δζ (1−')φtrftr] [δζ (1− φtr)]
[1−δζ(1−φtr)(1−')]2
−
((1− δζ (1−') (1− φtr)))φprδζfpr−
φprδ
2ζ2'fpr (1− φtr)
((1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr)))2
+
" ¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δζ (1−') (1− φtr))
−'
¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(δζ (1− φtr))
#
δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢ ¡
apr − wpr − δζφprfpr
¢
[(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]
2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(280)
Thus, we obtain the following expression:
φtr,new = φtr,0 +
∂φtr,0
∂ (atr − wtr)
"
(atr,new − wtr,new)
− (atr,0 − wtr,0)
#
(281a)
+
∂φtr,0
∂ (apr − wpr)
"
(apr,new − wpr,new)
− (apr,0 − wpr,0)
#
(281b)
+
∂φtr,0
∂ftr
(ftr,new − ftr,0) (281c)
+
∂φtr,0
∂fpr
(fpr,new − fpr,0) (281d)
+
∂φtr,0
∂φtr
¡
φtr,new − φtr,0
¢
(281e)
+
∂φtr,0
∂φpr
¡
φpr,new − φpr,0
¢
(281f)
+
∂φtr,0
∂'
('new −'0) (281g)
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By defining
V =
1
ζ15
Γ0f,0
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−δζftr (1−') (1− δζ (1− φtr) (1−'))−
δζ (1−') [atr − wtr − δζ (1−')φtrftr]
(1−δζ(1−φtr)(1−'))2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
−
³
−δ2ζ2φpr'fpr(1−')
[(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]2
´
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−
¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ'
¡
apr − wpr − δζφprfpr
¢¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
δζ (1−')
[(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
0
, (282)
we obtain:
φtr,new = φtr,0 (283a)
+
∂φtr,0
∂ (atr − wtr)
µ
1
1 + V
¶⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
atr,new
−wtr,new
!
−
Ã
atr,0
−wtr,0
!
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(283b)
+
∂φtr,0
∂ (apr − wpr)
µ
1
1 + V
¶⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
apr,new
−wpr,new
!
−
Ã
apr,0
−wpr,0
!
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(283c)
+
∂φtr,0
∂ftr
µ
1
1 + V
¶
(ftr,new − ftr,0) (283d)
+
∂φtr,0
∂fpr
µ
1
1 + V
¶
(fpr,new − fpr,0) (283e)
+
∂φtr,0
∂φpr
µ
1
1 + V
¶¡
φpr,new − φpr,0
¢
(283f)
+
∂φtr,0
∂'
µ
1
1 + V
¶
('new −'0) . (283g)
Or by substituting the coeﬃcients:
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φtr,new = φtr,0 −Atr [(atr,new − wtr,new)− (atr,0 − wtr,0)] (284)
−Btr [(apr,new − wpr,new)− (apr,0 − wpr,0)]− Ctr (ftr,new − ftr,0)
+Dtr (fpr,new − fpr,0) +Etr
¡
φtr,new − φtr,0
¢
+ Ftr ('new −'0)
where Atr to Ftr are all positive constants.
Thus, higher productivity and lower wages lead to a reduction of the firing
rate. Higher firing costs in the trapped sector reduce firing (not taking their
indirect eﬀect via the wage formation into account which outweighs the direct
eﬀect), whereas higher firing costs in the primary sector increase firing in the
trapped sector. There is a positive spillover eﬀect from the firing rate in the
primary sector to the trapped sector, i.e. if the firing rate in the primary
sector is reduced, the same is true for the firing rate in the trapped sector.
Furthermore, a higher intersectoral mobility reduces firing in the trapped sector
(as the average profitability of trapped workers increases).
Hiring Rate: A worker is hired if Πt > htr. Thus:
ηtr = Γ
⎛
⎝
atr−wtr−δ(1−')φtrftr
1−δ(1−φtr)(1−')
+ htr+
δ'φprfpr
(1−δ') +
¡
1− φpr
¢
δ'
µ
apr−wpr+δφprfpr
(1−δ(1−φpr))((1−δ'))
¶ ⎞⎠ (285)
Analogous to the firing rate the hiring rate is re-written as:
ηtr = Γ
⎛
⎝ 1
ζ15
⎛
⎝
atr−wtr−δζ(1−')φtrftr
1−δζ(1−φtr)(1−')
+ htr+
δζ'φprfpr
(1−δζ') +
¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ'
µ
apr−wpr+δζφprfpr
(1−δζ(1−φpr))((1−δζ'))
¶ ⎞⎠⎞⎠
(286)
To obtain the first order Taylor approximation, we need to calculate the first
partial derivatives:
∂ηtr,0
∂ (atr − wtr)
=
1
ζ15
Γ0h,0
∙
1
1− ζδ (1− φtr) (1−')
¸
0
(287)
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∂ηtr,0
∂ (apr − wpr)
=
1
ζ15
Γ0h,0
" ¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ'¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δζ (1−') (1− φtr))
#
(288)
∂ηtr,0
∂ftr
=
1
ζ15
Γ0h,0
∙
−δζφtr (1−')
1− ζδ (1− φtr) (1−')
¸
0
(289)
∂ηtr,0
∂fpr
=
1
ζ15
Γ0h,0
⎡
⎣
− δζ'φpr
(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))
− δ
2ζ2'φpr(1−φpr)
(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))
⎤
⎦
0
(290)
∂ηtr,0
∂h
=
1
ζ15
Γ0h,0 (291)
∂ηtr,0
∂φtr
=
1
ζ15
Γ0h,0
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−δζftr (1−') (1− δζ (1− φtr) (1−'))−
δζ (1−') [atr − wtr − δζ (1−')φtrftr]
(1−δζ(1−φtr)(1−'))2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
−
³
−δ2ζ2φpr'fpr(1−')
[(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]2
´
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−
¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ'
¡
apr − wpr − δζφprfpr
¢¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
δζ (1−')
[(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(292)
∂ηtr,0
∂φpr
=
1
ζ15
Γ0h,0
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
£¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δζ (1−') (1− φtr))
¤"
−δζ' (apr − wpr)
−δ2ζ2'fpr
¡
1− 2φpr
¢ #
−
" ¡
1− φpr
¢
δζ' (apr − wpr)−
δ2ζ2'fpr
¡
φpr − φ2pr
¢ #¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(δζ (1−'))
[(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]
2
− δζ'fpr
(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(293)
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∂ηtr,0
∂'
=
1
ζ15
Γ0h,0
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
δζφtrftr [1− δζ (1− φtr) (1−')]−
[atr − wtr − δζ (1−')φtrftr] [δζ (1− φtr)]
[1−δζ(1−φtr)(1−')]2
−
((1− δζ (1−') (1− φtr)))φprδζfpr−
φprδ
2ζ2'fpr (1− φtr)
((1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr)))2
+
" ¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(1− δζ (1−') (1− φtr))
−'
¡
1− δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢¢
(δζ (1− φtr))
#
δζ
¡
1− φpr
¢ ¡
apr − wpr − δζφprfpr
¢
[(1−δζ(1−φpr))(1−δζ(1−')(1−φtr))]
2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(294)
Thus, the first order Taylor approximation is
ηtr,new = ηtr,0 +
∂ηtr,0
∂ (atr − wtr)
[(atr,new − wtr,new)− (atr,0 − wtr,0)](295a)
+
∂ηtr,0
∂ (apr − wpr)
[(apr,new − wpr,new)− (apr,0 − wpr,0)] (295b)
+
∂ηtr,0
∂ftr
(ftr,new − ftr,0) +
∂ηtr,0
∂fpr
(fpr,new − fpr,0) (295c)
+
∂ηtr,0
∂φtr
¡
φtr,new − φtr,0
¢
+
∂ηtr,0
∂φpr
¡
φpr,new − φpr,0
¢
(295d)
+
∂ηtr,0
∂'
('new −'0) (295e)
Or by substituting the coeﬃcients
ηtr,new = ηtr,0 +Gtr [(atr,new − wtr,new)− (atr,0 − wtr,0)] (296a)
+Htr
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
apr,new
−wpr,new
!
−
Ã
apr,0
−wpr,0
!
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
− Itr
Ã
ftr,new
−ftr,0
!
− Jtr
Ã
fpr,new
−fpr,0
!
−Ktr
Ã
htr,new
−htr,0
!
− Ltr
Ã
φtr,new
−φtr,0
!
(296b)
−Mtr
Ã
φpr,new
−φpr,0
!
+Ntr
Ã
'new
−'0
!
. (296c)
where Gtr to Ntr are all positive coeﬃcients. The rationale for the signs
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of the coeﬃcients is the same as for the linearized firing rate in the trapped
sector.193
193For the linearized model a value for the first derivative of the cumulative function has
to be chosen (Γ0). In chapter 5 for the firing and hiring rate the same values are used,
while we choose (Γ0f = 6 ∗ 10−7) and (Γ0h = 6 ∗ 10−6), where f and h stand for the firing
and hiring rate respectively. In the homogenous model, this provides us with a similar labor
demand elasticity and thus a similar employment path, but is more in line with the empirical
evidence on hiring and firing elasticities (for a summary, see Orszag and Snower, 1999).
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7 Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of Employment
Subsidies
7.1 Introduction
This chapter194 aims to provide a groundwork for comparing the eﬀectiveness
of alternative employment subsidy policies. In doing so, we attempt to make
our analysis maximally useful to the decisions that policy makers commonly
face in practice.
We focus on employment subsidies because these policies are often meant
to reduce both unemployment and earnings inequality together. The quest for
such measures has been a prime objective of employment policy throughout the
OECD and continues to be central to the policy debate in the large continental
European countries.195
To make our analysis expressly relevant to policy making, we do not follow
the mainstream practice of deriving policies as first-best responses to market
failures; rather we begin with a model that covers a variety of common la-
bor market imperfections - insider wage bargaining, hiring and firing costs,
and imperfections related to the tax and transfer system - and examine the
second-best employment policy response, taking these imperfections as given.
We assume, as policy makers often do, that the institutions underlying these
imperfections can be changed only gradually and with considerable delay; and
thus we argue that it is useful to examine the relative eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent
employment policies while these institutions are in place. Furthermore, in ac-
cord with policy makers’ actual concerns, we measure policy eﬀectiveness not
just in terms of employment and welfare, but also give explicit consideration
to earnings inequality and government budgetary outlays.
Due to the labor market imperfections above, the resulting unemploy-
ment can be ineﬃcient. Our analysis is appropriate to policy design in high-
unemployment countries, such as Germany, where policy makers have every
reason to believe that unemployment is in fact ineﬃciently high. Then, in prin-
ciple, employment policies may make some people better oﬀ without making
others worse oﬀ.
It is well known that identifying such Pareto welfare-improving policies is
194For a diﬀerent version of this chapter see "Evaluating the Eﬀectiveness of Employment
Subsidies," with Alessio Brown and Dennis Snower, Kiel Working Paper, No. 1302, Novem-
ber 2006.
195For a detailed discussion of currently applied employment subsidy programs in Germany
and recent reform proposals see Boss (2006).
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insuperably diﬃcult in practice. Thus our analysis focuses on policies that
are "approximately Pareto welfare eﬃcient" - or simply approximately welfare
eﬃcient, for short - in the following sense:
1. they improve aggregate employment and welfare (defined in terms of the
utility functions of the households),
2. they do not increase earnings inequality (measured in terms of the Gini
coeﬃcient), and
3. they are self-financing (i.e. they do not require an additional government
budgetary allocation).
Clearly, approximate welfare eﬃciency is not equivalent to Pareto welfare
eﬃciency, because an employment policy can obviously satisfy the three con-
ditions above and still generate uncompensated losers. Nevertheless, we argue
that approximate welfare eﬃciency is a useful concept for policy making, since
policies that are approximately welfare eﬃcient are not only desirable for Ben-
thamite reasons (the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people),
but are unlikely to be blocked through the political process (since the fear of
rising earnings inequality is the most common reason for blocking eﬃciency-
improving employment reforms).196
The design of employment policies in most OECD countries indeed reflects
governments’ need to address both equity and eﬃciency objectives. The ineﬃ-
ciency of passive unemployment policies - such as the payment of tax-financed
unemployment benefits to those who are jobless - is generally due to policy
makers’ attempt to satisfy equity objectives. Both the unemployment bene-
fits and the taxes that finance them generate externalities: the recipients get
an uncompensated benefit, while the tax payers have an uncompensated cost.
Thus the work-leisure choice is distorted. The widespread move from passive
to active labor market policies is usually motivated by the need to reduce such
ineﬃciencies. Some active labor market policies however appear to have im-
proved employment incentives at the expense of income equality.197 Against
this backdrop, it appears useful to identify policies that increase employment
and welfare without raising income inequality.
This chapter addresses two important questions: (i) How should employ-
ment policies be targeted? (ii) What should the magnitude of the policy inter-
vention be? There is much disagreement on these issues among policy makers.
196See, for example, Orszag and Snower (1998), Saint Paul (1995, 1996 and 1998).
197See, for example, Grogger and Karoly (2005).
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In practice, there are two broad policy approaches to targeting: The first
favors targeting workers with low incomes and low abilities; and the second fo-
cuses on targeting the unemployed. Within each of these approaches, there is a
plethora of more detailed choices to be made.198 Specifically, this chapter com-
pares the eﬀectiveness of the following employment subsidy policies: (i) wage
subsidies targeted at workers with low abilities, (ii) hiring vouchers targeted
at long-term unemployed workers, (iii) hiring vouchers targeted at workers
with low abilities, and (iv) hiring vouchers targeted at long-term unemployed
workers with low abilities.
We address the issue of targeting by examining how much additional em-
ployment and social welfare each employment subsidy policy creates. To an-
alyze the desirable magnitude of the policy intervention, we make use of the
concept of approximate welfare eﬃciency. Specifically, we examine how large
each particular employment subsidy can become before it ceases to be approx-
imately welfare eﬃcient (AWE). In our analysis, the policies under consider-
ation exhibit "diminishing returns," in the sense that equal incremental in-
creases in each employment subsidy leads to progressively smaller incremental
increases in employment and social welfare and a progressively larger govern-
ment budgetary outlay. We show that, for each employment subsidy, once a
critical level is exceeded, it ceases to be self-financing. Recalling that our notion
of approximate welfare eﬃciency involves the satisfaction of three constraints -
an employment and welfare constraint, an earnings inequality constraint, and
a self-financing constraint - we find, in our calibration exercises, that as each
subsidy is increased, the self-financing constraint is reached first. Thus the
self-financing constraint determines the magnitude of each policy intervention
that is compatible with approximate welfare eﬃciency.
On this basis, we then compare the eﬀectiveness of alternative employment
subsidy policies. Our notion of policy eﬀectiveness is related to a policy’s
ability to raise employment and welfare, while remaining AWE. The more an
198For example, if workers with low incomes are the focus, how narrowly should they be
targeted? (Should employment-promoting policies be directed mainly, say, at the lowest
decile or the lowest quintile?) How should the magnitude of the policy intervention depend
on incomes? (For instance, should the employment subsidy or tax rebate rise as income
falls, or should the profile be hump-shaped, as for the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit?) If
unemployed workers are the target group, then how narrowly should the policy be targeted
at the long-term unemployed and how should the magnitude of the employment-promoting
intervention depend on the duration of unemployment? Alternatively, should the policy be
targeted at young or old unemployed people, and if so, how?
Beyond that, the two approaches could be combined. The policy could, for example, be
targeted at low-skilled, unemployed workers. If so, what should be the relative importance
of skills versus unemployment duration in the policy targeting scheme?
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approximately welfare eﬃcient policy raises employment and welfare, the more
"eﬀective" we denote the policy to be.
Our analysis tackles these issues by presenting a model that is rich enough
to capture the various groups of workers relevant to these alternative tar-
geting approaches, while at the same time being simple enough to generate
straightforward policy guidelines. We calibrate the model for the German
labor market, which has characterized by high aggregate and long-term unem-
ployment over the past three decades, and we then derive the corresponding
policy implications.
We show that, for the calibrated model, a hiring voucher targeted at the
long-term unemployed is particularly eﬀective in raising employment and wel-
fare, without reducing income inequality or requiring an additional government
budget outlay. (In fact, as noted, the employment- and welfare-maximizing
AWE subsidy reduces earnings inequality.) Furthermore, we find that hir-
ing vouchers targeted at the duration of unemployment are more eﬀective in
raising employment and welfare than those targeted at unskilled (low-ability)
workers. Moreover, while low wage subsidies (LWS) can also reduce income in-
equality, they are a relatively expensive and ineﬀective instrument for reducing
unemployment. These are striking results.
We also investigate the employment and equity eﬀects of implementing em-
ployment subsidies in excess of the magnitudes that are self-financing. Specif-
ically, we examine how much employment could be created by each of the
policy measures under consideration if the government’s net budgetary allo-
cation for this measures were increased by a specified amount. Here, too, we
find that hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed have relatively
strong employment creating eﬀects, without inequality implications. Subsidies
targeted at low-ability workers turn out to be less eﬀective.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background
to our analysis. Section 3 presents our theoretical model of the labor mar-
ket. Section 4 calibrates this model for Germany, shows the driving eﬀects to
make a policy eﬀective and derives the policy implications. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
153
7.2 Background
7.2.1 The Two Great Divides
Our analysis deals with the “two great divides” that separate the haves from
the have-nots in the labor market: (i) the divide between employment and
unemployment and (ii) the divide between high-wage and low-wage jobs. The
first divide is central to the employment policy debate in Europe, while the
second receives relatively more attention in the United States.
Both divides may be ineﬃcient and inequitable. Unemployment and work-
ing poverty are obvious sources of income inequality. These problems may also
reflect inequality of opportunity if the incentives to work and search for jobs
are unequally distributed among the working population. Furthermore, un-
employment and working poverty are ineﬃcient when incentives for work, job
search, and human capital acquisition have been distorted. For these reasons
these problems become legitimate objects of government policies. A wide vari-
ety of employment policy instruments have been used for this objective: income
taxes and income tax credits, wage subsidies, hiring vouchers, in-kind benefits,
and so on. For the purposes of our chapter, we are concerned only with the
eﬀect of these policy instruments on incentives in the labor market; diﬀerent
policies that create the same incentives will be indistinguishable in our model.
On this account, we will denote all these instruments as "employment subsi-
dies," in the sense that they promote employment by altering the incentives of
labor market participants. The central issues of this chapter are how to target
these subsidies and how large the subsidies should be.
The two divides are not completely separate phenomena. For example,
long-term unemployment can lead to skill attrition, lower productivity, and
thereby to low-wage jobs. Low-wage jobs are frequently associated with rel-
atively high labor turnover and thus the low-wage job holders often become
relatively prone to unemployment. Thus both of the above policy approaches
- those targeted at low incomes/skills and those targeted at the unemployed -
will aﬀect both unemployment and working poverty. On this account, we will
analyze both problems within the same analytical framework.
Some commentators199 have noted that, with regard to individual welfare,
there is often little to distinguish the unemployed in Europe from the working
poor in the US. Both groups tend to have relatively low living standards.
With regard to the economy’s productive potential, however, there may be
199See, for example, Krugman (1994) and Freeman (1995).
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significant diﬀerences. The working poor produce goods and services, whereas
the unemployed do not. Moreover, the unemployed impose costs on the rest
of society - since their unemployment benefits and related welfare entitlements
are paid largely by employers and employees, as are some of the crime and
health costs generated by the unemployed - whereas the working poor tend to
do so only to a lesser degree. Beyond that, the unemployed suﬀer depreciation
of their human capital, whereas the working poor may gain human capital,
possibly in terms of work habits and contacts to employment opportunities.200
These phenomena are captured by our model.
In our model, diﬀerences in productivity among workers are due to both
diﬀerences in ability and diﬀerences in unemployment duration (via skill attri-
tion). This distinction is important, since ability and unemployment duration
diﬀer in their amenability to policy influence. In practice, unemployment du-
ration is readily aﬀected through the standard employment policy instruments,
whereas ability can be aﬀected primarily though education and training policy
and this influence takes a comparatively long-time to manifest itself. Since our
focus is on employment policy, we let the unemployment duration-dependent
productivity diﬀerences be endogenous (influenceable by the policy), whereas
the ability-dependent productivity diﬀerences are defined as exogenous (not
influenceable by the policy).201
7.2.2 Relation to the Literature
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the impact and optimal
design of employment subsidies, originated with the work by Pigou (1933) and
Kaldor (1936).202
Even today, many theoretical analyses are still static and thus suﬀer from
the serious drawback that they capture only short-run impact eﬀects of em-
ployment policy.203 There are however good theoretical and empirical rea-
200Naturally, these diﬀerences must not be overplayed. The productivity of the working
poor is often low and thus their output of goods and services, relative to the voluntary
and informal work of the unemployed, is accordingly limited. Furthermore, as governments
throughout the OECD have begun to shift from passive to active labor market measures, so
the costs that the working poor impose on the rest of society have risen and the corresponding
costs of the unemployed have fallen.
201Our analysis can be extended to education and training policy; see, for example, Oskamp
and Snower (2006).
202For a survey of the empirical literature, see for example Katz (1998). For US evidence,
see Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) and O’Leary et al. (2006). For international evidence,
see for example N.E.R.A. (1995), and for British evidence, see Bell et al. (1999). As follows,
we will focus on theoretical papers and the calibration thereof.
203See, e.g., Layard et al. (1991), pp. 490-492, and Snower (1994).
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sons to believe that longer-run eﬀects are important, often more important
than the short-run eﬀects.204 (There are various significant dynamic intercon-
nections. For example, hiring in response to employment policy takes time
and may have persistent eﬀects since incumbent employees’ probability of be-
ing retained generally exceeds the unemployed people’s probability of being
hired.) We explicitly capture the dynamic eﬀects of subsidies by specifying
the transition rates between employment and unemployment as a function of
the employment incentives of the firm.
We contribute to the existing literature by considering, as noted, skills de-
pending unemployment duration as well as on diﬀerent levels of ability. This
detailed grid allows us to analyze and contrast the eﬀects of employment subsi-
dies targeted at diﬀerent skill classes under the criteria approximative welfare
eﬃciency - explicitly taking the complete budgetary eﬀects into account.205
This is in stark contrast to the existing literature which only considers
a small subset of possible targets for employment subsidies. A large part
examines the rationale and economic eﬀects of subsidies for the low skilled
(e.g. Phelps, 1994, 1997a, 1997b, Drèze and Snessens, 1997, and Oskamp and
Snower, 2006)206, while less attention has been given to subsidies to long-term
unemployed workers (Hui and Trivedi, 1986, Snower, 1994, Vereshchagina,
2002).
We now proceed to present how these heterogeneities are modelled in our
analytical framework.
7.3 The Model
We construct a Markov model of the labor market in which the dynamics
of employment and unemployment is determined by transition probabilities
among various labor market states. We derive these transition probabilities
from optimization principles.
As noted, our model is meant to be both rich enough to capture unemployment-
duration dependent and ability-dependent skills, but it also aims to be simple
204Orszag and Snower (2000) have shown that the dynamic, long-run eﬀects of employment
subsidies, once the associated lagged adjustment processes have worked themselves out, diﬀer
from what may be expected in the short run.
205Orszag and Snower (2003a and 2003b) pointed out the fact that the literature disre-
garded the complete impact of employment subsidies on the government budget constraint by
requiring that aggregate payroll taxes finance aggregate employment subsidies and thereby
ignoring the reduction of unemployment benefit payments, which result from reduced em-
ployment. In this paper we follow their line of reasoning.
206Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) analyze low wage and hiring subsidies, but do not take
diﬀerent unemployment durations into account.
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enough to generate straightforward, intuitively transparent, policy guidelines.
Accordingly, our model involves some judicious compromises between analyt-
ical simplicity and the depiction of heterogeneous labor market behaviors.
Specifically, our model contains workers in three ability classes: low-ability,
medium-ability and high-ability workers, denoted by αa = lo,me, hi, respec-
tively. These ability classes can be interpreted as the exogenous component of
skill diﬀerences, specifically, exogenous with respect to the employment poli-
cies under consideration in this chapter. Within each ability class, there are
workers in five labor market states:
1. the long-term unemployed
¡
UL
¢
, who have been unemployed for more
than a year (the period of analysis),
2. the short-term unemployed
¡
US
¢
, who have been unemployed up to one
year,
3. the primary entrants
¡
NE1
¢
, who are short-term employed workers (em-
ployed up to one year) that were previously short-term unemployed,
4. the secondary entrants
¡
NE2
¢
, who are short-term employed workers
that were previously long-term unemployed, and
5. the insiders
¡
N I
¢
, who are long-term employed, i.e. employed for more
than a year.
We assume that insiders are more productive than primary entrants who,
in turn, are more productive than secondary entrants. (The terms "primary"
and "secondary" are taken from the literature on dual labor markets207, where
workers in the primary sector are more productive than those in the secondary
sector.) Our model describes labor market activity for workers in each ability
class as a Markov process involving these five states. The transition proba-
bilities among these states are derived from microeconomic foundations. As
noted, we treat the ability classes as exogenous with respect to employment
policy, and thus we assume that there are no transitions among these ability
classes.208
In sum, workers in our model occupy three ability classes (αa = hi,me, lo,
i.e. low, medium, and high ability) and three duration-dependent classes,
207See e.g. Dickens and Lang (1988).
208With respect to training policy, these ability classes would become endogenous, as in
Oskamp and Snower (2006).
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if employed (dn = I,E1, E2, i.e. insiders, primary entrants and secondary
entrants), or two duration-dependent classes, if unemployed (du = S, L, i.e.
short-term and long-term unemployed). We assume constant returns to labor.
Let adnαa be the labor productivity of an employee in duration class dn and
ability class αa.209 The firm faces a random cost ξαa,t, which is iid across
workers and time within the ability class αa. This cost may be interpreted as,
say, an operating cost or a negative productivity shock. Its mean is normalized
to zero and its cumulative distribution Γαa
¡
ξαa
¢
is time-invariant.
Agents in our model pursue the following sequence of decisions. First the
government sets the income tax rate to ensure that its tax receipts are equal to
its net budgetary allocation on employment subsidies. Second, wages are de-
termined through bargaining. Third, the random operating costs are revealed
and then employment decisions are made.
7.3.1 The Government Budget Constraint
For simplicity, our model considers only four instruments of government policy:
(i) a payroll tax, with a tax rate τ , (ii) an unemployment benefit bαa,t, (iii)
an employment subsidy, specifically a hiring voucher σduαa,t targeted at workers
of duration-dependent groups and ability-dependent groups or a wage sub-
sidy σαa,t for employees of certain abilities αa, and (iv) the net allocation of
government expenditures Gt to employment subsidies.
The government budget is given by
Gt+
X
αa
nαa,tlαawαa,tτ =
X
αa
X
du
uduαa,tlαabαa,t+
X
αa
X
du
σduαa,tu
du
αa,tlαaη
du
αa,t+
X
αa
σαa,tlαanαa,t
(297)
For simplicity, our model has only one tax: a proportional payroll tax paid
by employed workers. This tax rate τ balances the government budget in
absence of subsidies (i.e., σαa,t = σ
du
αa,t = 0 and Gt = 0), thereby finances
payments of the unemployment benefit bαa,t to all short-term and long-term
unemployed workers.
We take the net allocation of government expenditures Gt to employment
subsidies as exogenously given. The gross allocation of government expendi-
tures is equal to the total amount that the government spends on employment
209We follow the notational convention that only those variables have time subscripts that
actually vary through time in our model.
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subsidies. If these subsidies create employment, then they generate subsidy-
induced revenue for the government, by leading to a fall in the number of people
requiring unemployment benefits and an increase in the number of people pay-
ing taxes. The net allocation of government expenditures Gt is equal to the
gross allocation minus the subsidy-induced revenue.210 When Gt = 0, the gov-
ernment budget on employment subsidies is balanced, employment subsidies
are self-financing.
7.3.2 Wage Determination
For simplicity, let the wage wαa for each ability class αa be the outcome of a
Nash bargain between the median insider of that ability class and her firm.
The median insider faces no risk of dismissal at the negotiated wage.211 The
wage is renegotiated in each period t. Each worker has the following utility
function
Utt(c) = c
ξ
t , (298)
which depends positively on consumption ct.212 Under bargaining agreement,
the insider receives the wage wαa,t(1− τ), where τ is the payroll tax rate, and
the firm receives the expected profit
¡
aIαa − wαa,t
¢
in each period t. Thus the
expected present value of the insider’s utility V Iαa,t under bargaining agreement
is
V Iαa,t = (wαa,t(1− τ))
ξ + δ
¡¡
1− φαa,t+1
¢
V Iαa,t+1 + φαa,t+1V
S
αa,t+1
¢
(299)
210Along these lines, the net allocation of government expenditures to employ-
ment subsidies can be calculated as Gt =
P
α
P
du
σduα,tu
du
α,tlαη
du
α,t +
P
α σα,tlαnα,t −³
∆t
P
α nα,tlαwα,tτ t −∆t
P
α
P
du
uduα,tlαbα,t
´
, where ∆t denotes the change in the respec-
tive revenue/expenditure.
211These assumptions are made merely for analytical convenience; various other assump-
tions would lead to similar results. For example, we could assume that the wage in each
sector is determined through bargaining between an insider and her firm in that sector, and
that the trapped workers have a higher replacement ratio than the primary workers. The
net replacement rates (unweighted average across six family types) of workers with 67, 100,
and 150 percent of average productivity are 78.25, 68.25, and 64.67 percent, respectively
(see Technical Appendix and OECD, 2006).
Alternatively, the wage could be determined through bargaining between the firm and
a sector-specific or economy-wide union that represents the senior workers (i.e. workers
who do not face a risk of dismissal at the bargained wage). Finally, the wage could be the
outcome of a bargain between the firm and the marginal worker, or between the firm an a
union representing all employees. In this last case, the insiders’ objective in the bargain will
depend on their retention rate.
212In our model, for simplicity, workers consume all their income.
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where φαa,t+1 is the firing rate and V
S
αa,t+1 the expected present value of a
short-term unemployed workers’ returns. The expected present value of firm’s
returns under bargaining agreement are
ΠIαa,t =
¡
aIαa − wαa,t + σαa
¢
+ δ
¡¡
1− φαa,t+1
¢
ΠIαa,t+1 − φαa,t+1fαa,t+1
¢
(300)
where fαa,t+1 are firing costs.
Under disagreement, the insider’s fallback income is bαa,t, assumed for sim-
plicity to be equal to the unemployment benefit. The firm’s fallback profit is
−fαa,t, i.e. during disagreement the insider imposes the maximal cost on the
firm (e.g. through strike, work-to-rule, sabotage) short of inducing dismissal.
Assuming that disagreement in the current period does not aﬀect future re-
turns, the present values of utility under disagreement for the insider are
V 0Iαa,t = (bαa,t)
ξ + δ
¡¡
1− φαa,t+1
¢
V Iαa,t+1 + φαa,t+1V
S
αa,t+1
¢
(301)
and for the firm are
Π0Iαa,t = −fαa,t + δ
¡¡
1− φαa,t+1
¢
ΠIαa,t+1 − φαa,t+1fαa,t+1
¢
(302)
Thus, the insider’s bargaining surplus is
V Iαa,t − V
0I
αa,t = (wαa,t(1− τ))
ξ + δ
¡¡
1− φαa,t+1
¢
V Iαa,t+1 + φαa,t+1V
S
αa,t+1
¢
− (bαa,t)ξ − δ
¡¡
1− φαa,t+1
¢
V Iαa,t+1 + φαa,t+1V
S
αa,t+1
¢
= (wαa,t(1− τ))ξ − (bαa,t)ξ (303)
and the firm’s surplus is
ΠIαa,t −Π
0I
αa,t =
¡
aIαa − wαa,t + σαa
¢
+ δ
Ã ¡
1− φαa,t+1
¢
ΠIαa,t+1
−φαa,t+1fαa,t+1
!
−¡
−fαa,t + δ
¡¡
1− φαa,t+1
¢
ΠIαa,t+1 − φαa,t+1fαa,t+1
¢¢
= aIαa − wαa,t + σαa + fαa,t (304)
The negotiated wage maximizes the Nash product (Λ):
Λ =
³
(wαa,t(1− τ))ξ − (bαa,t)ξ
´µ ¡
aIαa − wαa,t + σαa + fαa,t
¢1−µ
, (305)
where µ represents the bargaining strength of the insider relative to the firm.
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Thus, the following relationship holds:
(1− µ)
³
[wαa,t (1− τ)]
ξ − bξαa,t
´
= µξ
£
wαa,t (1− τ)
¤ξ−1Ã
aIαa − wαa,t+
σαa + fαa,t
!
(1− τ). (306)
In the labor market equilibrium, let firing costs be proportional to the wage,
fαa,t = ρwαa,t, and the unemployment benefit be proportional to the wage as
well, bαa,t = rrαa(1 − τ)wαa,t, where rrαa is the net replacement ratio. Then
the negotiated wage is
wαa =
µξh
(1− µ)
³
1− rrξαa
´
+ µξ (1− ρ)
i ¡aIαa + σαa¢ (307)
Since the wage is renegotiated in each period, the present value in period
t is independent of the present value in period t+ 1.
7.3.3 Transitions among Labor Market States
The transitions among the labor market states are summarized in figure (29).213
For analytical simplicity, we choose to describe these transitions in terms of a
small number of transition variables.
The short-term unemployed
¡
US
¢
are hired with probability ηS and then
become primary entrants
¡
NE1
¢
; with probability
¡
1− ηS
¢
they remain un-
employed and then join the long-term unemployed
¡
UL
¢
, thereby losing pro-
ductivity. The long-term unemployed are hired with probability ηL and then
become secondary entrants
¡
NE2
¢
; with probability
¡
1− ηL
¢
they remain long-
term unemployed.
At the end of a period, the primary entrants turn into insiders
¡
N I
¢
, and
thereby gain productivity. As insiders, they lose their jobs with probability
φ and then become primary entrants; with probability (1− φ) they are re-
trained.214 The same holds for the secondary entrants: they, too, turn into
insiders, who have a φ chance of losing their jobs and a (1− φ) chance of
retaining them.215
213To simplify notation, we suppress the subscripts refering to ability (α) and time (t) in
figure (29), e.g. short-term unemployment (du = S) is written as US rather than USα,t.
214Entrants turn into insiders at the end of a period. In case they are fired at the beginning
of the next period these entrants have been insiders just for an instant. That is the reason
why for expositional convenience in figure 1 we let entrants become insiders only if retained.
215Since all employed workers have the same productivity once they have been employed
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Figure 29: Transitions among labor market states
In short, human capital depreciates with the duration of unemployment
and appreciates with the duration of employment.
Thus the labor market system for each ability group a in period t may be
described as follows:
Sαa,t = Tαa,tSαa,t−1 (308)
where St is a vector of the labor market states:
Sαa,t =
¡
N Iαa,t, N
E1
αa,t, N
E2
αa,t, U
S
αa,t, U
L
αa,t
¢0
(309)
and Tαa,t is a Markov matrix of transition probabilities:
Tαa,t =
(1− φαa,t) (1− φαa,t) (1− φαa,t) 0 0
0 0 0 ηSαa,t 0
0 0 0 0 ηLαa,t
φαa,t φαa,t φαa,t 0 0
0 0 0 (1− ηSαa,t) (1− ηLαa,t)
(310)
for a period (and thus, if they are retained, will become insiders in the next period), they
all face the same firing probability φ.
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We now proceed to derive the transition probabilities from microeconomic
foundations.
7.3.4 Hiring and Firing
First consider the firing rate φαa for insiders. An insider is associated with the
wage wαa and the firing cost fαa. Let the time discount factor be δ. Recalling
that the insider’s productivity is aIαa and a wage subsidy for a worker with
ability αa is σαa, the expected present value of profit generated by an insider,
after the random cost ξαa,t at time t is observed, is
216
ΠIαa,t =
¡
aIαa − wαa − ξαa,t + σαa
¢
+
∞X
i=t+1
δi
" ¡
1− φαa
¢i ¡
aIαa − wαa + σαa
¢
−φαafαa(1− φαa)i−1
#
, (311)
so that
ΠIαa,t =
aIαa − wαa + σαa − δφαafαa
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ − ξαa,t (312)
The expected incentive to retain the insider
¡
νIαa
¢
is defined as the diﬀerence
between the expected profit from retaining the insider
µ
aIαa−wαa+σαa−δφαafαa
1−δ(1−φαa)
¶
and the expected profit from firing him (−fαa), i.e. this insider retention
incentive is
νIαa =
aIαa − wαa + σαa − δφαafαa
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ + fαa (313)
An insider is fired in period t when the realized value of the random cost ξαa,t
is greater than the insider employment incentive:217 ξαa,t > ν
I
αa. Since the
cumulative distribution of the operating cost is Γαa
¡
ξαa,t
¢
, the insider’s firing
rate is
φαa = 1− Γαa
¡
νIαa
¢
(314)
Next consider the hiring rate ηSαa for short-term unemployed workers. The
216In the first period, profit is
¡
aIα − wα − εα,t + σα
¢
; in the second period, the insider is
retained with probability (1− φα) and then generates an expected profit of aIα − wα + σα,
and the insider is fired with a probability of φα and then generates a firing cost of fα; and
so on.
217Equivalently, the insider is fired when the profit from retaining the insider is less than
the firing cost: a
I
α−wα+σα−δφαfα
1−δ(1−φα)
− εα,t < fα.
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expected present value of profit generated by a primary entrant (a worker who
has been hired after being short-term unemployed), after the random cost ξαa,t
at time t is observed, is
ΠE1αa,t =
¡
aE1αa − wαa − ξαa,t − hαa + σαa + σ
S
αa
¢
+
∞X
i=t+1
δi
Ã ¡
1− φαa
¢i ¡
aIαa − wαa + σαa
¢
−φαafαa(1− φαa)i−1
!
(315)
so that
ΠE1αa,t = a
E1
αa − wαa − ξαa,t − hαa + σαa + σ
S
αa +
δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ ¡
aIαa − wαa + σαa
¢
− φαafαaδ
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ , (316)
where σSαa is a hiring voucher for a short-term unemployed worker with ability
αa.218
The expected incentive to hire a short-term unemployed worker
¡
νSαa
¢
is
defined as the diﬀerence between the expected profit from employing the pri-
mary entrant and the expected profit from not doing so (i.e. zero). Thus the
short-term unemployed hiring incentive is
νSαa = a
E1
αa −wαa − hαa + σαa + σ
S
αa +
δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ ¡
aIαa − wαa + σαa
¢
− φαafαaδ
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢
(317)
A primary entrant is hired in period t when the realized value of the random
cost ξαa,t is less than the primary entrant hiring incentive:
219 ξαa,t < ν
S
αa. Thus
the hiring rate for short-term unemployed is
ηSαa = Γαa
¡
νSαa
¢
(318)
218Clearly, a wage subsidy raises current and expected future expected profits of all em-
ployees of the respective ability and thus, raises the hiring rates as well as lowers the firing
rate. A hiring voucher, however, aﬀects only the current period profit of the respectively
subsidised entrant and thereby her respective hiring rate. For the influence of the subsidies
in the linearized model see Appendix 7.6.1.
219Equivalently, the primary entrant is hired when the profit from employing this worker is
greater than than the hiring cost: aE1α −wα−εα,t+σα+σSα+
δ(1−φα)(aIα−wα+σα)−δφαfα
1−δ(1−φα)
> hα.
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Finally, consider the hiring rate ηLαa for the long-term unemployed. The
expected present value of profit generated by a secondary entrant (a worker
who has been hired after being long-term unemployed), after the random cost
ξαa,t at time t is observed, is
ΠE2αa,t = a
E2
αa − wαa − ξαa,t − hαa + σαa + σ
L
αa +
δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ ¡
aIαa − wαa + σαa
¢
− φαafαaδ
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ , (319)
where σLαa is a hiring voucher for a long-term unemployed worker with ability
αa. The expected incentive to hire a long-term unemployed
¡
νLαa
¢
is defined
as the diﬀerence between the expected profit from employing the secondary
entrant and the expected profit from not doing so (i.e. zero). Thus the long-
term unemployed hiring incentive is
νLαa = a
E2
αa −wαa−hαa +σαa +σ
L
αa +
δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ ¡
aIαa − wαa + σαa
¢
− φαafαaδ
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ .
(320)
A secondary entrant is hired in period t when the realized value of the
random cost ξαa,t is less than the secondary entrant hiring incentive:
220 ξαa,t <
νLαa. Thus the hiring rate for long-term unemployed workers is
ηLαa = Γαa
¡
νLαa
¢
. (321)
7.3.5 Employment and Unemployment
The change in employment in each ability group (∆Nαa,t) is the diﬀerence
between the outflow from the unemployment pool
¡
ηSαa,tU
S
αa,t−1 + η
L
αa,tU
L
αa,t−1
¢
and the outflow from the employment pool
¡
φαa,tNαa,t−1
¢
of that ability group:
∆Nαa,t = η
S
αa,tU
S
αa,t−1+η
L
αa,tU
L
αa,t−1−φαa,tNαa,t−1. Assuming a constant labour
force Lαa in each ability class and defining the employment rate to be nαa,t =
Nαa,t/Lαa,t, we obtain the following employment dynamics equation:
221
nαa,t = η
S
αa,tu
S
αa,t−1 + η
L
αa,tu
L
αa,t−1 +
¡
1− φαa,t
¢
nαa,t−1 (322)
220Equivalently, the secondary entrant is hired when the profit from employing this worker
is greater than than the hiring cost: aE2α −wα−εα,t+σα+σLα
δ(1−φα)(aE2α −wα+σα)−δφαfα
1−δ(1−φα)
> hα
221Note that ∆nα,t = ηSα,t
¡
1− nSα,t−1
¢
+ ηLα,t
¡
1− nLα,t−1
¢
− φα,tnα,t−1.
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The long-term unemployed comprise those workers who were either short- or
long-term unemployed in the previous period and who have not been hired in
the current period. Thus the long-run unemployment dynamics equation is
uLαa,t =
¡
1− ηSαa,t
¢
uSαa,t−1 +
¡
1− ηLαa,t
¢
uLαa,t−1. (323)
The short-term unemployment rate is the diﬀerence between the aggregate
unemployment rate and the long-term unemployment rate:
uSαa,t = 1− nαa,t − u
L
αa,t (324)
7.3.6 The Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor market equilibrium is the solution of the system comprising
• employment and unemployment dynamic equations (322), (323) and
(324),
• the government budget constraint, equation (297),
• the firing and hiring rates, equations (314), (318), (321), and
• the wage equation (307).
We now proceed to calibrate the model above for German data and com-
pare the eﬀectiveness of alternatively targeted employment subsidies in terms
of AWE. We will proceed as follows: first, the calibration, then an intuitive
analysis of the eﬀective policy design and then, the numerical results. In a
further step, by relaxing the self-financing constraint, i.e. with a given posi-
tive net allocation of government expenditure to the policy, we compare the
performance of our diﬀerent subsidies in a marginal exercise beyond the ap-
proximately welfare eﬃcient subsidy.
7.4 Evaluation of Employment Subsidies
7.4.1 Calibration
The period of analysis is one year. The interest rate r is set at 4% per year,
which corresponds to the average real interest rate in the OECD over the last
166
four decades, and we set δ = 1
1+r . For simplicity, we begin by choosing a utility
parameter ξ = 1; later we also show results for ξ = 0.5.222
Firing costs and hiring costs are set proportional to 60 percent (fαa = ρwαa
with ρ = 0.6) and 10 percent (hαa = µwαa with µ = 0.1) of the the labor costs
respectively (Chen and Funke, 2003). The net replacement rates rrαa are set
to 78.25 percent for low-ability, 68.25 percent for medium-ability, and 64.67
percent for high-ability workers (OECD, 2006).223 The tax-rate τ that balances
the government’s budget in the absence of subsidies amounts to 0.069.
Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimated rates of skill depreciation during un-
employment: white collar workers lose about 30 percent of their skills after
being unemployed for one year, whereas the number is about 10 percent for
blue collar workers.224 In Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) the rate of deprecia-
tion of skills during unemployment is twice the rate of accumulation.225 In line
with these studies we assume an insider productivity advantage is 10 percent
and a skill depreciation of 20 percent of the respective productivity due to
long-term unemployment.
Figure (8)226 shows the percentage values for Germany for the three ability
classes of the relevant variables of the employment dynamics equations. The
percentage share of the labour force lαa for each ability class for Germany
(2002) is taken from OECD (2005a), the respective aggregate unemployment
rates for Germany (2002) uαa,0 from OECD (2005b, 2005c). The actual hiring
rates for 1996 of each ability and duration group ηSαa,0 and η
L
αa,0 are taken from
Wilke’s (2005) Kaplan-Meier functions for Germany. According to OECD
(2005b, 2005d) the average share of long-term unemployment (uLαa,0/uαa,0) is
around 50 percent and similar across all ability classes.227
The firing rates φαa,0 are assigned the values necessary for the model to
reproduce the unemployment rates of the respective ability classes228. We in-
222For the latter, we have decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Thus, in the aggre-
gated welfare function a bigger weight is given to an improvement of low ability workers’
income (being closer to Rawlsian welfare).
223See Technical Appendix for a description of the calculation of these rates.
224See Keane and Wolpin (1997), p. 500.
225See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), p. 527.
226Note that variables with subscript "0" denote the value at the "old" steady state, i.e.
before any policy exercise, while variables with subscript "new" denote the new steady state
after the policy exercise shows its full eﬀects.
227See also SVR (2005). In our calibration the share of long-term unemployed is somewhat
above 50% for the low-ability and slightly below 50% for the medium- and high-ability,
which seems plausible.
228The firing rate of 9% for low-ability employees is pretty close to what can be found in
the literature (e.g. Brussig and Erlinghagen (2005), Fitzenberger et al. (2003) and Wilke
(2005)). The firing rate for high-ability is somewhat lower than in reality since many high-
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low-skilled medium-skilled high-skilled aggregate
ls 16.6 59.4 24 100
us,0 18 10.2 5.2 10.3
uSs,0 7.7 5.1 2.8 5
uLs,0 10.3 5 2.4 5.3
uLs,0/us,0 57 49 46 50
ηSs,0 49 59 55 56.4
ηLs,0 38 42 51 43.5
φs,0 9.4 5.7 2.9 5.6
Table 8: Steady state values of the labor share, unemployment, HR and FR
for each skill class
terpret these numbers as steady state values.
We linearize the model around the old steady state (see Appendix 7.6.1)
and calculate the long-run eﬀects of the policy exercises (new steady state)
as permanent deviations from the old steady state. Thus, we have to choose
the first derivative of the cumulative density functions in our model (Γ0αa,0),
which determines the hiring and firing elasticities. For this purpose, we use
empirical estimates, as summarized in Orszag and Snower (1999, p. 208). The
first derivative of the cumulative function for the hiring rate (ηΓ0αa,0)
229(denoted
with subscript η) is set in such a way that the hiring elasticity with respect to a
hiring voucher is equal to 0.5.230 Also in line with the aforementioned empirical
literature, we set the first derivative of the cumulative function (φΓ0αa,0)
231 for
the firing rate (denoted with subscript φ ) in such a way that a one-period
reduction of the wage has an elasticity of 0.125.
To double check that we have chosen appropriate hiring and firing elas-
ticities, we compare the endogenous reactions of our model to the empirical
labor demand literature. A permanent 10 percent wage cut (ceteris paribus)
for low-ability workers generates for example an increase in the employment
rate of 8.7 percent in the long-run, which yields an long-term labor demand
elasticity of -0.87.232
ability workers rotate back into work quickly. This phenomenon cannot be captured by our
model since it is calibrated on a yearly basis and workers stay unemployment for at least a
year. However, this property does not aﬀect the model dynamics for the performed exercises.
229See Appendix 7.6.1.
230Reaction of the hiring rate to a hiring voucher for short-term unemployed, which is
permanently paid during the first year of the employment spell (χα =
∂ηSα
ηSα
/∂σ
S
α
wα
). For
simplicity, we choose the same ηΓ00,α for short-term and long-term unemployed in each
ability group.
231See Appendix 7.6.1.
232Note that the endogenous labor demand elasticity in our model varies with the size of
the wage movement. The bigger the change in the wage, the smaller is the labor demand
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Empirical labor demand elasticities for Germany are generally estimated
in a range from -0.3 to -0.9233. Sinn et al. (2006, p. 10) point out that these
estimation results rather reflect short-term than long-term elasticities, refer to
studies where considerable higher estimates have been found for the low wage
sector and consider an elasticity of -1 as realistic. Thus, we see ourselves well
in line with the empirical labor demand literature for Germany. For a detailed
description of the approximations for diﬀerent abilities’ labor costs and wages
see Technical Appendix.
Starting from this steady state we will perform policy exercises and compare
the resulting new steady states.234
7.4.2 Eﬀective Policy Design
We compare the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerently targeted employment subsidies un-
der the notion of AWE. As noted, the following criteria have to hold: (i) the
subsidies improve aggregate employment and welfare (defined as the sum of
the utility of the workforce), (ii) they do not increase earnings inequality (mea-
sured in terms of the Gini coeﬃcient235), and (iii) they are self-financing (i.e.,
they do not require a net allocation of government expenditures to the subsidy
in the new steady state, G = 0.)
It is of course possible that employment subsidies be self-financing. An
employment increase (generated by the subsidy) broadens the tax base and
thereby, raises the government’s revenue, and lower unemployment implies
less expenditures on benefit payments. Thus, to be self-financing the subsidies
must be financed by the additional tax revenue and the reduction in benefit
payments: X
αa
X
du
σduαau
du
αalαaη
du
αa +
X
αa
σαalαanαa
=
Ã
∆
X
αa
nαalαawαaτ −∆
X
αa
X
du
uduαalαabαa
!
, (325)
where ∆ denotes the diﬀerence between the value at the new steady state after
the policy exercise shows its full eﬀects and the value at the "old" steady state,
elasticity (in absolute terms).
233See Riphan et al. (1999).
234See Appendix 7.6.1.
235Note that the Gini coeﬃcient generated by our model is lower than in reality, as our
model does not generate income diﬀerentials within ability groups and it does not take
non-wage related inequalities into account (e.g., due to the wealth distribution).
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i.e. before any policy exercise.
As our numerical results will show, the self-financing constraint is reached
before the other constraints associated with approximate welfare eﬃciency are
reached. It turns out that some policies under consideration are not AWE, as
they are not self-financing at all.
Thus, before discussing the simulation results, in the following we dis-
criminate diﬀerent targeting schemes by their potential of being self-financing.
Thereby, we identify the main eﬀects that influence the existence and the size
of a self-financing area.
Wage Subsidies versus Hiring Vouchers: Let us start with comparing
the two most general types of subsidies:
• a wage subsidy σαa paid to the firm for each employed worker of a specific
ability class236,
• 1-period hiring voucher σduαa,t paid to the firm for hiring a worker of a
specific target group (duration and ability).
Our quantitative analysis will show that self-financing areas are more likely
to exist and, if they exist, will be larger for hiring vouchers than for wage
subsidies. Intuitively, this arises for the following reasons:237
Deadweight Eﬀect: First of all, the deadweight (defined as the rate of
subsidy payments which are paid to workers who would have been employed
in absence of the subsidy) is much larger for wage subsidies than for hiring
vouchers. Naturally, the latter also implies some deadweight, vouchers to those
unemployed workers who would have been hired also in absence of the subsidy,
whereby the deadweight of the former additionally includes subsidies to all
employed workers who would have been retained in absence of the subsidy.238
236Normally, wage-subsidies are targeted at the low-ability workers, i.e. low-wage subsidies,
α = l.
237The following eﬀects are strongly interrelated and reciprocally reinforcing. Thus, we
will not try to disentangle them in our numerical excercise.
238For example, 82 % of the low-skilled workers in Germany are already employed in absence
of a low-wage subsidy, while this groups contains 16.6 % of all workers. Thus, 13.6 % of
the workforce would receive a low wage subsidy, although these people would be employed
without a subsidy. For hiring vouchers deadweight subsidy payments cover only about 5 %
of the workforce.
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Wage Eﬀect: The wage-eﬀect plays an important role for wage-subsidies.
It is defined as the proportion of the subsidy, which does not increase the
firm’s surplus, as it is neutralized by wage increases and thus not used for
employment creation. Since wages are determined by insiders in our model
and wage subsidies are paid for all employed workers of a specific ability, also
for insiders, the latter will try to reap part of the subsidy, as they are part
of the employers’ surplus. Thus, a share of the subsidy goes directly to the
workers and the increase in firm’s employment incentives for workers of the
respective ability class are weakened.
Summary: These two eﬀects make a strong case that hiring vouchers are
more likely to be self-financing and thus, AWE than wage subsidies.
Duration versus Ability: As the deadweight eﬀect and the wage eﬀect
seem to favor hiring vouchers, we now proceed to analyze whether they should
be targeted at specific duration or ability groups. Besides the deadweight
eﬀect, the existence and size of a self-financing subsidy very much dependent
on the replacement rate and transition eﬀect:
Deadweight Eﬀect: The greater is the hiring rate in the initial steady
state, the larger will be the deadweight implied by a hiring voucher. As can be
seen in table (1), empirically, hiring rates in general increase with productivity.
Thus, hiring vouchers should be targeted at workers with the lowest produc-
tivity, namely low-ability workers as well as long-term unemployed workers.
Replacement Rate Eﬀect: As shown above, the lower the income and
ability, the higher is the replacement rate. Thus, increased employment in the
group with the lowest income will generate the largest reduction in government
expenditures (in terms of the respective wage). Hence, the government can
grant a higher voucher relative to the respective wage. Thereby, ceteris paribus,
the higher is the replacement rate, the more likely is the hiring voucher to be
self-financing. The replacement eﬀect clearly favors hiring vouchers for low-
ability workers.239
Transition Eﬀect: If a hiring vouchers brings a worker back to work,
her human capital appreciates in our model. In our model the human capital
239As insider bargain for the wage, long-term unemployed workers receive the wage of the
respective ability class. Naturally, low-ability workers have the lowest wage.
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appreciation implies that the formerly short- and long-term unemployed have
the same productivity as insiders after one period. As a consequence, their
low hiring probability (ηduαa,t) is exchanged for a considerably higher retention
probability (1−φαa,t). This eﬀect is strongest for long-term unemployed since
they have been most aﬀected by human capital loss. Thus, subsidies enabling
workers to move to a higher productivity class have a bigger long-run eﬀect on
the government budget. Clearly, this eﬀect favors hiring vouchers for long-term
unemployed workers.
Summary: While the last eﬀect is in favor of targeting long-term unem-
ployed, the second delivers an argument for targeting low-ability unemployed
and the first is ambiguous. The intuition is straightforward, hiring vouchers
are more eﬀective, the least skilled/productive the targeted workers are, i.e.
the longer they have been unemployed and the lower their ability is. Which
low-productivity class of workers is the most eﬀective target group for hiring
vouchers for Germany can only determined by our following numerical simu-
lation.
7.4.3 Numerical Results
We simulate our above model for Germany, and compare the eﬀectiveness of
the following employment subsidy policies:
(i) A low-wage subsidy (σl) which is paid (each period) for each low-
wage/ability employee. It will reduce the firing rate, by making employees
more profitable for the firm. Thus, it raises the insider retention incentive,
whereby the firm retains more workers with high operating costs (low produc-
tivity).(see equations (314), (313))
At the same time the hiring rate will increase since the subsidy provides the
incentive to hire more low productivity workers, which would not have been
hired otherwise. (see equations (317), (318) and (320), (321))
(ii) A hiring voucher targeted at low-ability workers (σdul ), which is paid for
hiring unemployed, low-ability workers. Following the same rationale as above,
the firm will hire more workers than without a voucher . In contrast to the
first policy, the firing rate will not be aﬀected since the voucher is only paid
for new hires and not for the entire employment stock.(see equations (317),
(318) and (320), (321))
(iii) A hiring voucher targeted at long-term unemployed workers (σLαa),
which is paid if a long-term unemployed worker is hired. (see equations (320),
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(321))
(iv) A hiring voucher targeted at the low-ability, long-term unemployed
workers (σLl ; see equations (320), (321))
In a first step, we identify the policies which are AWE and compare their
eﬀectiveness. But as noted the self-financing criterion is the limiting factor and
some policies do not satisfy this constraint. While it may not be approximately
welfare eﬃcient, it may nonetheless be desirable for policy makers to prioritize
the employment and welfare creation - without increasing inequality - com-
pared to other government tasks. Then the government allocates a positive
net expenditure to these subsidies, G > 0. Thus, in a second step we exam-
ine the performance of the diﬀerently targeted employment subsidies (i)-(iv)
with respect to the remaining two criteria, given an positive net expenditure
allocation to these subsidies beyond their approximate welfare eﬃciency.
Approximately Welfare Eﬃcient Targeting: Our simulation reveals
that a low-wage subsidy is not an AWE policy for Germany. While a low-
wage subsidy creates more employment and reduces inequity, it is not self-
financing. This result is driven by the deadweight eﬀect and the wage eﬀect,
as described above. Thus, low wage subsidies can only be implemented if the
government is willing to provide extra resources permanently. We will analyze
their performance in this respect below.
Furthermore, our results show that hiring vouchers for Germany can be
self-financing and thereby AWE, depending on the target group.
To determine the most eﬀective employment subsidy, we examine the ap-
proximately welfare eﬃciency of hiring vouchers targeted at the low-productivity
groups, namely at long-term unemployed as well as at the low-ability unem-
ployed, and compare their employment, welfare and equity eﬀects.
For both groups there are two possible options for hiring vouchers (HV):
Option 1: a same lump sum voucher is paid for hiring a long-term un-
employed worker (low- ability worker) irrespectively of his ability class (unem-
ployment duration),
Option 2: a diﬀerent voucher is paid for hiring a long-term unemployed
worker (low- ability worker) depending on his ability class (unemployment
duration).
While option 1 implies a voucher which is self-financing across ability classes
(unemployment duration), option 2 (unemployment duration) is determined to
be self-financing within each ability class (unemployment duration), thereby,
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preventing cross-subsidization across ability classes (unemployment duration).
Targeting Long-Term Unemployed: Vouchers targeted at long-term
unemployed (LTU) workers are AWE for Germany. Table (2) compares the
eﬀectiveness of the two design options by describing their unemployment, wel-
fare240 and equity implications, the latter given by the Gini coeﬃcient.
If a same lump sum hiring voucher is paid for all long-term unemployed
compared to an ability specific payment, the self-financing restriction is hit
much earlier. While only 947 € per worker are AWE in the former case, up to
4390€ (2503€) can be paid for low-ability (medium-ability) workers in the lat-
ter (see figure (9)241). The intuition is straightforward: option 2 fully exploits
the larger self-financing areas for long-term unemployed workers in the low-
ability and medium-ability class, thereby, it prevents costly cross-subsidization.
The self-financing area and thereby, the self-financing, approximately welfare
eﬃcient subsidy decreases with productivity due to a smaller deadweight eﬀect
and the bigger replacement rate eﬀect.
By comparing the results of these two exercises, we can clearly infer that
hiring vouchers of diﬀerent magnitudes for each ability group deliver a supe-
rior eﬀectiveness. They perform better in terms of unemployment reduction,
welfare improvement and inequality reduction. According to our calibration
the long-term unemployment among low-ability workers can be e.g. reduced
by 9 percent "for free,"242 i.e. from roughly 10 percent to 9 percent of all
low-ability workers.
Targeting Low-Ability Unemployed: If a lump sum hiring voucher
is targeted at all low-ability unemployed (LAU) (option 1), there is no self-
financing area at all.
But as shown in figure (10)246 diﬀerentiating the vouchers for short-term
and long-term unemployed workers reveals an approximately welfare eﬃcient
hiring voucher for low-ability workers (4390 €), which though is present only
for long-term unemployed workers. The reason is that short-term unemployed
workers have a higher productivity than the long-term unemployed, thereby
240The welfare of the workforce is calculated as the sum of the utility of the workers over
the various labor market states. See Appendix (7.6.3). A "+" for welfare changes indicates
an increase in welfare. The cross-policy ranking of changes in welfare corresponds to the
ranking of changes in overall unemployment. The utility parameter ξ does not aﬀect the
cross-policy rankings.
241Option 2 vouchers are diﬀerentiated in those for low-, medium- and high-ability.
242Without any bet allocation of government resources to this policy in the long-run.
246Vouchers are diﬀerentiated in those for long-term and short-term unemployed.
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HV for LTU Opt. 1 HV for LTU Opt. 2
1 Subsidy 947 4390 / 2503 / 0
2 Subsidy in % of W 3.7 / 3.1 / 2.2 16.9 / 8.4 / 0
3 % ∆ of LA LTU243 -2.1 -8.9
4 % ∆ of LAU -0.8 -4.4
5 % ∆ of LTU -2.0 -5.9
6 % ∆ of Overall U -0.9 -2.8
7 Change of Welfare + +
8 Gini coeﬃcient244 11.45 11.41
Table 9: AWE HV for LTU workers in design options 1 and 2 and the resulting
unemployment, welfare and equity implications
HV for LAU Opt. 2
1 Subsidy 4390 / 0
2 Subsidy in % of respective wage 16.9
3 % ∆ of Low-Ability Long-Term Unemployment -8.9
4 % ∆ of Low-Ability Unemployment -4.4
5 % ∆ of Long-Term Unemployment -2.9
6 % ∆ of Overall Unemployment -1.4
7 Change of Welfare +
8 Gini coeﬃcient245 11.45
Table 10: AWE HV for LAU workers in design option 2 and the resulting
unemployment, welfare and equity implications
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a higher hiring rate, which implies a higher deadweight eﬀect and a smaller
transition eﬀect. Both impede a self-financing are for these workers.
Clearly, AWE hiring vouchers for long-term unemployed workers - in their
more eﬀective option 2 targeting - nest the AWE hiring vouchers for low-
ability workers - in option 2 targeting -, which is a special hiring voucher for
low-ability, long-term unemployed workers.
Thereby, it is worth emphasizing that thus, for Germany targeting vouchers
at long-term unemployed workers (targeted at the low- and medium-ability
workers) is more eﬀective than targeting low-ability workers.
Overall, it has to be mentioned that the size of the approximately welfare
eﬃcient subsidy depends crucially on the hiring elasticities. We claim that
they can be influenced substantially by policy makers. Designing a successful
subsidy system should include complementary measures247, such as tightening
unemployment benefits or firing costs, improving job placement or increasing
the pressure to accept job oﬀers, to ensure the aforementioned simulated or
even better long run eﬀects.
Employment-Equity Trade-Oﬀ Interestingly, the self-financing hiring
voucher reduces the economy’s unemployment and inequity at the same time.
Thus, a hiring voucher does not face an employment-equity trade-oﬀ. It is
possible to improve at both ends. This is all the more interesting since other
simulated policy measures, such as a reduction of the replacement rate for the
low-ability workers (which are the most unemployment prone) would buy more
employment at the cost of a higher Gini coeﬃcient; thus facing an employment-
equity trade-oﬀ.
Displacement Eﬀects The critical reader may wonder if our results dif-
fer significantly if we consider displacement (and not only deadweight) eﬀects
in our model. The simplest way to incorporate them are short-run decreasing
returns to labor under fixed capital. When labor input is increased by factor
x (with x > 1), under a Cobb-Douglas function Y = AN1−αK¯α we would ob-
tain the following marginal product: ∂Y/∂N = x−α (1− α)AN−α0 K¯α. If the
labor input increases by 1 percentage point (which corresponds roughly to a
1 percentage point reduction of unemployment), the marginal product would
decrease by 0.3 percentage points (assuming a capital share of 33 percent for
Germany, see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). This would reduce the wage
247See Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag and Snower (1998).
176
claim of the insiders, but nevertheless reduce the profit of the firm somewhat.
The AWE hiring vouchers for low-ability, long-term unemployed workers is
reduced from 17 to 15 percent by this exercise. Thus, our results are not af-
fected qualitatively and only slightly quantitatively. Furthermore, we consider
displacement to be rather a short-run phenomenon because capital adjusts in
the long-run.248
Relaxing the Self-Financing Constraint: Approximately welfare eﬃ-
cient policies can contribute to reduce the unemployment, but according to
our calibration they would surely not be suﬃcient to bring Germany back to
full employment. Thus, we analyze the performance of diﬀerently targeted
subsidies, once we go beyond the approximately welfare eﬃcient subsidy.249
We define a policy measure to outperform the other policies if it delivers the
biggest marginal eﬀects in terms of the two remaining policy objectives for a
given additional amount of government spending.
Specifically, we assume that in the long-run the government is willing to
allocate a net expenditure of € 50 (G = 50, per year and per person of the
workforce250) for active labor market policies.251 Note that the gross amount
of money which is additionally allocated to the policies is larger since part
of the additional expenses are financed by additional revenue, generated by
resulting higher employment levels. These expenditures are allocated to the
targeted groups by increasing the subsidy (in equal Euro steps for all targeted
groups) until the (new steady state’s) budget constraint is reached.
Figure (11)253 presents the implications for the government’s objectives un-
employment and inequality of this marginal exercise beyond the AWE subsidy,
comparing hiring vouchers for long-term unemployed (LTU) and for low-ability
248Although our quantitative analysis above omits displacement eﬀects, we consider our
calibration to be rather conservative (with respect to the size of the approximately eﬃ-
cient subsidy). While we used a tax rate (6.9 percent) to balance the budget (financing
unemployment related expenses), in reality other taxe revenue would also increase with
the employment rate. This would raise the self-financing, and thereby approximately eﬃ-
cient subsidy and thus lead to a higher eﬀectiveness (in terms of employment, welfare and
inequality).
249However, we do not calculate a welfare measure for this exercise since the government
either has to cut other spending positions (which may reduce the agents’ utility) or create
government debt (which has to be paid by future taxes).
250The number has to be interpreted as a real value.
251For Germany with a workforce of roughly 40 million, this would amount to about 2
billion Euro. This amount, G might reflect, as noted, a budget deficit or savings in other
areas.
253Vouchers for LTU are diﬀerentiated in those for low-, medium- and high-ability, vouchers
for LAU in those for long-term and short-term unemployed.
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HV for LTU252 HV for LAU LWS
Total Subsidy (% of wage) 51.7/38.5/20.5 64.6 / 47.7 1.5
Additional Subsidy 9033 12363 403
% Marginal ∆ of LAU -7.8 -18.7 -1.5
% Marginal ∆ of LTU -15.1 -11.4 -0.8
% Marginal ∆ of U -7.1 -5.3 -0.4
% Total ∆ of LAU -11.8 -22.3 -1.5
% Total ∆ of LTU -20.1 -14 -0.8
% Total ∆ of U -9.7 -6.6 -0.4
Gini coeﬃcient 11.29 11.38 11.32
Table 11: Unemployment and inequality eﬀects of HV for LTU and LAU
workers - in design option 2 - and LWS beyond their AWE, i.e. with a net
allocation of government expenditure of 50 Euro per worker
(LAU) workers and low-wage subsidies. The marginal unemployment reduc-
tion refers to the approximately welfare eﬃcient steady state, i.e. the steady
state with the respective AWE subsidy, whereas the total reduction is calcu-
lated with respect to the old steady state.254
Employment Eﬀects: For the same two reasons as mentioned above,
low wage subsidies perform worse in reducing unemployment: First of all, the
deadweight eﬀect is quite substantial.
While the hiring voucher targeted at the long-term unemployed is paid
to roughly 2.2 percent of the overall working population, it is almost 13.6
percent for low-wage subsidies; indicating a much larger deadweight for the
latter. Furthermore, as noted, there is a considerable wage eﬀect: the subsidy
is not used entirely to improve the employment incentive of the firm (and thus
increase employment). Part of it goes directly to the employed workers since
it aﬀects the bargaining.
For these two reasons low-wage subsidies underperform in relative terms:
99.7 percent of the recipients get the subsidy, although they would also have
been employed in the absence of a subsidy. The ratio is quite big for hiring
vouchers targeted at long-term unemployed (68.5 percent) as well; nevertheless
considerably smaller. Thus, in contrast to low-wage subsidies, hiring vouchers
(targeted at long-term unemployed, see column one of table (4), or the low-
ability unemployed, see column two) come along with a substantial size per
254Naturally, as low-wage subsidies are not approximately eﬃcient, the marginal reduction
is equal to the overall.
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subsidized worker (for a given net government allocation) and deliver a bigger
employment eﬀect.255
Again, also in this marginal exercise for Germany, the hiring voucher tar-
geted at low-ability unemployed workers is outperformed by the one targeted
at long-term unemployed workers: in terms of the marginal reduction as well as
the overall reduction of total unemployment. Besides the transition eﬀect, an-
other reason can be found in the employment dynamics equation (322). In our
model it is much easier to obtain small employment eﬀects for a given ability
group compared to a large eﬀect, i.e. labor demand elasticities are bigger, the
smaller the marginal expenses are.256 The hiring voucher for low-ability, long-
term unemployed is larger if the given net expenditure is exclusively targeted
at low-ability workers (64.6 percent, see column two of table (1)) compared
to targeting it exclusively at long-term unemployed (51.7 percent, see column
one of table (4)). As a consequence, the labor demand elasticity (in absolute
values) in the former case is smaller than in the latter.
Thus, it is a better strategy to focus a given net expenditure on long-term
unemployed workers in diﬀerent ability classes, compared to restricting the
hiring voucher only to the low-ability unemployed. Our simulation indicates
that a policy which is targeted at long-term unemployed and which has the
aforementioned size could cut long-term unemployment by 20 percent and
overall unemployment by roughly 10 percent.
Equity Eﬀects: While our model shows that hiring vouchers are a much
better instrument to reduce unemployment than low wage subsidies, the answer
is more ambiguous with respect to equity. The Gini coeﬃcient improves for
wage subsidies and hiring vouchers; even somewhat more for hiring vouchers.
But there are two countervailing eﬀects at work:
The low-wage subsidies are targeted at two groups which are at the lower
end of the income scale (low-ability unemployed and employed) and improve
their income via the bargaining mechanism. As the low-ability insiders bid
for a higher wage, the income of the low-ability workers increases (while their
employment increases somewhat too), namely wages and indirectly benefits.
While the hiring vouchers are not as clearly targeted at the "poorest"
255All calculations are based on the new steady state. To provide a fair comparison, the
approximately welfare eﬃcient part of the hiring subsidies is not taken into account.
256This is most easy to see under homogenous labor where the long-run employment is
equal to n = ηη+φ (see chapter 6). The marginal employment eﬀect of an increasing hiring
rate obviously is posive, but decreasing (∂n∂η > 0,
∂2n
∂η2 < 0).
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groups (also hiring of high-ability long-term unemployed is subsidized) and
do not have a direct wage eﬀect, their incentive eﬀect is much bigger. They
improve equality by bringing the long-term unemployed back to work: In con-
trast to that low-wage subsidies do so by putting money in the pockets of
low-income people (without generating much additional employment).
Hiring vouchers for long-term unemployed workers reduce inequality by
more compared to hiring vouchers for low-ability workers, as they have bigger
employment eﬀects.
Low wage subsidies can be considered to be an instrument which is in be-
tween unemployment benefits and hiring vouchers in terms of their employment-
equity trade-oﬀ. While higher unemployment benefits for the low-ability work-
ers can improve equity (giving more money to the poorest in our model: the
low-ability unemployed), they destroy the firm’s employment incentives (via
wage bargaining, as the workers’ fallback position increases) and thus increase
unemployment. For a given budget constraint low-wage subsidies improve
employment incentives only slightly but increase the income of low-income
workers. And hiring vouchers increase employment incentives substantially,
thus reducing inequality by bringing people back into work; thus yielding less
unemployment and more equity at the same time.
7.5 Concluding Thoughts
This chapter has proposed a new criterion for the evaluation of employment
subsidies: approximately welfare eﬃcient (AWE) policies are self-financing and
improve employment/welfare, without increasing earnings inequality. Policies
satisfying this criterion can be expected to be particularly attractive to policy
makers. We have compared various popular employment subsidies on this
basis. Needless to say, approximate welfare eﬃciency is a highly conservative
criterion; policy makers may well wish to implement measures that are not
AWE, but in that case they need to move along an equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ
(viz., they need to sacrifice either employment/welfare or earnings equality257).
Our analysis indicates that the employment policies under consideration ex-
hibit diminishing returns, in that equal incremental increases in each employ-
ment subsidy lead to progressively smaller increases in employment/welfare
and require progressively larger net government expenditures on the subsi-
dies, for a given upper bound on earnings inequality. Once a critical level
257An increase in the net government budgetary allocation for the employment subsidy
would naturally also require such an sacrifice, in an intertemporal sense.
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of each subsidy is exceeded, it is no longer self-financing.258 Furthermore,
for our model, the self-financing constraint becomes binding before employ-
ment/welfare begins to decline or inequality begins to increase. Thus, the
critical subsidy level identifies the magnitude of the subsidy that is maximally
eﬀective, i.e. it creates maximal employment/welfare while remaining AWE.
For a variety of employment subsidies, diﬀering in terms of their target groups,
the maximal employment eﬀects of AWE policies may be calculated, and the
subsidies may be ranked on this basis.
In the context of our labor market model, calibrated for Germany, we have
shown that low-wage subsidies (targeted at low-income/ability workers) are not
AWE, i.e. no positive low-wage subsidies are self-financing. By contrast, hiring
vouchers can be AWE. Our calibrated model lead to an unambiguous ranking
of these hiring vouchers: hiring subsidies for the long-term unemployed are
more eﬀective than hiring vouchers for low-income/ability workers. The same
ranking, in terms of employment, holds for employment subsidies financed
through government expenditures extending beyond the AWE limit.
While these results are striking, it is worth emphasizing that are specific to
our German calibration. Our model permits an analysis of the determinants
of AWE policies. Thus it provides a groundwork for future research comparing
employment subsidies in diﬀerent countries.
258Of course, the critical level can be zero, in which case the subsidy is never self-financing.
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7.6 Technical Appendix
7.6.1 Linearization
Firing Rate: Non-linear equation:
φαa = 1− Γαa
Ã
aIαa − wαa + σαa − φαafαaδ
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢ + fαa
!
, (326)
where σαa is a wage subsidy for ability class αa. Linearization:
φαa,new = φαa,0 −φ Γ
0
αa,0
"
1
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢#
0
(327a)
1
1 + Vαa
" ¡
aIαa,new − wαa,new + σαa
¢
−
¡
aIαa,0 − wαa,0
¢ # (327b)
−φ Γ0αa,0
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¡
1− φαa
¢¢ + 1#
0
1
1 + Vαa
(fαa,new − fαa,0) (327c)
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Vαa =φ Γ
0
αa,0
"
δ
¡
fαa (δ − 1)−
¡
aIαa − wαa
¢¢¡
1− δ
¡
1− φαa
¢¢2
#
0
where variables with subscript "0" are at the old steady and variables with
subscript "new" are at the new steady state.
Hiring Rates: Non-linear equation:
ηSαa = Γαa
⎛
⎝
aE1αa − wαa + σSαa + σαa+
δ(1−φαa)(aIαa−wαa+σαa)−φαafαaδ
1−δ(1−φαa)
− hαa
⎞
⎠ , (328)
where σSαa is the hiring voucher for short-term unemployed workers of ability
class αa.
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Linearization:
ηSαa,new = η
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And equivalently for the second unemployment duration group.
7.6.2 Ability Group Specific Numbers
Replacement Rate: To calculate the replacement rate for each ability group,
we used the net replacement rates from OECD (2006). To obtain ability-
specific numbers, the 67% average productivity worker (APW), 100% APW
and 150% APW were chosen to represent the low, medium and high-ability
group in our model, respectively. For simplicity, we took the unweighted aver-
age across six family types as well as over the initial period of unemployment
and long-term unemployment.
Labor Costs: The aggregate producer wage and gross value added per
worker can be obtained from Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder
(2006).
The aggregate producer wage is defined as the average real gross wage per
employee plus social security payments. We took the 2003 values for real labor
costs (50334 Euros) and gross value added (32672 Euros) since the OECD
numbers which we used for further calculations were only available until this
point in time.
Using the wage equation (109)259, we calculated the average bargaining
259Note that all the calculations are done for ξ = 1 in the utility function (υ(c) = cξ).
This is without loss of generality. The model results for hiring vouchers are not aﬀected at
all by diﬀering ξ, except of course for the welfare calculations, which we show for ξ = 0.5
and ξ = 1. However, for low wage subsidies the wage formation would be aﬀected and thus
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low-skilled medium-skilled high-skilled aggregate
ls 16.6 59.4 24 100
ws 26019 30022 44220 32672
aIs 31179 47012 75069 51109
aE1s 28345 42738 68244 46462
aE2s 22676 34190 54595 37170
Table 12: Relevant labor cost values
power in the economy, where the variables denote aggregate values:
w = (1− µ) rr ∗ w + µ (a+ ρw) (330)
µ =
w − rr ∗ w
a+ ρw − w ∗ rr (331)
We obtain µ = 0.204.
Ability group specific relative labor costs for Germany are calculated as
follows (OECD, 2005c): High-ability workers earn 148 percent of their medium-
ability counter-parts’ wage and low-ability 87 percent, respectively.260 Low-
ability workers’ highest education level is lower secondary education, whereas
it is upper secondary education or post-secondary non-tertiary education for
medium-ability and tertiary education for high-ability.
Assuming that the bargaining power is the same in all ability groups and
using the respective replacement rates261 we get for each ability group αa
aIαa =
wαa −
¡
1− µαa
¢
rrαawαa − µαaρwαa
µαa
(332)
Figure (12) summarizes the relevant values.
7.6.3 Welfare of the Workforce
The welfare (Ω) of the workforce is calculated as the sum of the utility of the
workers over the various labor market states.
the results would change slightly. The cross-subsidy rankings with respect are though not
aﬀected by this specification of the utility function.
260Similar relations can be found in Wienert (2006).
261Furthermore, we assumed that the firing costs are 60 percent of the labor costs, see
Chen and Funke (2003).
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Ωt =
X
αa
υ(wαa,t(1− τ))lαanαa +
X
αa
X
du
υ (bαa)u
du
αalαa (333)
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8 Conclusion
Mankiw (1990) compares the recent developments in macroeconomics to the
Copernican revolution. "Compared to the then prevailing geocentric system
of Ptolemy, the original Copernican system was more elegant and, ultimately,
it proved more useful. But at the time it was proposed and for many years
thereafter, the Copernican system did not work as well as the Ptolemaic sys-
tem. For predicting the positions of the planets, the Ptolemaic system was
superior." (Mankiw, 1990, p. 1646) Almost 20 years after Mankiw has written
these lines, his critique has probably become obsolete. Medium scale models
(e.g., Christiano et al., 2005, Smets and Wouters, 2003) can predict the dy-
namic adjustment paths in response to macroeconomic shock fairly well and
are able to produce similar theoretical impulse response functions as the em-
pirical counterparts from Vector-Autoregressions. Thus, there is no longer a
reason to resort to traditional ad-hoc models due to their better empirical
performance.
However, there are still some parallels to the Copernican revolution. "At
the time, he [Copernicus] mistakenly thought that the planets followed circular
orbits; we now know that these orbits are actually elliptical." (Mankiw, 1990,
p. 1646) The form of the orbits resembles to the microstructure of current
state of the art macroeconomic models. To obtain empirically realistic impulse
response functions, business cycle modelers add several ad-hoc assumption on
a microeconomic level, which cannot be observed in reality, for example, habit
formation, indexation to inflation and artificial timing assumptions.
This dissertation starts (chapter 2) by pointing out the path to modern
macroeconomics and remaining weaknesses. Afterwards (chapter 3), a stan-
dard New Keynesian business cycle model is linearized around a zero inflation
steady state and it is shown that the interaction of price and wage stagger-
ing is complementary in terms of "quantitative persistence." Next, the thesis
analyzes the eﬀects of real wage rigidities on a disinflation, pointing out the
importance of non-linearities, which arise due to the non-superneutrality262
of money in this class of models (chapter 4). These non-linearities are often
ignored in the existing literature.
In the second building block (chapters 5 to 7), a new micro-founded macro-
labor framework is developed and applied to diﬀerent policy problems. We
262Money is neutral if increases in the money supply do not have any permanent eﬀects,
while it is super-neutral if changes in the money growth rate do not have any long-run
eﬀects.
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show that market frictions, such as labor turnover costs and wage bargain-
ing, have important implications for macroeconomic performance and for the
implementation of diﬀerent labor market policies. Many of these market fric-
tions have so far often been analyzed in static framework or they have been
completely ignored, especially by the mainstream New Keynesian literature.
Recently, there is a promising stream of research which combines labor
market frictions and the New Keynesian workhorse model (e.g., Blanchard
and Galí, 2006, Christoﬀel and Linzert, 2005, Krause and Lubik, 2007, and
Trigari, 2004). However, all the aforementioned papers use the mainstream
search and matching equilibrium unemployment approach. As discussed in
chapter 2, the search and matching model is very ad hoc and thus potentially
subject to the famous Lucas (1976) Critique.
In terms of Mankiw’s comparisons to the Copernican revolution, modern
macroeconomic researchers have not only recognized that the Ptolemaic sys-
tem (old neo-classical synthesis) is not superior. They also know that planets
do not follow circular orbits (the existing micro-structure of macroeconomic
models is far from perfect, especially with respect to the labor market struc-
ture). The appropriate micro-structure263 for macroeconomic models remains
a challenging question for future research.
As a consequence, research at the intersection of labor and monetary eco-
nomics can be expected to be very stimulating during the next couple of years.
Hopefully, in a decade from now, macroeconomists will have agree on a more
convincing micro-structure for medium scale macroeconomic models than we
have it nowadays (corresponding to the discovery of the elliptical orbits). A
more comprehensive framework may be useful for the evaluation of a wide set
of diﬀerent policies.
Blinder (1997, p. 17) states: "Having looked at monetary policy from
both sides now, I can testify that central banking in practice is as much art
as science. Nonetheless, while practicing this dark art, I have always found
the science useful." The better economists get the micro-structure of macro-
economic models fixed, the more reliable they will be able to predict welfare
implications and adjustment costs of diﬀerent policies and the more seriously
they will be taken by policy makers. In this sense, an appropriate micro-
263Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose an alternative approach to sticky prices ("sticky infor-
mation"), which is based on slow information dissemination (a detailed analysis goes beyond
the scope of this thesis). For the simulation in a general equilibrium model and the micro-
foundations of "sticky information" see Mankiw and Reis (2007) and Reis (2006a, b). The
fact that firms review prices more often than they change them raises objections against this
approach (see Blanchard and Galí, 2007, and Fabiani et al., 2005).
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structure may be crucial for the relative importance of the components "dark
art" and science, in central banking as well as in other government policies.
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